There are many lessons from Europe’s biggest war in 80 years, but one stands out as absolutely essential. Ukraine has shown time and time again, and with growing frequency, that Russia can dish it out, but can’t take it. Ukraine’s resolve and innovation, its ability to fight and beat Russia, demonstrate its unique value to allied democracies.
If you’re in any doubt about Ukraine’s military power and reach, consider the extraordinary events of recent weeks. Putin and his men have launched countless strikes against Kyiv and other cities, but the heavy Ukrainian response against targets in Moscow, St Petersburg, and elsewhere has shocked a regime that thought it could wage aggressive war without consequences. Meanwhile, Crimea is besieged by Ukrainian Unmanned System Forces.
Russia’s hardline so-called war bloggers now express something between pain and rage that a supposedly inferior enemy can humble the country in this way. President Trump is reportedly “hugely impressed and enthusiastic” about Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign.
All of which has once again exposed the hollowness of the Kremlin’s so-called red lines. As these continue to fade, European governments have greater political freedom to demonstrate their resolve and redefine their approach with Russia.
Across the continent, discussions about a new security system are gaining momentum. Proposals range from a multi-tier NATO to a stronger role for the European Union’s mutual defense clause under Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty, to substitute for the diminishing US presence.
The most comprehensive view is reflected in the three alternatives outlined in a May report from European think tanks chaired by former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö. More Europe in defence – three pathways describes option one as the Europeanization of NATO — a gradual shifting of military, political, and operational responsibilities from the US to European allies, while preserving the alliance as the central framework for collective defense.
The second is “new European multilateralism” — building a coalition of willing states, with decision-making coordinated by a European Security Council and dedicated military structures, capable of acting even if NATO becomes politically blocked or dysfunctional.
The third is deeper, EU-led defense integration, using the bloc’s financial, industrial, and regulatory tools to accelerate capability development, strengthen the European defense-industrial base, while partnering with Ukraine, the UK, and Norway within common defense projects.
While the report argues that deeper integration will be incremental, European Commissioner for Defense and Space Andrius Kubilius has advanced the ambitious vision of a European Defense Union, earlier voiced by Ursula von der Leyen. The Union would be built around the E5 powers — France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom — and might aim to integrate Ukraine and Norway through a new intergovernmental treaty based on Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union.
The idea is in the air. Earlier this year, a concept of the North Atlantic Defense Alliance (Det Nord-Atlantiske Forsvarsforbund, NAFF) was introduced as a de facto security community of states ready to respond to challenges. In its broadest interpretation, this group includes the Nordic and Baltic states (the so-called Nordic-Baltic Eight), Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Ukraine, together with close Indo-Pacific partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.
The challenge facing Europe is not a lack of ideas but the need to address multiple strategic vulnerabilities simultaneously. Europeans must hedge against growing uncertainty surrounding long-term US security commitments—a challenge that may persist regardless of who occupies the White House, as global power becomes increasingly diffuse.
They must reduce dependence on American nuclear deterrence, intelligence and satellite reconnaissance, command-and-control systems, logistics, strategic airlift, ballistic missile defense, electronic warfare (EW), and other critical enablers while rebuilding military capabilities that have atrophied over decades. According to estimates by the Kiel Institute, this would cost about €500bn ($567bn) over a decade.
At the same time, Europe must confront the reality that Russia will remain a security threat regardless of whether Vladimir Putin stays in power, and regardless of how the war ends. The threat from Russia may simply persist with a new dictator in Moscow. And even in defeat, Russia would still harbor imperialist ambitions that might one day ignite another war.
The war against Ukraine has demonstrated that Moscow is not acting alone but benefits from financial and other support from other members of the CRINK bloc (that is, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea). Europe must therefore prepare not only for a long-term confrontation with Russia, but also for strategic competition with a broader coalition of authoritarian powers, including a now-strengthened Iran.
Meanwhile, after 12 years of war on the EU border, Europe still lacks a unified threat perception. For countries on NATO’s eastern flank, Russia represents the primary existential danger. For others, migration, instability in North Africa, climate change, or economic competition with China often rank higher. Building a new security architecture without a common understanding of the threat will prove difficult.
These challenges are compounded by political and economic constraints. Many European leaders remain reluctant to advocate for substantial increases in defense spending amid sluggish economic growth, fiscal pressures, and competing domestic priorities. A future ceasefire in Ukraine may further weaken the sense of urgency.
Meanwhile, competition for defense investment, industrial contracts, military production capacity, and political leadership risks fragmenting rather than strengthening Europe’s response.
Against this backdrop, any future European security system must be able to act rapidly, decisively, and at scale. Institutions alone cannot compensate for the absence of shared threat perceptions, political will, military capabilities, or knowledge of the new doctrines adapted to high-intensity technological warfare.
Repeated exercises and operational assessments have exposed weaknesses in European armed forces when confronted with unmanned system-saturated battlefields, contested electromagnetic environments, and high-intensity attritional warfare. Many European militaries remain optimized for expeditionary operations rather than sustained continental defense. Ukraine has already adapted to the realities of the next generation of warfare.
This is precisely why Ukraine’s role is so important. Any framework designed to deter Russia will be weaker if it excludes the only European country with recent large-scale warfighting experience against the Russian military, one of the continent’s largest armed forces, a rapidly evolving defense-industrial base, and unmatched operational expertise in modern warfare. Is it even sensible to begin thinking about continental defense and security systems without Ukraine at the heart of the conversation?
At the practical level, bringing Ukraine into a new system means maintaining a well-financed Ukrainian military integrated into European defense planning, expanding initiatives such as the Drone Deal and joint defense-industrial projects, developing a common European-Ukrainian air defense system, and boosting a joint anti-ballistic missile initiative.
Ukrainian officers, planners, and innovators should be embedded across European institutions—not merely as advisors, but as contributors to force development and strategic planning. Europe should also institutionalize Ukrainian participation in military education, exercises, and red-teaming activities to ensure that future defense planning reflects battlefield realities rather than assumptions.
A new European defense alliance would allow Europe to get moving on Ukrainian defense integration ahead of either EU enlargement or NATO accession. The objective would be territorial defense, a common defense market, joint capability development, and eventually common structures capable of acting independently when necessary.
Europe currently has only two armies on the continent with extensive experience in modern large-scale warfare: Russia’s and Ukraine’s. One represents the threat. The other is its solution.
Arne Bård Dalhaug is a retired Lieutenant General in the Royal Norwegian Army, President of the Norwegian Defence Association, and Senior Adviser to the Norwegian Atlantic Committee
Elena Davlikanova is a Senior Fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and Sahaidachnyi Security Center. Her work focuses on Ukraine, Russia’s domestic issues, and their effects on global peace. She is an experienced researcher and foresight expert with studies entitled ‘Russia-2032 Scenarios: A decade past the full-scale invasion’ and ‘The War of Narratives: The Image of Ukraine in Media.’
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
