Ukraine, with limited manpower, needs asymmetric advantages wherever they can be found. Innovation is decentralized across many Ukrainian units, and across the country, volunteers, engineers, and soldiers are working hand-in-hand to develop new technology.
But there’s a limit to commanders’ capacity to withdraw soldiers from the front to train them on new kit or send them abroad to scout the best equipment for their needs, so foreigners are helping to bridge the gap.
Bryan Pickens, a former US Army Green Beret who has fought in Ukraine, says that any brigade with a premier drone unit also has tech scouts, while Ukraine’s defense intelligence agency (HUR) also has a group, including foreigners, scouting technologies abroad.
It’s a two-way street — Pickens, who carries out the role for Ukrainian special forces, said he is constantly being asked by Western companies to test their equipment in combat.
Obi, the callsign of a special forces operator from New Zealand who has been fighting in Ukraine since 2022, now spends most of his time evaluating emerging military technology. He works with defense companies and helps determine which systems can give Ukrainian forces an edge.
“A big part of the job involves liaising with foreign companies,” he said. “Many prefer working directly with native English speakers, so we’ve become a useful bridge between foreign manufacturers and the regiment.”
Because of the flexibility of his contract, Obi is also able to travel abroad to seek technologies. “Our role is to identify useful systems, negotiate access to them, and then integrate them into special operations,” he said.
And scouts like Obi are particularly important because they have been operators and so understand their units’ battlefield requirements.
“A commander can fly to Poland and watch a demonstration, but that doesn’t mean they’ll understand how the equipment performs under battlefield conditions,” he said. “Operators know whether a drone solves a real problem, whether it introduces new risks, or whether it needs further development.”
Technology scouts also do more than identify promising systems. They test equipment, provide feedback to commanders, and help integrate technology into frontline units.
Obi said about 90% of his time is spent evaluating and integrating technology, while the other 10% is spent directly employing the systems.
“We can have a greater impact off the battlefield,” he said. “The front already has experienced teams conducting operations. Our job is to find solutions that can help all of them.”
A good example of the influence of technology scouts on the battlefield is the use of mid-range drones, which have led the effort against Russian logistics in the occupied territories. Once the Azov Brigade procured US-designed Hornet drones and became the first unit to link them to Starlink low-orbit satellites, their range quickly grew, catching Russia off guard.
But not all Western companies are as supportive as Perennial Autonomy, the California-based developer of the Hornet.
“Most companies show up with promises, deliver a small batch of donated equipment for testing, and then never return,” said Pickens. They then take advantage of the “combat tested” claim, while selling their equipment elsewhere, he added. “There needs to be honest discussions and follow-through on both sides.”
The war has become one of technological attrition. Innovation cycles, especially with unmanned systems, are often compressed into a matter of weeks, and battlefield tech advances can quickly create windows of opportunity.
As the cost of new technology items falls, the ability to scale cheap and effective systems increases the damage inflicted across the battlefield. Ukraine demonstrated this first with first-person-view (FPV) drones, before going on to build drones that increasingly resemble hybrid missiles.
“Any new technology that extends our reach is a clear advantage,” said Heorhii Volkov, commander of the Yasni Ochi (Clear Eyes) drone unit in 2 Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine.
“Where we have an edge is in management and speed of implementation, while Russia’s advantage is sheer quantity and scale,” he said. “Lasting superiority will depend on how fast ideas are adopted and scaled.”
Yet immediate battlefield demands often mean commanders are unable to devote personnel to finding and developing technology.
“Many commanders are reluctant to expand the number of engineers or technology scouts,” said Pavel Shurmei, commander of the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment. “They think ‘we’re short on drone pilots. The pilots we do have need rotation and relief, so there’s no point in increasing the number of engineers.’”
And when units discover effective systems, they don’t always share the lessons.
“If a unit finds a particularly effective system, they often want to keep it to themselves,” Obi said. “Supply is limited, and units worry about creating logistical shortages if everyone starts demanding the same equipment.”
Moscow has learned many of the same lessons. It established the Rubicon Center to accelerate technological adaptation, though its more centralized model tends to innovate more slowly. Once a capability proves successful, however, Russia can often copy and distribute it across much of its military, as happened with the Iranian-designed Shahed drones.
As the war becomes ever more technological, with innovation cycles speeding up, tech scouts are vital in the constant quest for advantage. And for Ukraine, with its limited manpower, technology from across the globe must shoulder more of the burden.
David Kirichenko is a Ukrainian-American freelance journalist who has been covering Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine since 2022, and is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He can be found on X/Twitter @DVKirichenko.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
