The Ukrainian Armed Forces launched a major organizational reform early in 2025, introducing a corps-based structure. The aim was to establish larger operational formations that bring brigades, artillery, drone units, logistics, and intelligence under a single command.  

Those changes are now bearing fruit as battlefield commanders are encouraged to make their own decisions and cast aside the Russian legacy of reference to faraway senior officers. 

Each corps, operating with greater autonomy, would be responsible for a specified sector of the front. The new structure was designed to improve coordination along a front line stretching more than 1,000km (620 miles), while accelerating decision-making on the battlefield.  

The shift away from a Soviet-style, top-down system toward a more decentralized approach has accelerated significantly since General Mykhailo Drapatyi became commander-in-chief in July. He is bringing much-needed change to the military’s culture. 

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His predecessor, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, sometimes instructed brigade commanders on exactly how and where to fight, down to the coordinates for establishing positions. Drapatyi has adopted a very different approach by focusing on mission command and moving away from the micromanagement that had become a hallmark of Syrskyi’s leadership.  

Instead, he encourages competition among subordinate units, gives their commanders greater autonomy, and expects them to take responsibility for their decisions. He prioritizes professional competence and battlefield performance over personal loyalty, seeking to foster a military culture built on initiative, accountability, and results. 

This cultural transformation is reflected in one of Ukraine’s most capable and battle-hardened formations, the 3 Army Corps, and its Operation Vivaldi, widely considered Ukraine’s biggest military success of 2026. 

The underlying principle is that an army wins not through numerical superiority, but through the quality of its command and control. 

In June 2025, 3 Army Corps deployed to an area of responsibility stretching from Borova to Lyman. Its priority was not simply to make tactical adjustments to improve frontline positions, but to improve force effectiveness. 

The first step was to rebuild trust. Some brigades joined the corps after extremely difficult fighting, having suffered heavy casualties, personnel shortages, and a loss of confidence in their commanders. 

The corps overhauled command-and-control arrangements among its subordinate units, introducing a key principle: commanders must take responsibility for the entire cycle, from training and preparing their soldiers to delivering results on the battlefield.  

To put this into practice, the corps replaced some commanders, restructured headquarters in other units and strengthened the role of non-commissioned officers. 

Ukrainian forces, and 3 Army Corps in particular, have increasingly embraced a mission-command approach that gives subordinate commanders greater freedom to make decisions at their level. 

Rather than having senior commanders dictate every tactical maneuver, the corps delegates decisions on how to accomplish a mission to commanders closer to the battlefield. Brigade and, in some cases, battalion commanders are better positioned to make these decisions because they have a more immediate understanding of local conditions and available tactical options.  

This gives brigades greater autonomy and strengthens their ability to operate independently, while the corps focuses on broader operational objectives. 

Alongside this, 3 Army Corps has placed a strong emphasis on technology to offset Russia’s resource advantage, and is among Ukraine’s leading formations in the use of unmanned ground vehicles and battlefield robotization. During Operation Vivaldi, commanders said unmanned vehicles had taken the place of approximately 6,000 infantry personnel in assault and logistical missions. 

The real advantage lies in how effectively such capabilities are integrated into a unified system. Drones, operators, intelligence, targeting, and strike assets must work together seamlessly, with each action contributing to the broader operational plan. 

Bringing together command-and-control reforms, technological innovation, and organizational changes played an important role in the success of Operation Vivaldi. Although the operation may be difficult to replicate in other sectors of the front because of differences in terrain, logistics, and other constraints, its underlying principles and effective elements can be applied elsewhere. 

The shorter the gap between a problem emerging and its resolution, the more effective a military force becomes. Ukraine can only slow Russian advances and blunt its assaults if its forces continue to adapt, innovate, and make decisions quickly. 

Giorgi Revishvili is a Defense and Security Consultant. He is a former Senior Advisor to the National Security Council of Georgia and was a Fulbright Scholar at the Bush School of Texas A&M. 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

Illustration: An defense technology assembly diagram of a LUCAS drone. Credit: Sara Boyer/Center for European Policy Analysis.
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