Ukraine agreed with the US on March 11 that it will immediately engage in a 30-day ceasefire if Russian invasion forces match the pledge. The US will now speak to the Kremlin about this proposal.
In return for its agreement, the US will resume intelligence sharing and arms supplies to Ukraine, and the two countries will continue talks about the mining of critical minerals.
Edward Lucas, Britain, Author and analyst
The ball is in Putin’s court. Finally.
So far, Western interaction with the Kremlin has resembled a game of tennis, but with a few tweaks. One player — the Russian — always serves. The court is unevenly shaped. The Ukrainian has his shoelaces tied together.
Now it is the other way round. The Kremlin can reject the ceasefire offer. After all, it is winning (albeit at immense cost) the war of attrition. Ukraine is running out of soldiers, and Russia is not. How far is Donald Trump really ready to confront Russia then? The chance is small, but not zero, that he would feel just as stung by Vladimir Putin’s rejection as he did by Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s argumentativeness.
Putin can hit the ball a different way, with a bit of spin. Suppose he says that he likes the ceasefire offer but wants a bit more. A bit of demilitarization. A guaranteed early election (though not in territories the Kremlin controls.) Sanctions relief. The administration might see that as reasonable. More likely, they would go back to the Ukrainians and demand more concessions.
Meanwhile, other clocks are ticking. Dismayed, even disgusted by eight weeks of diplomatic carnage, Europe is bolstering its own defenses and emerging from decades of American tutelage. “We are all Gaullists now” says the Dutch Defense Minster Caspar Veldkamp.
We have more players now. And the rules of the game are changing.
Mikhail Komin, Russian in exile, political scientist
The ceasefire terms largely reflect Washington’s preferences, securing only a temporary pause in hostilities without guarantees for Kyiv.
There are good reasons for the Kremlin to agree since it benefits Moscow far more than Ukraine.
First, a ceasefire would give Russia time to replenish its forces, as its recruitment and weapons production rates outpace Ukraine’s. Second, before formally agreeing, Moscow will likely push Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region (Kyiv is currently losing territory there), which would bury Kiev’s idea of a territorial exchange. Third, Russia will block any future security guarantees for Kyiv during peace talks, threatening to withdraw from the ceasefire to prevent European peacekeepers or discussions of NATO membership.
A further bonus of any ceasefire extended beyond 30 days is an increase in pressure on Ukraine to hold elections — something Moscow favors, as it seeks to remove Zelenskyy. Lastly, by engaging in a US-brokered truce, Russia paves the way for direct talks with Washington, including sanctions relief.
Eventually, after maximizing his gains, Putin will resume the war on his own terms.
Nicolas Tenzer, France, Author and analyst
The Ukrainian negotiators have achieved one obvious gain: the resumption of American aid and intelligence sharing.
President Zelenskyy had stated that he wanted a ceasefire; the Americans took up the proposal as if it was their own. We will now see whether Russia, which will never abandon its intention to subdue or destroy Ukraine, will accept this ceasefire.
Let’s not get too excited. Even if the Trump administration may have been sensitive to accusations of betrayal, it has no reason to give up its ideological alignment with Putin’s Russia.
Washington will likely continue to demand, if there are further negotiations, the ceding of Ukraine’s sovereign territory, so betraying the allies’ commitment to the unconditional defense of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
This would give Putin a license to kill, since we know that in the occupied territories, mass rapes, torture, summary execution and deportations of children — a crime of genocide — are daily occurrences.
Nor does the United States currently accept that Russia’s countless crimes be punished, that it pay reparations, or renounce its hostile position on Ukraine’s entry into NATO or the granting of security guarantees.
If this results in a sham peace, accompanied by a lifting of sanctions against Russia and a resumption of trade, the deal would allow it to rearm, revive its now-shattered economy, and resume war at a later date.
Should this happen, it is to be hoped that the Europeans will oppose such a pseudo-agreement.
Sam Greene, US, Academic and Russia expert
The result in Riyadh is a masterful piece of diplomacy from Kyiv: at the cost of a notional promise to observe a bilateral ceasefire and warm words for the Trump administration, President Zelenskyy restored American military and intelligence support, avoided being locked into a minerals deal in the absence of security guarantees, and put the ball firmly in Moscow’s court. It is hard to imagine a better outcome.
As with all outcomes in contemporary American policymaking, however, Ukraine and her European allies must assume that it will not last. With immediate Russian acquiescence to a ceasefire unlikely to be forthcoming, the White House’s frustration may lead to renewed demands for Ukrainian concessions. Europe, then, must move quickly to help reduce Kyiv’s dependence on Washington, with particular emphasis on intelligence and air defense, thus insulating Ukraine both from Russian attack and American inconsistency.
Nor is there room for complacency when it comes to the Washington-Moscow dynamic. If Putin believes he can catch Europe on the back foot, he may yet agree an unstable ceasefire that keeps Ukraine in peril but locks out a mooted European reassurance force, while engendering a dialogue with the US about sanctions relief. If Europe wants to see a durable and sustainable peace on its continent, leaders will need to kick their own diplomacy into higher gear.
Volodymyr Dubovyk, Ukraine, Academic and analyst
The meeting in Jeddah can be seen, perhaps, as a breakthrough. The question is: a breakthrough towards what exactly?
The main questions remain the same as before the agreement. What will Moscow’s response be? I think that it may play along, pretending that it also wants peace. Is the Trump administration really ready to renew military aid, intelligence and satellite imaging sharing, as was promised? Is it ready to use tougher tactics if Moscow misbehaves? The fear remains that this administration prioritizes a rapprochement with Moscow at the expense of everything else.
Most of all, the core questions are still there: What about security guarantees for Ukraine, the peacekeepers, the role for Europe, further aid to Ukraine (beyond spending the funds remaining from the last aid package)? The real hard work lies ahead.
Eitvydas Bajarūnas, Lithuania, Diplomat
The key question remains over Russia’s willingness to agree and then honor the ceasefire, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio stating, “The ball is now in Russia’s court.”
Pro-war Russian bloggers immediately responded with hostility, some even viewing it as a betrayal by the Americans. The US decision to renew defense supplies/intelligence-sharing with Ukraine has particularly inflamed Russia’s ultra-nationalists.
While the ceasefire does not yet achieve Putin’s long-term goal of controlling all of Ukraine, Russia’s struggling economy and military fatigue might make a short pause useful to the Kremlin.
A crucial external factor will be China’s stance. If Beijing supports a ceasefire agreement, it may pressure Russia to comply.
But there are many elements at play, including Russia’s reaction, European unity, the US commitment to a long-term deal, as well as China’s diplomatic positioning.
Elena Davlikanova, Ukraine, Academic
These negotiations have at least broken the narrative that Ukraine does not want peace. But it still sidesteps major points of disagreement with the US — security guarantees, the status of occupied territories, or elections.
The US aims for a ceasefire and possibly a reset with Russia. But for Ukraine and Europe it’s a chess game, where peace means fortifying against Russia.
Ukraine looks beyond a ceasefire and understands that what’s at play is sovereignty, not territory. The real fight will continue since Russia’s hybrid war will not stop and its strategic aims remain unchanged. The true clash on the peace deal’s specifics is yet to come, making any ceasefire fragile, if even possible.
Federalization, Russian as a second state language, lifting sanctions on the Moscow-run Orthodox church, capping Ukraine’s military or limiting its defense industry, and security guarantees — all of these would represent existential threats. Concessions that weaken Ukraine invite more than Russian aggression — they lay the groundwork for a broader war.
Jan Kallberg, Swedish-born, Cyber academic
Putin, now 72, is not getting any younger and sees as his historic destiny to recreate the Russian Empire, so I have a hard time believing that any ceasefire will eventually lead to a robust and lasting peace.
A peace without a total victory also raises the natural question: was it worth it? A demobilization would send home hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers telling a tale of extraordinary mismanagement and incompetence, death by drone, failed operations, starvation, and massive losses — all of which directly contradicts the regime’s narrative.
A frozen conflict, a prolonged cease fire, or fractional land gain will not be enough to stave off dissent. So, Putin needs a complete surrender and absorption of Ukraine into Russia, otherwise, his regime is at risk of failure. A ceasefire may happen, but Putin’s aims will not change.
Benjamin Schmitt, US, Astrophysicist and geopolitical analyst
The most important element of the March 11 agreement is the immediate restoration of US military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine. That the Trump Administration decided to gamble with the lives of Ukrainian service personnel and civilians by withholding critical aid and intelligence support over the past 10 days was a strategic and moral blunder of the highest order.
As for any ceasefire of 30 days or longer, well, Putin’s Kremlin has repeatedly violated ceasefires during the past 11 years since its initial unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in 2014.
Even if a temporary ceasefire is achieved, it remains vital that no concessions are given to Putin in order to get there, especially on energy sanctions. Remember: beyond Russia’s atrocities in Ukraine, Moscow continues to lead widespread acts of sabotage against energy and critical infrastructure across the NATO alliance, along with its longstanding campaigns of cyberattacks, assassinations, elite capture, and strategic corruption aimed at undermining Western democratic resilience.
There can be no short-term energy or other sanctions relief on the Kremlin, and there can never again be any energy “business as usual.”
Mark Voyger, US, Academic, and former NATO and US Army official
Ceasefires endorsed by the Russian regime do not have a happy history. The lessons of the defunct Minsk 1 and 2 Agreements — how they were abused by the Kremlin between 2014 and 2022 to justify its constant violations of all ceasefires, and ultimately all-out war — must be learned to avoid any repetition of that diplomatic fiasco.
Russia has mastered the art of lawfare, the malicious exploitation of international law, to find hybrid pretexts for war and justify its imperial expansionism.
The legal traps and loopholes that the Kremlin would inevitably insert into any agreement mediated by the US would serve as time bombs that the Kremlin would constantly use to manipulate and disrupt a peace process.
For Russia, the real deal-making begins after its signs an agreement, as it constantly breaks deals to extract more concessions while also laying the blame with the other party.
For the Jedah Process to evade the Kremlin’s lawfare traps and not turn into yet another failed Minsk-type process the US must finally learn the lessons of negotiating with Russia and not force Ukraine to yield to Russia’s demands to achieve “peace for the sake of peace”.
Steven Horrell, US, former US Navy intelligence officer
The resumption of US intelligence sharing to Ukraine is a critical aspect of the US –Ukraine agreement.
The total cutoff of intelligence to Ukraine was among the most shameful anti-Ukrainian actions taken by the Trump administration. Quite simply, withholding indications and warning intelligence of Russian strikes caused needless civilian deaths. And the timing of Russia’s large-scale drone and missile attacks March 6-7 only highlights that withholding intelligence to pressure President Zelenskyy gave Putin free rein.
Ukraine’s own intelligence capabilities are well-honed and admirable, but the US has provided crucial information beyond its capabilities — over-the-horizon insights including warnings of Russian launches, higher-end space-based or highly technical intelligence. It saves lives.
We must also remember that the US and our NATO allies have unquestionably benefited from the capture of Russian weapons by Ukraine. One day, this will save US and NATO lives.
Leon Hartwell, US, Political analyst
Under current conditions, a ceasefire alone will not deliver lasting peace. Warring parties routinely sign ceasefire agreements with no intention of ending the conflict for good. Putin has shown time and again that Russia does not truly want peace with Ukraine, and history is littered with broken promises toward that country.
Without a “hurting stalemate,” security guarantees that are both credible and enforceable, and a deal that safeguards Ukraine’s territorial integrity, any ceasefire will be fleeting at best and dangerous at worst. It would simply buy Russia time to rearm, regroup, and retrain. That is a gamble Ukraine cannot afford.
Elina Beketova, Ukraine, Researcher and journalist
The US-Ukraine talks have brought positive results, including Ukraine a 30-day ceasefire, and resumed US intelligence sharing and security assistance. Next week, discussions on the details of the ceasefire will begin. It’s unclear how or who will monitor the ceasefire and we need to remember that in previous agreements, Russia has broken its word.
Overall, this is a good step forward, but it must also bring progress on the issue of prisoners of war, kidnapped children, and the thousands of civilians held in temporarily occupied territories or Russia.
All the authors are Fellows at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.)
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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