This is the third of a three-part series on China’s relationship with Europe. 

The negative numbers began to cascade across European balance sheets as soon as China entered the World Trade Organization in late 2001.  

But the cost-benefit calculations were not equal for all Europeans. Some nations, such as Germany, initially gained from high-value exports and joint ventures. Others, like Greece and Portugal, faced a surge of low-cost Chinese goods and strategic investments by entities linked to the Chinese state. 

The Chinese economy was barely one-eighth the size of that of the European Economic Community before the People’s Republic embarked on its policy of “reform and opening up” at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978. By 2025, the relative economic weight of China and the European Union was almost equal.  

Together they account for about a third of world trade. In 1975, their bilateral trade was worth about €2bn ($2.2bn) annually; 50 years later, it was €2bn a day, according to figures compiled for the Institut Jacques Delors.  

By any measure, it should have been a success story. But the two were not playing on the same field. State subsidies in China, ranging from concessionary land deals to direct financial aid and favorable local taxation, handed Chinese firms a competitive advantage which added to their low labor costs.  

A thicket of protectionist rules and non-tariff barriers to entry frustrated foreign enterprises and channeled investment into joint ventures tied, inevitably, to forced technology transfer.  

The EU trade deficits with China climbed remorselessly, from €39.6bn in 2001 to peak at €397bn in 2022 after the Covid-19 pandemic, before settling above €350bn annually. While the EU maintains a surplus in services, it is only in the tens of billions.  

Get the Latest
Sign up to receive regular emails and stay informed about CEPA's work.

New infrastructure accelerated the flow of exports. While Chinese goods had to be shipped or flown to the United States, they could be loaded onto trains to Europe, cutting the transit time from more than a month to less than two weeks, avoiding bottlenecks and crisis points. Traffic on the railway link multiplied almost tenfold in the last decade. 

At the same time, China’s leaders redirected their own investments abroad from buying fixed assets, like ports and factories, into new plants built to get around tariffs on electric vehicles and similar items. The Communist Party encouraged rapid growth in research and development, no longer content to copy and to sell. It meant to originate and to own the value in new products. 

China’s patent filings now dwarf those by the EU, its universities regularly outrank their European counterparts, and Chinese academics lead the world in scientific publications. In short, a juggernaut was coming for the workplaces and welfare systems of Europe. The response has been episodic and ineffective. 

In 2003, the European Commission declined to recognize China as a market economy, prompting ire in Beijing. The next year, the two made a customs co-operation agreement and pursued “dialogues” on tricky subjects like intellectual property and industrial policy.  

A decade later, the EU changed its anti-dumping regulations to stay compliant with its WTO obligations but still refused to define China’s economy as playing by market rules. 

By then, Xi Jinping was settled in power, having taken all the great offices of the Chinese system between 2012 and 2013. Xi encouraged engagement on big-picture issues like climate change, but his focus on exports and technology acquisition was relentless.  

Meanwhile, waves of repression inside China created political barriers, notably to a bilateral agreement on investment which foundered amid strident criticism in Europe of the human rights abuses against the Uyghur Muslim minority in the far west of China.  

Such protests were never likely to move the Chinese leader. They merely encouraged him to grow economic ties with Russia and countries in what China was soon calling the “Global South.” The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, followed by EU economic sanctions, deepened the dependency between Moscow and Beijing.  

Their bilateral trade almost doubled as Russian oil and gas fueled Chinese factories and Chinese-made electric cars poured into the Russian market. 

European leaders found that the political climate turned hawkish; Europe found itself caught between trade wars, a new strain of assertiveness in Chinese politics and the search for a balance between co-operation and rivalry, both between China and the West and within the EU.  

The Chinese decision starting in April 2025 to restrict exports of rare earths, valuable minerals for manufacturing everything from catalytic exhausts to pharmaceuticals, in reprisal for President Donald Trump’s tariffs, shocked business and political elites. 

The “second China shock” has hollowed out the German industrial belts, forcing Berlin to move closer to the French preference for tariffs and barriers. By some counts in the German media, the country is losing more than 10,000 industrial jobs a month, fueling support for the right-wing AFD party, while France is struggling with its public debts. 

In October, the two nations submerged their differences to write to the European Commission, urging it to use the trade weapon against competitors who exploited state subsidies and undervalued currency to destroy their rivals. There is also talk of diversifying supply chains and a “buy Europe” policy. The letter did not name names, but everyone knew the target was China.  

The proposed “second strike” capacity aimed at imposing duties on countries that retaliate when the EU imposes trade measures is an escalatory step that has uncomfortable echoes of nuclear deterrence doctrine. In Beijing, the Ministry of Commerce is unsheathing its own weapons and already talks of countries harming themselves by “wrong steps.”  

The scene is set for a showdown of some kind. It is a far cry from the hopes of 2001. 

Michael Sheridan is a veteran British foreign correspondent and is the author of ‘The Gate to China’, an acclaimed history of Hong Kong, and ‘The Red Emperor: Xi Jinping and His New China’, which is published by Hachette Books and has been translated into a dozen languages, including Ukrainian, Polish, and Japanese. 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

Illustration: An defense technology assembly diagram of a LUCAS drone. Credit: Sara Boyer/Center for European Policy Analysis.
Comprehensive Report

Unleashing Defense Innovation

By CEPA International Leadership Council

Building a future-capable force.

May 5, 2026
Learn More
Europe's Edge
CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.
Read More