This is the second of a three-part series on China’s relationship with Europe.

At first, necessity was the mother of partnership between European commerce and the People’s Republic of China. At Swiss business schools, the example of Schindler, the elevator maker, remains a keynote study.

In 1979, the Swiss company became an early joint venture partner with China, even though it had ties with Jardine Matheson, the Hong Kong-based trading house associated with the opium trade of the 19th century. The reason: China had a housing crisis. It was expanding skyward because a growing population required tower blocks.

The country lacked sophisticated technology and had to shop abroad. Eventually, the Swiss firm won out over Japanese and American competitors. Politics played a part. Switzerland had recognized the People’s Republic in 1950, and it was a neutral power. Today China has a giant domestic elevator industry of its own plus joint ventures with, among others, Kone of Finland and Hitachi of Japan.

China also needed cars. It made a deal with Volkswagen and by the spring of 1983 a version of the VW Passat, renamed the Santana, was plying the roads. Its angular style became a symbol of a revolution in private transport. The cars were manufactured by Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive, today known as SAIC, in a joint venture with the German firm and local investors. Today SAIC is a leader in the field of electric vehicles and batteries.  

In aviation, Airbus pioneered joint venture manufacturing, outlasting a venture by the US plane maker McDonnell-Douglas and paving the way for profitable European exports of engines and technology, which remain strong despite China’s drive to build a commercially viable civil airliner of its own.

These stories exemplified the optimism in Europe which accompanied China’s membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) from 2001 and drove trade deals and foreign direct investment through the early years of this century. It was, as the Hong Kong representative in Geneva had said, “win-win.”

The early signs of strain emerged in disputes over patents and ownership. Chinese officials regularly spoke of “technology transfer” as a good which would serve both sides. It became a condition of doing business in certain fields. Multinational country managers, often keen primarily to expand their footprint in China, would assure head offices that their Chinese partners could be trusted.

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Meanwhile, low-cost Chinese manufactured goods poured into European markets under the tariffs agreed on entry to the WTO. Initially confident of their negotiating power as a bloc, the Europeans refrained from resorting to rhetoric about trade wars or dumping. The Chinese export wave, known today as the China Shock, was seen by specialists as a transitional phenomenon that would eliminate itself through the magic of free trade.

Today’s leader, Xi Jinping, watched from a critical vantage point as the manufacturing and export boom in China turned a pariah state into an economic powerhouse that had foreign governments, banks and corporations knocking on its door. His fortunes, indeed, advanced with the country’s renaissance.

Xi’s career took off in the coastal province of Fujian, which stood at the forefront of China’s export zones. It received a flood of investment from Taiwan, whose manufacturers realized that instead of trying to sell goods into the Chinese market, they should make things cheaply in China to sell to others. This was the trick that turned the world economy inside out.

At some point during this period, party elders decided to favor Xi Jinping as a rising official whose consciousness of the value of trade was matched by his cautious disposition. In China, the consensus remained that prosperity and peace were indivisible (which also lowered the risks of any adventure to seize Taiwan).

When Xi moved up the hierarchy to vice president in 2008, he visited a slew of European nations as he worked to understand foreign countries and to grow into the top role. He, too, was being auditioned: he met Joe Biden, then also vice president. For all the courtship of Europe, it was the United States which mattered most to China.

That is why the financial crisis in the West of 2008 dealt such a blow to Chinese reformers. It broke out in the American credit markets and then spread to Asia. The economic slowdown was the most serious problem the Chinese regime had faced in the new century. Exports collapsed by a fifth, foreign investment slowed, domestic consumption fell, and thousands of factories closed, leaving between 10 and 20 million workers jobless. The blow fell most heavily in the coastal export zones where Xi had made his name and the global trade experiment was at its height.

The crisis almost consumed the administration of President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. The technocrats rallied the central bank, raided currency reserves and threw the power of the state behind a $500bn stimulus package that poured funds into high-speed trains and urban infrastructure, reforming the tax system and doling out credit.

It was the zenith of pragmatic managerialism in China, but the legacy would be more Communist Party control, a taste for intervention in markets and an iron determination on the part of Xi Jinping that China would never again be subject to the shocks of international capitalism.

Facing down America and balancing Chinese economic interests with Europe would be his mission.

Michael Sheridan is a veteran British foreign correspondent and is the author of ‘The Gate to China’, an acclaimed history of Hong Kong, and ‘The Red Emperor: Xi Jinping and His New China’, which is published by Hachette Books and has been translated into a dozen languages, including Ukrainian, Polish, and Japanese.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

Illustration: An defense technology assembly diagram of a LUCAS drone. Credit: Sara Boyer/Center for European Policy Analysis.
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