This is the first of a three-part series on China’s relationship with Europe.
In the 1990s, the shadow of Tiananmen Square fell across Europe’s trade relations with China. The massacre of protesters in 1989 marked a return to dictatorship and wiped out hopes of political reform. European firms drew back, an arms embargo was imposed, and political pressure grew to isolate “the butchers of Beijing.”
Yet by the end of the decade China had swept triumphantly into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), its economy was growing fast, and the world was at its door as a new word, “globalization,” set the agenda at every corporate summit.
To reconstruct the turnaround, a historian must first identify the political personalities behind it. Even as the blood was hosed off Tiananmen — and while the future President Xi Jinping’s wife, the singer Peng Liyuan, serenaded the martial law troops — many Chinese leaders knew they had made a terrible blunder.
They included Xi Jinping’s father, the twice-purged army veteran Xi Zhongxun, who paid homage in public to the “wise” and “resolute” decision to suppress “a counter-revolutionary riot” but in private mourned the setback to economic reform.
Xi Zhongxun himself had taken charge of the southern powerhouse of Guangdong, turning it into a workshop for the world that drew in foreign investment through the 1980s. He was one of the kingmakers who influenced the choice of China’s next leaders after 1989.
The new faces were two men who had stepped up from the coastal trading metropolis of Shanghai. Jiang Zemin, the Communist Party boss in Shanghai, a Soviet-trained engineer, became President and leader of the party. Yet the key figure turned out to be a dynamo called Zhu Rongji, the city’s mayor, a sharp-witted technocrat born in 1928. In succession, he became governor of the central bank and prime minister.
The duo had overseen a peaceful end to mass protests in China’s commercial capital at the time of Tiananmen. There was no massacre in Shanghai. Instead, Zhu went on television to issue a grim warning, and the authorities deployed police and militia to quieten the demonstrations slowly. Shanghai was soon back in business. European companies were in the first wave of investors in the city’s new financial district of Pudong.
Both leaders were determined to open China up to the world economy, defying vocal opposition from leftists in the party. Their campaign can be traced through the archives of the WTO in Geneva, an invaluable guide to the negotiations.
As early as 1986, China had applied to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but the major trading powers had decided to transform the GATT into a new body that would govern services as well as trade from January 1, 1995.
It was too soon for China to join the new World Trade Organization at its birth, but negotiations began in earnest. The EU formed a negotiating bloc in rounds of bilateral talks between China and all its partners, which the WTO would then orchestrate into a package.
Accession was vital to China, as Zhu Rongji argued in party councils. In 1993, for example, the People’s Republic recorded a trade deficit of more than $12bn, due to the cost of imports for modernization. At the same time, China’s foreign trade had soared to $195bn from $20bn in 1978, the start of the “reform and open up” era.
John Bond, the chairman of HSBC Holdings, heard Zhu speak and realized that the Communist cadre had posed a modern version of the famous “Needham Question” raised by the Cambridge polymath, Joseph Needham, of why modern science had enjoyed a meteoric rise in Europe but not in China.
“How can 22% of the world’s population account for less than 4% of the world’s GNP?” Bond asked.
The WTO documents show the intricacy and the scale of that challenge. The rewards were obvious. In the five years after 1990, Guangdong Province, the former fiefdom of Xi Jinping’s father, saw an expansion across key industries of 40% every 12 months, according to the official Statistical Yearbook for 1996.
Formidable obstacles remained. Zhu Rongji fought battles in Beijing to push through a 1994 package of changes to banking, finance, taxation, investment, foreign exchange and foreign trade. The working party in Geneva met behind closed doors 21 times between March 1996 and September 2001.
The Europeans pressed hard on intellectual property, copyright protection, patents, trademarks (matters of great concern to Germany), test data, trade secrets, government procurement, minority shareholder rights, and judicial remedies. The WTO working party report alone ran to almost 200 pages. In the end, Europe had a deal.
The fate of China was put into American hands. Between September and December 2001, the Clinton administration waged cliff-edge negotiations with the Chinese that remain controversial to this day. A myth has grown that China was ushered into the WTO by vested interests pushing a globalization and free trade agenda. The record shows that China’s road to accession was, in fact, long, painstaking and hard-fought.
The final agreement imposed harsher conditions on China than any other nation when its membership became formal on December 11, 2001. It ran to 1,500 pages and weighed 13 kg (29 lbs.). Zhu Rongji saw his country become the world’s second largest economy, the biggest exporter, and the world’s largest holder of foreign currency reserves. He died earlier this year.
“It was win-win,’ said the Hong Kong representative in Geneva from 1994 to 2002, Stuart Harbinson. “That was the conventional wisdom.”
Michael Sheridan is a veteran British foreign correspondent and is the author of ‘The Gate to China’, an acclaimed history of Hong Kong, and ‘The Red Emperor: Xi Jinping and His New China’, which is published by Hachette Books and has been translated into a dozen languages, including Ukrainian, Polish, and Japanese.
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