This article forms part of a CEPA series on the new strategic landscape in the Arctic.
“High North, low tension” is becoming a comforting slogan rather than a credible strategy. Russia’s war on Ukraine, NATO’s northern enlargement, and growing Russia-China cooperation have eroded Arctic exceptionalism.
A conventional Russia-NATO war is not inevitable, but Moscow is likely to continue using sabotage, cyberattacks, electronic interference, and provocations to challenge sovereignty and test allied resolve. The alliance’s challenge is to defend the High North against aggression deliberately kept below the threshold of war.
Moscow’s Arctic strategy centers on protecting its nuclear deterrent, controlling the Northern Sea Route, and restricting NATO’s access to sensitive Russian territory. The Kola Peninsula, which abuts Norway and Finland and is home to key Northern Fleet and sea-based nuclear assets, is central to these objectives.
The war in Ukraine has weakened some of Russia’s conventional capabilities, while Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession has heightened Moscow’s sense of exposure, a combination that may encourage greater reliance on asymmetric operations.
Moscow is also eager to divert Western attention and resources away from Ukraine by generating pressure elsewhere. A conventionally weakened Russia does not necessarily mean a safer Arctic.
One reason is that vast distances, harsh weather, and sparse infrastructure make Arctic disruption by Moscow difficult to detect and expensive to repair.
Underwater cables are particularly vulnerable. In September, NATO ships prevented a covert Russian operation near Svalbard involving GUGI, Russia’s specialized deep-sea directorate, and critical cable infrastructure. No damage was reported after the ships involved were confronted by NATO vessels, but the incident illustrated the potential for strategic disruption.
The threat also extends onshore: arson and sabotage against ports, fuel depots, power infrastructure, and logistics hubs could disrupt civilian services and NATO reinforcement, while the use of proxy actors would further complicate attribution.
GPS jamming, spoofing, and cyberattacks offer similar leverage. Russia could also adapt tactics used on NATO’s eastern flank, including drone incursions into allied airspace, to test surveillance, response times, and political resolve in the Arctic.
NATO’s 2026 Resilience Baseline Requirements recognize these interconnected vulnerabilities, and coordinated electronic, cyber, and physical attacks could magnify their consequences.
Research ships, fishing vessels, and commercial platforms can also provide cover for surveillance or sabotage preparations, and suspicious behavior around critical infrastructure demands scrutiny. Analysts have warned that hostile states use commercial and scientific operations as cover for threat activities in the Arctic.
Svalbard in particular combines physical vulnerabilities with political pressure, and the Kremlin is using historical narratives, information operations, maritime pressure, and legal ambiguity to challenge Norwegian authority.
Elsewhere, Moscow can exploit disputes over resources, environmental protection, and indigenous rights. While these concerns are legitimate, the threat lies in their deceptive manipulation and use to divide allies.
Greenland presents a related challenge. Its geography, missile-warning infrastructure, and minerals make it strategically valuable, and the new US–Denmark–Greenland agreement combines an expanded American military presence with recognition of Danish sovereignty and Greenlandic self-determination.
China adds another dimension. Growing Sino-Russian military and maritime cooperation in the Arctic is well documented, though their interests differ. While Moscow prioritizes control, Beijing wants access. NATO must take their cooperation seriously.
Retreating sea ice has increased accessibility, but also exposure, and more traffic and infrastructure brings greater risks of accidents and confrontation. Unlike many other theaters, Arctic hybrid incidents may occur close to strategic nuclear forces, for whom a disrupted cable or satellite facility could be misread as preparation for a wider attack.
For the Baltic states, this is no distant problem. North Atlantic reinforcement routes, Russia’s northern forces, and the Baltic theater form a connected strategic landscape. Defending the Baltic region and securing the High North are increasingly the same task.
A stronger military posture is necessary, but troops alone cannot counter sabotage or electronic interference. NATO must detect hostile activity, withstand disruption, and impose consequences.
For this task, Arctic-capable uncrewed systems can expand surveillance and improve early warning.
Infrastructure protection, backup networks, and rapid repair also require cooperation with private operators and allied exercises testing simultaneous physical and cyber disruption.
The decisive requirement is political, and will need to come through faster intelligence sharing, joint assessments, and pre-agreed response options. Diplomatic, economic, law-enforcement, cyber, and military instruments must give Allies choices beyond passive endurance or escalation.
Uncertainty cannot become a permanent excuse for inaction.
Equipment and logistics need to suit Arctic conditions, and crisis communications must help manage the risks near nuclear assets. Together, these measures should deny Moscow the expectation that hybrid aggression is cheap and safe.
The Baltic, Central and Eastern European experience makes clear that recognizing hybrid aggression is not the same as deterring it. NATO’s defining Arctic test will be its response to an incident too serious to ignore, yet deliberately kept below the threshold of war.
If that threshold becomes a shield against consequences, Moscow will keep exploiting it.
What, then, should NATO do next?
Three areas deserve a closer look without delay: satellite services and ground stations; access to critical infrastructure; and the ports, airfields, and fuel facilities on which northern reinforcement relies. They could all create opportunities for coordinated disruption during a crisis.
NATO should examine where Russian probing or Chinese commercial and scientific access could expose these vulnerabilities, and whether allies could sustain operations if several vital nodes failed at once.
Eitvydas Bajarūnas, a former Lithuanian Ambassador to Sweden, Russia and the UK, is a member of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in Brussels and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
This article was funded by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. CEPA maintains strict intellectual independence over all publications and projects. Opinions, arguments, viewpoints, and conclusions expressed in this work do not represent those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
