The supply of US arms to Ukraine was a defining feature of the last administration. One of its final acts was to meet the allied coordinating group in Ramstein on January 9 to agree additional support. Whether that will win the Trump administration’s full-hearted endorsement is another matter.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said there will be another meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) in February, and there are unspent US funds available.
The Biden administration announced $500m for Ukraine at the January meeting, leaving around $3.8bn allocated for Ukraine but unused. These funds pertain to military equipment being sent to Ukraine from the US stocks through the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA.)
There have been some tentatively optimistic signs. The Trump team has abandoned talk of ending the war in 24 hours, which would only have been achieved by terminating all aid and supporting Russia’s claims (and even this would not have ended the fighting if rejected by Ukraine.) It now mentions six months as the likely timeframe. Trump will not disengage US support for Ukraine, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said on January 9, having met the President-elect.
The Ramstein coordinating mechanism has marshaled the work of around 50 democracies to aid Ukraine in fighting Russia’s war of aggression. The military assistance has been huge — if not always timely — and has helped revitalize Western defense manufacturing; US 155mm shell output alone has grown by 178% since 2022.
Under the supplemental law of April 2024, the White House was authorized to send Ukraine existing military equipment worth $7.8 bn (not to mention the additional authority, which became available after accounting errors worth $6.2 bn and $2.1 bn revealed by the Department of Defense).
Fearing that Donald Trump might cut-off aid to Ukraine immediately, the Biden administration publicly promised to use all of the remaining PDA funds before the new President entered office. It failed to do so.
This is unsurprising, once again highlighting long-understood problems in the US security cooperation domain: bureaucratic procedures, as well as the slow acquisition and replenishment of depleted stocks.
Should the new administration keep providing military support to Ukraine, it will have to address these issues.
But while team Trump might use the remaining funds approved by Congress, there is currently no discussion at all of a new aid package. The remaining $3.8bn will not last long.
Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the US has played a key role in coordinating international military aid to Ukraine within the Ramstein format — both by symbolically guiding partners on the political level and by taking the lead in coordinating the technical aspects of the deliveries.
Uncertainly over Trump has generated action in Europe. The continent’s NATO members have been preparing to take the leading role in coordinating military assistance to Trump-proof Ukraine aid.
The 2024 NATO summit in Washington agreed a new system, called the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), to replace the former International Donor Coordinating Center (IDCC.)
While Ramstein serves as a political platform, NSATU focuses on the technical aspects, such as logistics, training, and other support. It was reported to have become fully operational in December, although according to some of the author’s sources the unit is yet to be staffed.
There remain issues to resolve. NSATU’s predecessor was dogged by understaffing, a lack of resources, and constant turnover of personnel due to short-term rotations. Additionally, many of NSATU’s functions are still handled by US personnel, many of whom split their time between this work and US European Command.
Countries participating the in the UDCG divided responsibilities within eight capability coalitions aimed at supplying a particular type of military equipment and training to Ukraine. These include air force, armor, artillery, demining, drones, integrated air and missile defense, IT, and maritime security coalitions.
Apart from providing aid, the coalitions aimed to build Ukraine’s long-term capabilities and help Ukraine’s army meet NATO standards. At the last Ramstein meeting, coalitions presented their roadmaps for developing Ukraine’s armed forces through 2027, in line with the Ukraine Compact commitment signed at the Washington summit last year.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has developed a strong framework for cooperation with the capability coalitions. Work is still needed however to avoid duplication of the coalition efforts and NSATU, and how to integrate the two in terms of organizational structure and personnel.
Regardless of the Trump administration’s future policy, one thing is absolutely clear — Washington will expect Europe to take on a much greater share of the burden in defending the continent, including the defense of Ukraine. We will be hearing a lot more about these European-led efforts in the coming months (and perhaps years.)
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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