Since the launch of the full-scale invasion, Russia has deployed more than 10,000 strategic and operational-tactical missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and about 29,000 glide bombs against Ukraine, destroying lives and vital civilian infrastructure.
The Kremlin has disabled or destroyed around 90% of the capacity of Ukraine’s thermal power plants, 60% of hydroelectric facilities, and occupied Europe’s biggest nuclear reactor. The total damage now amounts to $56bn and will require extensive rebuilding and repairs. Ukraine will have to rely on its neighbors for supplies and is bracing for a winter with energy possibly rationed to two hours a day. It will be extremely hard to fight Russia without reliable energy supplies.
There is only one way to fix this developing disaster — help the Ukrainian armed forces with more air defense missiles to intercept Russian rockets, and/or station NATO anti-missile units on the western border to help shoot them down. The alternative is a serious degradation of Ukraine’s military abilities and a humanitarian catastrophe.
Despite sanctions that briefly impeded missile production, the Russian arms industry has rebounded. Production of ballistic and cruise missiles, deep strike drones, and glide bombs has significantly increased in 2024 compared to last year, with missiles up by about 50%, Iranian-designed Geran-2 drone output doubling, and glide bombs surging by 260%, according to the author’s Ukrainian government sources.
With the support of its Western allies, Ukraine expanded its arsenal of short-, medium- and long-range air defense systems, integrating effective Western surface-to-air systems with Soviet-era munitions to establish a robust network.
The Ukrainian Air Force learned to intercept all types of missiles, but since January the scale and complexity of Russian missile and drone combined attacks has evolved, with a cumulative effect on Ukraine’s capacity to resist.
It had exhausted its supply of guided anti-aircraft missiles for its most effective systems by May. With the swift supply of SAMs, some of them now arriving, the Air Force’s capacity to counter air attacks should be stabilized in the short term, but it won’t eliminate the continuing need for other air defense systems.
While F-16 fighter jets are long overdue, Ukraine is in urgent need of additional Patriot, NASAMS, and IRIS-T systems. They are crucial for deterring Russian aviation near the frontlines and establishing defense against cruise and ballistic missile strikes deep into Ukrainian territory.
As the frontline is stretched by Russia’s cross-border assaults it is increasingly difficult for Ukraine to protect both its frontline positions and its vital civilian infrastructure.
The air and ground forces urgently need short-range air defense missile systems like SA-8 Gecko, SA-13 Gopher (9K35 Strela-10), Aspide, Stormer HVM, and VAMPIRE. They are essential for protecting troop concentrations, air force infrastructure like airfields, and long-range air defense systems as part of a layered defense.
To achieve comprehensive airspace security, Ukraine requires 25 Patriot systems, each equipped with six to eight batteries, according to President Zelenskyy, an urgent need also spelled out by Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba whose short-term goal is seven Patriot systems. Even finding those seven has remained challenging, although Germany announced on June 11 that it would send a third system, along with IRIS-T and Gepard systems plus ammunition.
Romanian President Klaus Iohannis expressed a willingness to provide a Patriot system, contingent on reciprocal benefits, while Germany is exploring options to acquire more from allied states. But progress is painfully slow.
Underlying the West’s sluggish response is the stark reality that NATO is underequipped to defend its own borders from Russian attack. The bloc’s internal calculations show it has only 5% of the air defense capability it needs, the Financial Times reported.
Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) are also vital for Ukraine. These affordable and readily available armaments would broaden the range of targets fire groups could destroy, enhancing their role as a separate tier of air defense.
Meanwhile, NATO states could extend their air defense coverage to Ukraine. This strategic decision would allow Kyiv to relocate its air defense systems and provide closer protection to frontline areas and critical infrastructure, bolstering overall regional security.
Ukraine does not have time to wait for a change in the West’s strategic vision, it urgently needs to secure control of its airspace now.
The costs of not intercepting missiles far exceed the expense of intercepting them. Ukrainians are currently paying for past miscalculations of many governments (remember the 1994 Budapest Memorandum?), not just their own. The failure to assist now will have implications for the whole continent. Where do you think Ukraine’s cold and vulnerable people will be forced to go if their country lacks light and warmth?
Elena Davlikanova is a Democracy Fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.) She is an experienced researcher and in 2022 was co-author of ‘The Work of the Ukrainian Parliament in Wartime’ and ‘The War of Narratives: The Image of Ukraine in Media.’
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
War Without End: Deterring Russia’s Shadow War
Either Europe will continue allowing Russia’s shadow war to set the terms of escalation, or it will act now to prevent a larger war.
CEPA Forum 2025
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
