In any direct confrontation, European critical infrastructure would almost certainly become a target of the Kremlin’s long-range strikes, as it sought to degrade the continent’s warfighting capacity and population’s will to resist. 

One underappreciated vulnerability in Europe’s economic system is Norway’s natural gas infrastructure. Since 2022, Norway has replaced Russia as the continent’s main supplier, delivering 89 billion cubic meters to the European Union in 2025, almost one-third of the bloc’s gas imports and more than half of its pipeline supply. 

Russia’s share of EU gas continues to decline, while geopolitical volatility is making several other non-EU suppliers, foremost the US, less attractive. Norway’s role can be expected to grow further, both in its share of supply and political weight. 

Dependence on Norwegian gas is particularly high in Germany, the continent’s industrial powerhouse, whose factories are critical to European rearmament. In 2025, Norway supplied 44% of German gas imports, and industrial customers accounted for 60% of German gas consumption. 

The gas provides heat for metalworking, feedstock for ammonia and nitric acid used in explosives and propellants, and some of the electricity that keeps production lines running. 

This critical role makes Norway’s gas infrastructure a high-priority Russian target.  

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Most attention so far has focused on the threat of sabotage, notably against undersea infrastructure and gas pipelines. Since October 2023, for example, at least 11 undersea cables in the Baltic Sea have been damaged, several in circumstances suggesting deliberate acts.  

Sabotage that can be denied, however, is limited in scale, and the damage caused so far has been repaired relatively quickly. The Baltic connector pipeline between Finland and Estonia was ruptured in October 2023, most likely by a “dragged anchor,” and was back in operation six months later. 

War would remove all restraint, and in a conflict lasting more than a few weeks, Norwegian gas would be critical to sustaining Europe’s defense. Russia would be very likely to attack it. 

The Kremlin would correctly assume that strikes on critical European assets could lead to retaliation against its own infrastructure, as is currently the case with Ukraine, but that prospect has not been a deterrent and is unlikely to be one in a war on NATO. 

And it would not need to attack the entire system. Although Norway’s gas infrastructure appears dispersed, it converges on a few points. The Troll gas field alone, exploited chiefly through the Troll A platform and supported by two further platforms, accounts for about a third of the country’s gas production.  

Around 40% of Norwegian gas exports pass through a single processing plant at Kollsnes, west of Bergen, while Kårstø, further south, hosts the largest gas processing plant of its kind in Europe. 

A handful of accurate hits on compressors or processing units at these sites could therefore remove a large share of gas exports. The plants would not need to be destroyed outright, as disabling them for a prolonged period would create pressure by forcing importers to use their stored reserves. 

If strikes on gas infrastructure were combined with strikes on gas storage, a vulnerable target frequently attacked in the Ukraine War, critical shortages could emerge within weeks, slowing Europe’s wartime industrial production and threatening its sustainment. 

Moscow has the long-range strike arsenal to threaten this infrastructure effectively. Air-, ship-, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles would prove highly effective against a country with no ballistic missile defense at sea or land. 

Large swarms of low-cost cruise missiles could likewise overwhelm Norwegian air defenses, potentially in conjunction with higher-end cruise missiles.  

The Scandinavian country’s missile defenses appear better suited to deal with air-breathing rather than aeroballistic threats, but they lack the numbers to cover all possible approaches to Norway’s sprawling territory or provide point defense for all critical infrastructure. 

In wartime, naval air and missile defense operations by Norway’s NATO allies in the North Sea would be critical to protecting its extractive industries, above all its vital gas infrastructure. 

There is also a strong case for deploying ground-based ballistic missile defense assets around critical Norwegian facilities, just as Sweden is deploying a Patriot fire unit to Poland to defend NATO’s eastern flank.  

Germany, for example, as the country likely to be most dependent on Norwegian gas in wartime, may be better served by diverting a Patriot fire unit to defend these assets rather than seeing Norwegian gas supply destroyed. 

Norway must also seriously consider acquiring its own ballistic missile defense capabilities, even if current production lead times rule out near-term acquisition. 

Wherever possible, the resilience of critical facilities must also be strengthened by dispersing critical failure points and preparing for worst-case scenarios, including stockpiling hard-to-source spare parts.  

Such measures could be the difference between a temporary slowdown in gas supply to Europe’s defense industry and a major disruption that jeopardizes Europe’s war effort. 

Fabian Hoffmann is a Senior Research Fellow at the Ukraine and Full Spectrum Threats Program at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and a Non-Resident Fellow with CEPA’s Transatlantic Defense and Security program. His research focuses on missile technology, nuclear strategy, and European deterrence. His research and commentary have been published in the Journal of Strategic Studies, European Security, Foreign Affairs, and War on the Rocks, among others.   

This article was funded by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. CEPA maintains strict intellectual independence over all publications and projects. Opinions, arguments, viewpoints, and conclusions expressed in this work do not represent those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

Illustration: An defense technology assembly diagram of a LUCAS drone. Credit: Sara Boyer/Center for European Policy Analysis.
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