Nazi propagandists were first-rate, but their British opponents were even better. The long-lost dark arts of our wartime efforts might help us now derail Kremlin imperialism. That is the thesis of Peter Pomerantsev’s new book, How to Win an Information War: The Propagandist Who Outwitted Hitler. Its central character is Sefton Delmer, a British foreign correspondent in interwar Germany who later led an audacious psyops program.
Stirring broadcasts about freedom and democracy might encourage the resistance but would have no impact on Hitler supporters, Delmer argued. Instead, he produced authentic-sounding content that a regular German would find amusing and interesting—and spiced it with disinformation to sow dissent and confusion. His first effort was salty and salacious radio commentaries, supposedly from a disgruntled senior military officer called “Der Chef” [the Boss], about the sordid and greedy habits of Nazi party bosses: the orgies and sybaritic feasts were invented, but for hardpressed Germans they rang true. A later, more elaborate radio station featured live broadcasts of the Nazi leaders, interspersed with banned (but popular) jazz numbers and up-to-the-minute news carefully selected to corrode morale.
This sizzling story of great technical and creative expertise is surprisingly little known now. A copy of Delmer’s wartime memoir, Black Boomerang, is on sale for $820/€750; the earlier volume in his autobiography, Trail Sinister, goes for twice that.
Save your cash. I have copies of these and other Delmeriana. Pomerantsev’s account is far better. He depicts Delmer’s chequered professional and personal history, ranging from his childhood in Berlin in the First World War, his ability to sweet-talk senior Nazis, his tricky relations with British officialdom, and his disappointment with post-war denazification. Born in the Soviet Union to dissident parents, but raised in Germany and Britain, Pomerantsev earlier wrote two acclaimed books in Russian disinformation, Nothing is True and Everything is Possible and This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality. His life, he says modestly, is a “small echo” of Delmer’s career.
But Delmer was a practitioner, not a theorist. Pomerantsev’s profound and novel insights into the similarities and differences between Nazi, Soviet, and contemporary Kremlin propaganda are essential reading for anyone interested in understanding and resisting the Kremlin’s lie machine. Perhaps the biggest lesson is that propaganda is in essence a social phenomenon, a “remedy for loneliness”. Believers gain a sense of belonging and of power and feel their humiliation and estrangement assuaged.
Debunking and hectoring are poor counters to this. They bounce off. Gaining trust by providing useful-seeming information works better. Many in Delmer’s audience knew in their hearts that they were listening to an enemy propaganda station. The initial mental gymnastics involved in choosing to tune in and even half-believe what they heard provided a “psychological escape route” from the propagandists’ grip.
Delmer had his problems with rivals and bosses. One thing he did not have to worry about though was colossally expensive libel lawsuits from the targets of his broadcasts. Another must-read new book, Cuckooland, by the journalist Tom Burgis (disclosure: both authors are my friends), outlines the efforts made by Mohammed Amersi, a controversial British tycoon-politician with Russian connections, to cow his critics.
Though he failed to silence Burgis, Amersi — as the book makes clear — is not only rich but highly litigious. So I am happy to make clear that he denies all wrongdoing and that I am not likening him in any way to a Nazi. But I can safely say that the legal bludgeons available to the rich and powerful, enabling them, in Burgis’s words, to “own the truth”, are a national disgrace—and a national security vulnerability.
Edward Lucas is a Non-resident Senior Fellow and Senior Adviser at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
