Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine has revealed glaring deficiencies in ammunition stocks and production across the West, including the US.
The rates at which munitions have been expended by both Russia and Ukraine have exposed the inadequacy of current US production targets, eliciting a steady drumbeat of “empty bins” warnings by US military leadership and analysts alike.
And yet, despite recent selective increases, including both weapons and ammunition, US defense industrial output across the board is not at the level required to meet demand. Given the all-out war in Europe and growing tensions in the Pacific, America not only needs to be able to produce and field a wide array of defense equipment but also to quickly expand output in response to sudden upticks in demand — so-called “surge capacity.”
However, the current approach to procurement and defense industrial production bodes ill for both the US and its allies.
We have been here before. Before it entered World War II, the US tapped its vast industrial base and transformed the country into the “arsenal of democracy,” or rather the arsenal of the world, for without its weapons and munition supplies neither Great Britain nor the Soviet Union would have been able to survive the German onslaught. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s successful martialing of America’s industrial might holds lessons for today.
In the weeks following the attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941, Roosevelt created the War Production Board (WPB) to redirect US industrial might toward defense. Although the US possessed formidable economic power, none of it was oriented to war production.
While the WPB prioritized and allocated scarce materials such as steel, aluminum, and rubber, and banned the production of non-essential goods, businesses could still operate on a for-profit basis.
Many companies found ways to convert their products into wartime equivalents while others provided the component parts for larger weapons.
The scale and speed of the changes were nothing short of stunning. War-related production skyrocketed from just 2% percent of GNP in 1939 to 40% by 1943.
Today America’s economy is much changed, as is the industrial engine that once powered Roosevelt’s war effort. The globalization of production in the past three decades meant much US manufacturing was off-shored, especially in China.
There has been a dramatic consolidation in the defense industry. Since the 1990s, the number of major aerospace and defense prime contractors has dropped to just five. This, combined with the threat posed by Chinese aggression and a possible war in Asia, means that unless we adopt an innovative approach to procurement, we may not have sufficient time to make up for our shortfalls.
For instance, today it takes up to a year from the procurement contract to the actual delivery of 155mm howitzer ammunition and up to five years for the M1A2 SEPv3 tank, while the rates at which industry can deliver the F-35 aircraft are inadequate.
This is to say nothing of foreign military sales, with, for instance, contracts for some $19bn in American missiles, rocket launchers, and other weapons for Taiwan not expected to be delivered for several years. In short, we face a serious national security vulnerability in that we may be forced to go to war without sufficient stockpiles in place.
The Pentagon has recognized this enduring vulnerability of America’s defense industrial sector and on January 12 released the country’s first National Defense Industrial Strategy. Drafted last year, the 59-page document lays out long-term priorities that will guide DoD to create a modern, resilient defense industrial system designed to deter adversaries and meet the production demands posed by evolving threats.
The Pentagon’s strategy focuses on four areas critical to expanding and modernizing America’s defense industrial system, with a timeline set for the next three to five years. The areas identified in the strategy include resilient supply chains, workforce readiness, flexible acquisition, and economic deterrence.
While the Pentagon’s defense industrial strategy is an important first step, to fully address the problem at speed and scale we urgently need a crash program that will bring into one tent Presidential authority, Congress, the Pentagon — especially its senior military leadership — and defense industry leaders.
The government should establish a Rearmament Task Force (RTF), to include the Joint Chiefs, key combatant command (COCOM) leaders, especially the commanding generals in Europe and the Pacific, the heads of the five largest defense contractors, and senior members of Congress, including the Chairman of the House Budget Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The goal should be to review the current procurement process with an eye to streamlining contracts and increasing capacity, and most of all, to prioritize programs and platforms. This comprehensive effort should be launched immediately, with a series of intermediate progress reports delivered to the White House and Congress at pre-set intervals.
The RTF should become the principal mechanism for assessing our needs in defense production and recommending levels of funding to meet current and future targets. It should also be used to chart a production schedule that prioritizes the requirements of different services to reflect the risk assessment in different theaters.
As such, it will merge the geostrategic needs, force requirements, and defense production resources required to rebuild America’s military so that it can deter conflict, while also supporting our allies and partners.
The RTF should provide a blueprint for making the United States “Freedom’s Forge” yet again. This is a time for the government to step in, for much as FDR understood in the wake of Japan’s deadly strike on US naval and military forces in Hawaii, a national defense mobilization effort will not be solved by industry alone.
We need a whole-of-government and whole-of-industry effort to ensure America’s security and defense in an increasingly unstable world.
Chels Michta is a Non-resident Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Chels is a former CEPA Title VIII Fellow and is currently a military intelligence officer serving in the US Army.
The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Army, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
