The US midterm elections delivered a striking rebuke to President Trump. But Europeans, including Ukrainians, should be cautious not to over-interpret the implications for his foreign policy.
This election was not about Europe, nor Ukraine, nor foreign policy in general, other than as a metaphor for leadership. It was about prices, the economy, the self-inflicted war against Iran, and the general sense that Trump has lost the thread.
True, most Americans disagree with President Trump’s approach to Russia, Ukraine, NATO, tariffs, and more. And Democrats will have significant majorities in both the House and the Senate, beginning in January. But Trump remains President and therefore has significant leeway in foreign policy, as well as a veto over legislation passed by Congress. And there is no indication that the President will suddenly change his views.
Indeed, he is more likely to relish the fight with Congress and double down on his own style of policymaking. He may be inclined to pivot toward greater foreign policy activism — in Iran, Cuba, or Latin America more broadly, Russian business deals, tariffs, and North Korea — rather than skirt such endeavors. Moreover, engaging in such foreign policy efforts would help ensure that he is a relevant and dominant actor going forward at a time when his domestic position is weakened.
For example:
- Trump wants to see an end to Russia’s war on Ukraine but has not so far applied pressure on Putin to do so. Indeed, his negotiators are now pushing for a rewrite of the post-Cold War European security settlement, a long-standing Russian demand, as compensation to Russia for agreeing to end the war of aggression it started against Ukraine.
- Trump remains resentful of Europe — for not spending enough on its own defense, for “cheating” the US on trade, and most recently, for not joining the US war on Iran. His view on these issues will not change.
- Trump does not want to launch another major offensive against Iran but likewise does not want Iran to control the Strait of Hormuz. He may use the nuclear issue as a cover story to accept a deal with Iran. But equally, he may continue the embargo and launch new, limited airstrikes on Iran while avoiding a full-scale war, thus prolonging the uncertainty (and the high energy prices hurting the US and global economy).
- Trump may see the Castro regime in Cuba as low-hanging fruit: it is just 90 miles from US military logistics, and easily encircled and cut off from the world. He may view regime change as popular in the US (especially Florida), relatively low cost (a la Maduro), and a useful distraction from polarization at home.
- Trump may see a meeting with Kim Jong Un as a historic step that portrays himself as a peacemaker and generates weeks’ worth of media attention, again while distracting from domestic issues in the United States.
- Democrats in Congress may seek to pass legislation to sanction Russia without a Presidential national security waiver, or provide financial and military aid to Ukraine, or block US force posture adjustments in Europe and elsewhere. But these could well meet with Presidential vetoes, and it would take over a dozen Republican Senators to join with Senate Democrats to overcome such vetoes. This is possible on one or two issues, but it will not become routine.
So, if we accept that the midterms will not lead to fundamental changes in US policy toward NATO, Europe, Ukraine, and Russia, how should our allies and friends in Europe respond to the new political landscape?
With engagement, caution, and absolute non-partisanship. European allies should engage Democrats and Republicans alike in explaining their interests and seeking to unwind policies that have hurt them. But the last thing Europe (and especially Ukraine) needs is to become a partisan political issue in the United States.
Despite the sometimes-heated rhetoric, Europe and the US must remember their shared fundamentals. Beneath the daily policy disagreements, frustrations, insults and surprises, allies on both sides of the Atlantic are joined by the same values, the same interests, and the same destiny. No matter what, we have to stick together.
It is never good policy for Europe to wait, worry, and then complain when something happens that it doesn’t like. This results in bad policy outcomes, as well as a bad relationship between the United States and Europe.
Instead, the three maxims of how to engage with President Trump remain the same as they were on day one of his second term:
- Don’t assume you know what President Trump will actually do. Even he doesn’t know for sure until he does it. Don’t oppose something that hasn’t actually happened. (In other words, tune out the noise of headline-grabbing statements and focus on actual policy).
- Do your own homework. Trump acts on instinct and reading people and situations, not on knowledge, expertise, judgment, or facts. Do not expect him to heed advice from within his administration or without. You need to come to the table with your own detailed and well-grounded assessment of the situation, what you are prepared to do about it, and what should not be done about it. No one else will do that homework.
- Be proactive. President Trump wants results. In the absence of ideas, proposals, and action, he will create them. But faced with a proactive approach that is resourced and makes sense, he will likely go along and turn to other issues that frustrate him.
Following these three principles will not necessarily result in good outcomes. But they may prevent the worst from happening and preserve our shared values and interests-based community so it can fight another day.
Ambassador Kurt Volker is a former US Ambassador to NATO and a former US Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations. He is currently a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
