Georgia’s Constitutional Court has begun hearing a lawsuit filed by ruling-party MPs to ban opposition groups. According to the official results of the disputed 2024 parliamentary election, four of the five targeted opposition forces received nearly 800,000 votes, or about 38% of valid ballots.
The implications extend far beyond these organizations. Legislation adopted in May 2025 allows the court to ban similar successor parties and requires it to rule on such cases within 14 days. Separate amendments permit permanent restrictions on the political participation of individuals “associated” with banned parties.
The aim is to strip the opposition of its ability to contest future elections. Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgian Dream’s billionaire founder and the country’s de facto ruler, wants voters to conclude that no organized alternative to his rule exists, and that political change is impossible.
Even by Ivanishvili’s standards, the attempt to eliminate meaningful electoral competition marks an extraordinary low. The closest recent parallel, other than Russia, is Belarus’s liquidation of opposition parties in 2023 after it stole an election from the democratic opposition in 2020.
Georgian Dream MPs allege that the opposition parties seek to overthrow or forcibly change the constitutional order. Their case invokes alleged abuses under the former United National Movement (UNM) government, accuses opposition parties of attempted violent overthrow between 2019 and 2025, and cites election boycotts and challenges to the government’s legitimacy.
As Transparency International Georgia points out, the lawsuit treats alleged wrongdoing by individuals as grounds for dissolving parties, and transfers responsibility to other organizations. The Venice Commission found that the 2025 rules on individuals associated with banned parties impose penalties without requiring an individual assessment of conduct, and that the legal framework as a whole works toward “preventing the formation and survival of a political opposition.”
When they filed the original claim in October 2025, the plaintiffs left the smaller parties out. In their own explanation, those parties lacked significant political influence or a realistic prospect of crossing the electoral threshold. Restrictions could follow if those parties gained influence. In April, the plaintiffs added the Federalists, which were not among the four parties that crossed the threshold to win seats in 2024. In September, they moved to broaden the case and include For Georgia, the only one of the four original opposition targets that took up its seats in parliament.
The allegations concerning the 2008 war with Russia are also worrying. The plaintiffs argue that UNM’s actions created the conditions for the Kremlin’s invasion. This gives Moscow political ammunition to excuse its aggression and risks undermining Georgia’s efforts to hold Russia accountable.
Western governments have responded to Georgia’s democratic deterioration with incremental measures. Most significant perhaps was the European Council’s June 2024 conclusion that Georgia’s democratic backsliding was effectively halting its EU accession process. A month later, Washington paused more than $95m in assistance directly benefiting the Georgian government. Five months after that, the United States and Britain coordinated sanctions against officials implicated in violence against protesters and journalists, and Washington separately sanctioned Ivanishvili. Alongside his designation, the US Treasury issued General License 116, authorizing transactions with companies in which Ivanishvili holds at least a 50% ownership stake, provided they are not separately listed as sanctioned.
The EU suspended parts of its visa-facilitation arrangements in January 2025, then imposed an EU-wide visa requirement this March for holders of Georgian diplomatic, service and official passports. Ordinary passport holders retained visa-free access for short stays. In October, the EU endorsed the Venice Commission’s criticism of legislation expanding party bans to individuals and tightening restrictions on foreign funding and political activity.
While these measures inched up the pressure, Georgian Dream moved further and faster by expanding restrictions on political and civic activity, and widening the lawsuit from three parties to five.
Washington and European capitals still have the power to influence events if they coordinate. The court must rule by June 2027, but a verdict could come much sooner.
Georgian Dream seeks a reset with the Trump administration, and after a State Department visit in May, the US Embassy stated that a sustainable partnership requires a political climate “conducive to opposition engagement.” Banning parties that won nearly 38% of the disputed vote fails the administration’s own test.
Western governments should now make the consequences clear before the court rules. Washington and European capitals should specify which actions will trigger targeted financial and travel restrictions, and which corrective steps would lift them. Withdrawal of the lawsuit, release of political prisoners, repeal of restrictions on legitimate political participation and civil society activity should top the list.
Sanctions must reach the networks and individuals that implement repression, including responsible officials, police commanders, prosecutors, judges, and business enablers.
The Constitutional Court, widely regarded as dominated by party loyalists, recently lost one of its members. Judge Manana Kobakhidze, a co-founder and the first chair of Georgian Dream, whose term was due to end in February 2027, resigned on October 13 after her colleagues denied her recusal request. Some linked her departure to domestic and international pressure, including potential sanctions. If so, it would show the prospect of personal costs reaches even this court.
Pressure should make repression more expensive for its organizers and encourage others to stop cooperating with the regime.
Washington should review the broad authorization for transactions with Ivanishvili-owned companies that are not individually sanctioned and consider targeted restrictions on entities sustaining his political power, while limiting harm to the wider Georgian economy. Congress should also advance the MEGOBARI Act, passed by the House in 2025, which provides for sanctions against those undermining Georgian democracy. Georgians still believe political change is possible. Protests have continued for more than 700 days without pause, through arrests, restrictive laws, and mounting pressure. Western governments can give force to their opposition and disgust by imposing costs on those responsible.
Irina Arabidze is a Non-resident Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at CEPA and a visiting lecturer at Caucasus University in Tbilisi. A Fulbright scholar, she holds a master’s degree in International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and a graduate degree in International Relations and European Studies from the Central European University.
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