America’s midterms have accelerated the departure of the Atlanticist generation, the lawmakers who built and defended transatlantic coalitions in the decades after the Cold War. With some retiring and others being swept out, the bipartisan coalition that kept Europe and Ukraine high on Congress’s agenda is now much thinner.
The champions for Ukraine and the US-European alliance who did not run for re-election include Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Thom Tillis (R-NC), Mitch McConnell (R-KY), and John Cornyn (R-TX); along with representatives Mike McCaul (R-TX) and Don Bacon (R-NE); and Speaker Emerita Nancy Pelosi (D-CA). Their international relationships, decades of experience, and political skills will go with them when the new Congress arrives in January.
This shift in Congress is partly the result of generational change, as longtime members depart because of age or disputes with the Republican leadership. Many politicians first elected in previous decades saw NATO and Ukraine as core to American security. Shaheen and Tillis revived the Senate NATO Observer Group and pushed for Ukraine aid, as well as a firm line on Russia. McConnell’s lifetime of work as a defense appropriator greatly helped Ukraine’s defense, and he spoke out when aid was cut. Don Bacon worked across party lines to defend America’s NATO commitments and advance military cooperation with Ukraine. Lindsey Graham’s legacy will live on through his Russian Sanctions Act, although the legislation’s tough provisions have been waived by the White House, for now at least.
The second group of leavers was election night casualties. Familiar names included Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH), a former House Intelligence committee Chairman and one of the most prominent Republican voices on defense policy, who lost the Dayton area seat he has held for over two decades. Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA), a co-chair of the House Ukraine caucus, was defeated, and Moldova champion Rep. Mike Lawler (R-NY) conceded. Sen. Susan Collins’s (R-ME) decades-long career fell short of a sixth term.
This pattern matters. The Republicans most willing to break with their party on European security will no longer be present to keep the issue on the table. Democrats now hold majorities in both chambers, which significantly strengthens their hand in setting the agenda and negotiating with the White House.
So, is the result good or bad for Ukraine? In principle, good. For two years, a Republican Congress largely left Ukraine policy to the White House. Outgoing Speaker Mike Johnson (R-LA) kept the Ukraine Support Act off the House floor for more than a year, until a bipartisan majority in the Republican-controlled House used a discharge petition this summer to force a vote, passing over $1.3bn in additional aid. The Russian sanctions bill then passed the Senate 86-12, and again in the House 262-159. Lawmakers made clear with their votes that the administration’s recent approach to Moscow is the anomaly.
With Rep. Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) poised to become House Speaker, Ukraine legislation will no longer need a procedural revolt to reach the floor. Yet it is unclear how pro-Ukraine sentiment might manifest itself; many of the new Democratic legislators are moderates – not the far-left progressives many Europeans fret about – but will probably not have Ukraine and NATO high on their list of priorities.
Democrats will still need Republican votes to move legislation through the Senate and to override any potential vetoes, a threat the president has already made. That requires two-thirds majorities in both chambers. Many of the Republicans who supplied some of those votes are leaving. Nothing guarantees that like-minded members will fill the seats left behind, and rebuilding that bipartisan coalition now falls to the incoming class.
Pocketbook issues dominated voters’ decision-making, which suggests that while Ukraine still matters to voters, it will not be top of mind for legislators in the new Congress, as there is a clear signal to get the homeland in order before offering support abroad. While Ukraine and European security will likely not be a priority at the start of the new Congress, US voters have not rejected Europe. Most Republicans (63%) and Democrats (60%) still believe that the US should take an active role in world affairs, giving freshmen room to step up and lead on these issues without paying a political price. And if cost is what concerns voters, that then strengthens the case for engagement. Deterring Russia is far cheaper than fighting a new world war.
Once the new Congress settles, Washington will have every reason to lend its greater support to Kyiv and its allies. Ukraine’s forces have spent years adapting under fire, and their battlefield innovations are already feeding back into the US and European defense industries. Just as important, their experience offers a preview of what modern war will demand, and now there are fewer Republican roadblocks in the way.
The problems Ukraine is solving today will confront US forces tomorrow. For a freshman, that translates into concrete gains for constituents, including defense industry jobs in their districts and a boosted “wartime” economy.
The administration’s push for burden-sharing has made the alliance a better deal for the US, giving Congress another reason to stay engaged. Nearly all NATO members have committed to spending 5% of GDP on defense and security infrastructure by 2035, and Germany has built a political consensus behind major military investment. That gives both parties a good argument: Republicans can claim burden-sharing as a win, and Democrats can point to a stronger, renewed alliance.
The Atlanticist contingent has not been altogether wiped out, though it is smaller than it was projected to be just a week ago. In the Senate, Roger Wicker (R-MS), who chairs the Armed Services Committee until January, just returned from Kyiv, and Katie Britt (R-AL) has positioned herself to carry on Graham’s sanctions work. Mike Rounds (R-SD) and Angus King (I-ME) are the recommended successors to lead the NATO observer group in the new Congress.
In the House, Ukraine Caucus Co-chair Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) held her seat in a district redrawn to favor Republicans, and fellow co-chair Joe Wilson (R-SC) narrowly won reelection. Rep. Fitzpatrick’s defeat opens a Republican co-chair position, likely to be filled by David Joyce (R-OH) or Steve Womack (R-AR).
There is also a strong European bench in the new Congress of Democratic Atlanticists, including Reps. Jim Costa (D-CA), Bill Keating (D-MA), Mike Quigley (D-IL), Tom Suozzi (D-NY), Deborah Ross (D-NC), and Brendan Boyle (D-PA). This group offers an experienced foundation that can help guide incoming members on European and Ukrainian policy.
These midterm elections marked more than a changing of the guard in Congress. For decades, Europe could count on a generation of lawmakers whose ideals were rooted in shared experiences of living through the aftermath of the Cold War. The transatlantic relationship does not enjoy the political consensus of that era, and nostalgia will not carry the alliance into its next chapter.
US leadership is itself worth protecting. It is a force multiplier, from trade to security, and it allows the US to shape the global security agenda. That matters more than ever as China and Russia wage a shadow war against the West.
Europeans should be spending the lame duck period strategizing how they can work with, and capitalize on, a more Europe-friendly Congress.
Daniel Gaffin is the Program Officer for Congressional Engagement and Strategic Partnerships at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Daniel leads CEPA’s congressional engagement strategy, overseeing bipartisan outreach on Capitol Hill and coordinating high-level engagements that advance the organization’s policy priorities.
Alina Kreynovich is a Program Assistant for External Affairs at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). She supports CEPA’s convenings with US and transatlantic stakeholders.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
