Iran had two goals for its attack on Israel, neither of which was to incapacitate Israeli military capabilities. The first was to convince its own people of the country’s prestige and resolve. The second was to establish credible deterrence in the region, towards countries including Azerbaijan, its increasingly bold — and pro-Israeli — neighbor to the north.
With strict censorship in place and an aggressive media offensive underway, the first appears to have succeeded. The second was a catastrophic failure.
Azerbaijan, which took advantage of Russia’s lack of credible deterrence to brush it aside and defeat neighboring Armenia last year, now has confirmation that the Iranian threat is less fearsome than the Islamic Republic likes to pretend.
To listen to Iranian media reports, Operation “True Promise,” the code name for the launch of 170 drones and perhaps another 140 cruise and ballistic missiles, was a resounding success.
The attack on Israel was “a turning point in Iran’s defense history” that “showed the strong will of the Islamic Republic in revenge against criminals” and “made $270m in profit” (the difference in the costs to Israel and Iran.) This narrative appears to have won acceptance, at least among hardliners, who poured onto the streets to celebrate.
But across Iran’s northwestern border, Azerbaijani state media had an altogether different interpretation of events, releasing ebullient reports of the operation’s failure. The editor of one of its leading newspapers mocked Iran, saying it had “demonstrated the gap in its military preparation” and proved that “Iran’s real desire is not to wage war with the West, Israel or the European Union. Its real problem is the Turkic world” (which includes Azerbaijan.)
Operation True Promise has also shown this neighbor at least that Iran’s weaponry is almost entirely ineffectual against a well-equipped opponent; about 69% of Azerbaijan’s arms purchases between 2016 and 2021 came from Israel. In November, the government signed a $1.2bn deal to buy the Barak MX surface-to-air missile system from Israel.
Iran and Azerbaijan only agreed to normalize diplomatic relations in March after a shooting at the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran led to rounds of bellicose saber-rattling last year. Iran regularly conducts military exercises to practice crossing the River Aras, which separates the two countries.
Relations have long been fractious, with Tehran denouncing Baku’s links to Israel and accusing it of stirring up discontent among the substantial Azeri minority in Iran. At the same time, Azerbaijan has accused Iran of supporting Islamist coup plotters.
Despite a military only a quarter the size of Iran’s, Azerbaijan is newly emboldened after forcing out Russian peacekeepers and conquering Nagorno-Karabakh, the ethnic Armenian enclave that was a flashpoint for three decades.
The Azeri victory led to the flight of more than 100,000 Orthodox Christians — a group the Kremlin claims is close to its heart — yet rather than asserting itself as Armenia’s treaty ally, it merely stood back and described the outcome as Armenia’s just deserts for its desperate attempts to enlist Western support.
The fall of Nagorno-Karabakh not only ended a long-simmering conflict for Azerbaijan but also confirmed Russia’s lack of resolve. The Kremlin had failed to enforce the peace it brokered in 2020 when Azerbaijan’s Israeli-equipped armed forces inflicted a decisive victory over Armenia’s Russian-made defenses.
The Kremlin now worries that an Israeli counter-strike on Iran could further weaken its influence in the region, which is already deeply compromised by its commitment of resources to its war in Ukraine and failure to stand up for its supposed partners. After all the Iranian aid supplied to Russia, including ballistic missiles, the regime will certainly expect support from its increasingly dependent ally.
There is also some risk that Russia might become directly embroiled in the conflict. Should Israel retaliate, a likely target would be Iran’s nuclear facilities in Busher.
An attack that destroyed the Russian-built (and possibly Russian-operated) plant would demand a Kremlin response. But with Moscow’s forces still bogged down in Ukraine, anything beyond condemnations and sanctions would stretch the Kremlin’s capabilities.
As with most conflicts where Russia was once a key power, the message is clear: a security guarantee from the Kremlin is no longer of very much use.
Ben Dubow is a Nonresident Fellow at CEPA and the founder of Omelas, a security firm that tracks authoritarian influence online.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
