Elena Davlikanova:
The rule that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” does not work when applied to Ukraine and the Russian opposition. Although there are opinion leaders like Andrei Piontkovsky and Victoria Ivleva whose positions never played in the Kremlin’s interest, many Russian liberals have failed to pass the test where Ukraine is concerned.
A Ukrainian volunteer initiative analyzed statements about Ukraine between 2014 and 2022 by 91 prominent public Russian figures who positioned themselves as opposed to the Putin regime. Only half called the events of 2014-2022 a war, even fewer believed that Crimea is an inseparable part of Ukraine, and not all could admit that Russia is an aggressor, even after 2022. But almost all advocate for Russians, for example for milder visa policies and financial restrictions.
Lyubov Sobol:
Generalizing that the Russian opposition has been indifferent to the Ukraine war is incorrect and misleading. In 2014, tens of thousands protested the annexation of Crimea, and by 2022, despite being forced abroad by repression, they robustly counteracted Putin’s invasion propaganda. The opposition has consistently presented the truth about the war to Russians, adopting an unequivocally anti-war stance from the start.
While the Kremlin, not the opposition, initiated the war, it is important to recognize that public criticism about Crimea, or discussing events like Bucha [site of a notorious Russian massacre], invites substantial legal action in Russia. People who condemn the 2014 annexation or the 2022 full-scale invasion face up to five years in prison. Silence, fear, and apathy do not add up to support for the Kremlin’s actions.
Elena Davlikanova:
Even more harmful than the failure to ensure democratic development in their own country is an attempt to persuade the West that Russia is a step away from democracy. Mikhail Khodorkovsky has warned the West not to scare the Russian people away through sanctions. Some opposition leaders even advocate for lifting sanctions and offering EU candidacy as manifestations of the West’s goodwill. The world should learn from its mistakes — after Chechnya, Georgia, and the 2014 war against Ukraine, many in the West did their best to satisfy Russia’s appetites and until 2022 hoped for a common space from Vladivostok to Lisbon.
Even if economic interests are prioritized, integration into the civilized world requires adherence to rules ensuring fair competition, protection of investor rights, and peaceful co-existence. Russia has never embraced the principle of the rule of law, and a genocidal war in the heart of Europe has not left much space for maneuver.
Respect is earned by action. The 30 million-strong Russian diaspora have not become flag bearers for the anti-regime movement, despite the efforts of the Anti-War Committee and the Free Russia Forum. Of course, there are thousands of people who took an active stand, as well as some decent people in Russia itself, but for a nation of 144 million people, the reaction is mainly passive.
It took a million people in the main square of Kyiv to take an amateur tyrant down during the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine in 2014. That is almost the same as the number of Russians who found refuge abroad escaping mobilization, the majority of whom have not joined the anti-war movement in exile. While some say they refused to kill Ukrainians, others admit they did nothing to prevent or stop their suffering.
For Ukrainians, the narrative that the Russian people are suffering under sanctions and repression is untimely at least. Moreover, Russia is the main source of much of the turbulence in Europe and the US caused by its anti-democratic strategic communications and support for far-right movements.
Lyubov Sobol:
The deficit in the rule of law and democratic principles in Russia is irrefutable, yet it’s crucial to differentiate between the Kremlin’s geopolitical actions and the stance of ordinary Russians. Amid mounting repression, they often display apathy as a defensive response. Pre-invasion surveys from the Levada Center in 2021 indicated a general lack of animosity among Russians towards neighboring countries, and recognition of Ukraine’s sovereignty — a promising sign.
There are striking differences between the conditions for protest in Putin’s Russia and Ukraine’s Maidan. The latter had an opposition presence in parliament, it had un-persecuted sponsors of protests and a vibrant civil society, while Russia, under a revived legacy FSB, endures political imprisonment and quashed civic structures.
Although skepticism about Russian democracy is understandable, the global community must champion it, imposing sanctions and increasing pressure on Putin’s regime while simultaneously supporting democratic movements. A disregard for democracy only plays into Putin’s hands, facilitating a potentially indefinite reign underpinned by widespread disillusionment.
Elena Davlikanova:
Another test of the Russian opposition’s moral compass is the concept of the collective political responsibility of the Russian people, which does not find unanimous support. Garry Kasparov and Maria Snegovaya insist on it, but their voices are lost in the cries of denial. It is important as a driver for social and political change, and in turn essential for the de-imperialization of Russia and normalization of its relations with its neighbors and the West. Being a self-declared member of the Russian opposition is not an indicator of a person’s humanistic values, or necessary for the restoration of justice for Ukraine.
Ukraine’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and current head of the Russia Research Center, Volodymyr Ogryzko, noted that “the imaginary ‘beautiful Russia of the future’ promoted by the so-called Russian opposition, foresees a further cultivation of ‘greatness’ and the possession of nuclear weapons, which will inevitably lead to the emergence of a new Putin.”
Lyubov Sobol:
The collective responsibility of Russians isn’t a myth but an operational reality, exemplified by sanctions like the SWIFT ban and foreign companies leaving Russia, affecting many citizens. Discussions of collective guilt, however, can miss the mark.
Often, those who feel guilty haven’t committed wrongs, like Kasparov, who opposed Putin early on, while war criminals find self-justification and blame the West. Talk of all Russians being culpable dilutes the individual accountability of those ordering bombings, torturing prisoners, committing sexual violence, abducting children, voluntarily enlisting for war, and propagating conflict through the media. The dialog needs specificity and concrete action plans to be meaningful.
A separation of guilt is necessary, distinguishing those who initiated, organized, and supported war from those opposing military aggression, protesting against Putin’s policies, or fighting corruption. Silent Russians, by not toppling Putin’s regime, tacitly form a resistive force and a quagmire for government action. Moreover, on the question of guilt, why should an individual opposing the regime bear responsibility over others, like former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder or other politicians and journalists supporting the Kremlin’s interests abroad?
Even without a Russian passport, their contributions fostered the war in Ukraine more than many Russians. In 2020, Alexey Navalny’s team proposed that 35 individuals be sanctioned, yet no action was taken against Putin’s allies.
Listening to the Russian opposition earlier might have prevented European conflict. Assigning blame, if deemed necessary, should be a global consideration.
Elena Davlikanova is a Democracy Fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.) Her work is focused on analyzing opportunities for Ukraine-Russia reconciliation with regard to fascism and totalitarianism in Russia and their effects on Russia. She is an experienced researcher, who in 2022 conducted the studies ‘The Work of the Ukrainian Parliament in Wartime’ and ‘The War of Narratives: The Image of Ukraine in Media.’
Lyubov Sobol is a Senior Fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). She is a Russian political and public figure. She consistently advocates for the democratization of Russia and opposes Putin’s policies. She conducted journalistic investigations into corruption in Russia while serving as a lawyer for Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation. Currently, she leads anti-propaganda projects on YouTube, attracting hundreds of thousands of viewers.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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