Ukraine is the Wild West for many private intelligence firms, and in some cases an overreliance on them has put Ukraine’s intelligence community in a vulnerable position. Yet, with effective oversight mechanisms, they could help accelerate Kyiv’s intelligence reforms.
Private intelligence firms collect and analyze information from open-source and proprietary sources to produce actionable intelligence for the strategic decision-making of clients, and their operations in Ukraine have introduced new technologies, intelligence, and analytical capabilities.
Colorado-based Vantor, for example, provides geospatial intelligence derived from high-resolution satellite imagery that can be used to map, monitor, and analyze military activity. Its information has been used to monitor the activity of Russian forces in Ukraine and document their war crimes. Another example is Palantir, headquartered in Florida, which uses an AI-driven data analytics platform to facilitate quick intelligence processing.
British General Jim Hockenhull has described such private suppliers as a “force multiplier,” as they are “inevitably driven by a need to keep availability high” for users and therefore deliver robust service.
This force multiplier “has been a really significant way in which the Ukrainian military have been able to generate information advantage,” he said in December 2022, and their value has been growing ever since.
The problem is that private companies’ influential role has redistributed intelligence authority beyond the state, creating new challenges for democratic oversight and accountability. Technological modernization needs to be matched with institutional reform.
While private intelligence firms can use their powerful technology to improve government performance and eliminate intermediaries, reducing opportunities for corruption and espionage, they have different incentives from the public sector.
Private firms sell information and are driven by revenue, whereas the public sector is, at least in theory, driven by the protection of a public good. And the private sector will not take responsibility for that public good in the long run because it does not find it profitable or finds it too risky.
Ukrainian intelligence is increasingly reliant on the private sector, and the trend is likely to continue. Without proper oversight, this overreliance makes it more difficult to hold the IC and private companies accountable.
While a 2018 Law on National Security set out a framework for democratic control across the security and defense sectors, and a 2020 Law on Intelligence established oversight procedures, further institutional reform remains unfinished.
A bill to overhaul the Security Service of Ukraine’s (SBU) organization and powers passed its first reading in January 2021, for example, but is still awaiting a second reading. It faced criticism from human rights organizations, which warned provisions on surveillance, access to information, and telecoms interference lacked adequate safeguards.
In its 2025 Ukraine Report, the European Commission found there was a lack of progress in reform of the SBU and called for a narrower investigative mandate, stronger safeguards against abuse, and more effective internal and external oversight.
Legislative proposals also extend to private organizations. A bill “On International Defense Companies,” registered in April 2024 and still under committee consideration, proposes a framework for operations and a dedicated state regulator.
There are existing laws that impose some constraints on the private sector, but legal compliance does not guarantee democratic oversight or reliable access to private intelligence capabilities, especially if those capabilities come from companies headquartered abroad.
If such companies operate outside Kyiv’s jurisdiction, Ukraine becomes vulnerable to the political interests and decisions of the governments overseeing those jurisdictions. For example, a country could restrict Ukraine’s access to satellite imagery from a private intelligence firm, limiting access to vital intelligence.
Ukraine’s lawmakers should establish clear frameworks to define the role of private companies in national security alongside oversight measures to ensure accountability. Such frameworks could clarify issues such as liability for intelligence failures, data ownership, audit procedures, and mechanisms for accountability.
With cutting-edge intelligence technology developed by private operators, public-private sector cooperation is only likely to increase. But traditional institutions, such as the Verkhovna Rada’s Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence, and the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, must remain the main drivers of Kyiv’s IC reforms, giving a clear path to accountability.
They will need to establish clear regulations. The success of Ukraine’s IC will depend on governance frameworks capable of successfully integrating the private sector.
Ilya Timtchenko is a Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at CEPA and a PhD candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. An analyst with more than 14 years of experience focused on Eastern Europe, he holds a Master’s in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School, where he was a Belfer Center fellow. Before studying at Harvard, he worked as an editor and journalist in Ukraine.
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