Recent months have brought electoral success in Germany for three parties on the populist extremes that challenge the country’s current security and foreign policy, albeit for different reasons: AfD, BSW and Die Linke. Might they pose a challenge to eight decades of broad European security consensus?
The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), whose electoral support surged to record highs in the recent elections in the east German states of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony-Anhalt, is pushing for a softer line on Moscow: its Bundestag caucus has called for German weapons deliveries to Ukraine to stop, and for sanctions on Russia to be rolled back as part of peace talks. AfD politicians have also been involved in controversies related to their travel to Russia.
At the same time, the populist Alliance for Social Justice and Economic Reason (BSW), which calls for a return to cooperation with Russia and an end to military support for Ukraine, passed the 5% threshold in Saxony-Anhalt and supported the election of an AfD politician as president of the state parliament. The recent elections in Germany’s capital, Berlin, resulted in a win for the far-left Die Linke. While Die Linke condemns Russia’s war in Ukraine, it takes an active stance against the supply of weapons to Ukraine, as well as against Germany’s remilitarization program and involvement in NATO.
Among the major political parties, the three mainstream centrist forces, CDU, SPD and the Greens, favor a broadly pro-Ukrainian policy direction and the rearmament adopted by the current government. However, recent electoral gains for parties challenging this have put mainstream forces under pressure. Taken together, these tendencies, along with the intensification of Russian hybrid attacks on Germany, pose serious risks to one of Europe’s main security providers.
Since 2022, the German government has pursued rearmament and a much firmer stance towards Russia, while becoming Ukraine’s biggest military supplier. This year, the cabinet approved a draft budget providing for defense spending of almost €140bn ($156bn) in 2027, almost 30% above the 2026 figure. In August, the cabinet also approved plans to give domestic and foreign intelligence services more powers to hack communications and disrupt foreign adversaries’ operations to counter a growing threat from cyber and hybrid attacks.
However, if mainstream parties lose federal power to the far right, there are concerns about how these expanded capabilities might be used. That makes some nervous, not least neighbors with a grim experience of German military power. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski warned that AfD electoral gains could turn Berlin’s military buildup into a security risk for Europe, even as Warsaw backs a stronger German army.
The far right and the populist left explicitly challenge this security policy, as seen in Saxony-Anhalt. On October 14, the state parliament passed a motion calling for an immediate end to German military aid and non-humanitarian financial support for Ukraine, as well as the lifting of sanctions against Russia. The motion passed during a special parliamentary session with the votes of AfD and BSW. As political scientist Armin Pfahl-Traughber put it to DW: “Their common ground lies in their rejection of the political establishment, their pro-Putin stance, and their criticism of Germany’s support for Ukraine.”
Since state parliaments cannot determine Germany’s foreign and security policy, the motion is symbolic. State governments do participate in the Bundesrat (Federal Council), where they can introduce initiatives; however, even if the Russia-friendly AfD/BSW alliance behind the motion forms a state government, it would control only one of the 16 state delegations in the Bundesrat. The motion’s direct practical implications are thus limited.
At the same time, this motion can be seen as intended to challenge the mainstream discourse rather than effect immediate practical change. Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, a CEPA Fellow, former German diplomat and intelligence professional, suggests that, while these parties have limited opportunities to change security policy in the short run, their rise is creating internal pressure within the governing CDU. Some regional leaders feel compelled to challenge the Chancellor’s stance on Russia and Ukraine to satisfy their electorates (even if CDU local representatives condemned the Saxony-Anhalt motion). There is a risk that if sympathetic rhetoric grows at the state level, it may normalize these arguments in public discourse and so create grounds for rapprochement with Russia.
German security policy is challenged not only from the right but also from the left. In January, a law introducing a new military-service system came into force, aiming to recruit more volunteers. Questionnaires have been sent to young people turning 18, asking for personal information and their willingness to serve. Completing the questionnaire is mandatory for men and voluntary for women; mandatory medical examinations for men born in 2008 and later are scheduled to begin in July 2027. Military service itself remains voluntary.
The new approach has sparked youth protests against rising military spending and the prospect of conscription. According to organizers, around 45,000 people joined a School Strike Against Conscription on September 25. The strike was backed by both Die Linke and BSW. With Die Linke’s recent electoral victory in Berlin, opposition to military recruitment and spending could gain greater political traction. These tendencies, backed by the left-wing parties, are concerning since they challenge measures that are central to Germany’s military expansion.
The country’s security policy and its geopolitical course as Ukraine’s ally are thus challenged by radical forces on both the left and the right. While elections are not due until early 2029, the rise of extreme and Kremlin-friendly parties cannot be ignored.
Von Loringhoven suggests a two-step approach that mainstream parties could adopt to navigate these challenges. The first involves moving from a reactive to an offensive posture towards hybrid threats and strengthening deterrence by signaling that Germany will “double up” on support for Ukraine rather than cave in to Russian pressure. The second is the diplomatic balance: maintaining dialogue with Russia also serves as a domestic tool to counter accusations of abandoning diplomacy, which radical parties capitalize on.
The recent bilateral meeting between Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul and Russia’s Sergey Lavrov, the first between the countries’ foreign ministers since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, can be seen as a step in this direction.
What matters even more is preventing a split within the mainstream parties over core elements of security policy under pressure from the far right and the left.
Mykyta (Nikita) Vorobiov is a political and intelligence analyst focusing on Russian and Eastern European politics, security, and information campaigns. He holds a BA in Ethics and Politics from Bard College Berlin, where his research focused on Russian visual propaganda, and an MSc in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford, where he examined how the Russian state uses political discourse, media, and propaganda to legitimize prisoner mobilization. For the past five years, Nikita has published articles on politics and security for CEPA, VoxEurop, JURIST, and other outlets.
