After a months-long election campaign filled with smear campaigns, warmongering AI-videos, foreign interference, and false flag operations, it all came down to Hungary’s voters on April 12.
“It” was the battle between Viktor Orbán, who had 16 years behind his belt, endless resources, and political backing from Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, and Péter Magyar, a political rookie with a promise: to bring back hope for a better, corruption-free, and prosperous Hungary.
These parliamentary elections open the next chapter in Hungarian political history and are the most important since Hungary’s post-socialist transition in 1989. The elections broke an all-time high turnout, at nearly 80%, and resulted in a landslide victory for Magyar’s Tisza party. He also secured a parliamentary supermajority, winning more than two-thirds of the seats on 54% of the votes compared to 37% for Fidesz.
No one expected election night to end so quickly and for the outcome to be so decisive. As bad results started pouring in from his heartland countryside constituencies, Orbán quickly acknowledged the game was up, although some of his supporters remain buried deep inside the state and are likely to resist. His speech was short and free from the usual themes he built his entire campaign around (Ukraine, war, and Brussels).
He stressed that he would remain the leader of the 2.5 million Hungarians who voted for him. By comparison, Tisza received around 3.3 million ballots; the greatest number any party, including Fidesz, has ever received in Hungary. The gap in the raw numbers was impressive but not vast. Orbán may reflect that ultimately, he was punished by an electoral system that he had skewed to reward the biggest party
Orbán accepted defeat, putting an end to theories that he would question the results or try to somehow, through a series of Russia-backed false flag operations, hold on to power or at least create post-election chaos.
For minutes, no one quite believed what was happening. Even after Orbán’s speech and clear signs that Magyar had surpassed a two-thirds majority, disbelief was palpable; people were looking for a catch. But there were no catch nor footnotes, at least on the night. Budapest then exploded in celebration, something very rarely seen for a political outcome. “Tisza is flowing” and “Russians go home” were chanted as the crowd got more ecstatic, even before Magyar spoke to the crowds.
That speech was longer than the outgoing premier’s, and was both polite and far-reaching. He promised structural change, including reestablishing the frameworks of a democratic Hungary, and called on the President and other Orbán loyalists in key positions to resign or be sacked after the new government is established around mid-May. (On April 13, he promised term limits for prime ministers and said this would apply retrospectively, creating a barrier to Orbán’s return.)
Magyar repeated his pledge to be a trustworthy partner in NATO and the EU, and to join the bloc’s corruption watchdog, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). He also promised to represent all Hungarians, including those who voted for Fidesz, on a path toward national unification and to end deep polarization.
Expectations are high — the landslide victory is a testament to that — but can Magyar deliver on his promises? On paper, the new government will have the political legitimacy to do so: to restore accountability, reestablish checks and balances, and fulfill the European Commission’s list of conditions to secure the frozen EU funds of about €18bn ($21bn). That’s a key priority for Magyar; the money equates to about 15% of annual government expenditure.
With a constitutional majority behind them, Tisza can comfortably govern without having to worry too much about the institutional hurdles caused by Orbán loyalists or the president. It will give a never-before-seen opportunity for Magyar to free up the judiciary and media, too.
Of course, it will take time. Undoing 16 years of increasingly illiberal rule will be a slow process. Some top figures, including the former president of the Hungarian National Bank György Matolcsy, and Orbán’s childhood friend-turned-billionaire Lőrinc Mészáros, may be prosecuted. The number one on the hit list is the outgoing minister of foreign affairs, Péter Szijjártó, accused of treason (he has not been seen since April 12, with many Hungarian social media accounts sneeringly suggesting he had fled to Moscow. The following day, Magyar suggested he remained in Hungary and was busy shredding documents).
In recent weeks, leaked audio tapes of Szijjártó’s conversations with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov testified to his obsequiousness and unwavering loyalty toward Russia. Another leaked tape of a call last year recorded Orbán telling Putin that Hungary was like a mouse to Russia’s lion.
With a two-thirds majority in his pocket, will Magyar fly too close to the sun, as did (the once-liberal democratic) Orbán?
He is ambitious, just like Orbán back in the day, but his electorate is far from homogeneous. Tisza voters consist of disillusioned Orbán supporters, urban and rural voters, left-leaning liberals who see Magyar as their only hope, formerly apolitical voters, and youngsters — many of them first-time voters.
What connects these groups is a blend of high expectations and disgruntlement with Orbán’s corrupt system. Tisza is more of an umbrella party, and is therefore dissimilar to Fidesz’s ride-or-die supporters; if Magyar does not deliver or if his administration is snared by the same temptations of power abuse, he will be ousted in record time.
He must deliver, and this realization may prevent him from falling into the Orbán trap. As the saying goes, “A new broom sweeps clean” (új seprű jól seper), and Magyar must clean all corners and windows of Hungary — internally and externally, too.
For what it’s worth, Hungary’s example will be one for the textbooks. Internally, on how to dismantle a 16-year authoritarian regime and kickstart democratization. Externally, Magyar’s example may be studied by opposition movements in similar situations, including countries in Central Europe and the Balkans, but also by centrist parties in Western Europe and the US. Magyar offered a critique that was relentlessly focused on corruption, mismanagement, and declining living standards, while studiously avoiding liberal social issues.
Ferenc Németh is a Ph.D. candidate at Corvinus University of Budapest and a Fulbright visiting researcher at Georgetown University. He has previously conducted research in Toronto and Skopje, worked as a research fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, and interned at EULEX Kosovo. His areas of expertise include Central and Southeast Europe, EU enlargement, and regional security. Ferenc was a Denton Fellow at CEPA in 2024.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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