The European Union barely had time to celebrate the ouster of Hungary’s Viktor Orbán before Bulgaria delivered a political shock of its own. In the April 19 parliamentary election, former President Rumen Radev secured a decisive victory, with his party Progressive Bulgaria winning an outright majority (131 of 240 seats).
In Brussels and in the media, the immediate reaction was to ask whether Radev would emerge as another Orbán-style disruptor, and how closely he might align with Moscow.
This misses more consequential questions.
At first glance, there are real reasons for concern. Although his victory ends the rule of Prime Minister Boyko Borissov and sanctioned oligarch Delyan Peevski, a period marred by widespread corruption, Radev’s dominance — which ends years of fractured and indecisive elections — concentrates power in a way that is particularly risky for a still-fragile democratic system.
Such consolidation can further weaken institutional checks on executive power, entrench corruption, and enable obstruction of EU decision-making under the cover of a strong electoral mandate. His openness to Russia further amplifies concerns that Bulgaria could become a conduit for pro-Kremlin influence within the bloc. While serving in his previous largely ceremonial position as President, the 62-year-old former fighter pilot has opposed military aid to Ukraine, criticized sanctions on Russia, and argued for renewing dialogue with the Kremlin.
But there is another side to Radev’s victory. Its sheer scale creates an unusual degree of clarity, which could be beneficial for Bulgarians and the EU. With full control comes full responsibility. He can no longer point to coalition constraints or opposition resistance to justify inaction. The governing agenda is now entirely his, including his central campaign promise to combat corruption (Bulgaria is, jointly with Hungary, the most graft-ridden in the EU) and dismantle entrenched oligarch networks.
Should he deliver on this pledge, the structural conditions that enable Russian influence could be significantly weakened by the end of his term. Should he fail, the majority of his own supporters, who have high expectations of him to deliver, will end his political career.
This is why analysts and policymakers should shift their focus away from rhetoric and toward performance. The key question is not whether Radev sounds pro-Russian, but whether he governs in ways that confront — or reinforce — the domestic patronage networks and external dependencies that have long undermined Bulgarian institutions. His administration will either validate fears of illiberal drift or demonstrate that concentrated political power can be used to pursue overdue reforms.
For the EU, this moment calls for a more disciplined and proactive approach than in previous confrontations with democratic backsliding. Rather than reacting to rhetoric designed primarily for domestic consumption, Brussels should anchor its response in measurable outcomes.
Distinguishing between what Radev says and what his government does will be essential. For example, during the election campaign, Progressive Bulgaria promised to “free Bulgarian business from oligarchic extortion so it can invest freely, and our economy can be driven by entrepreneurship, investment, and fair competition.” If dismantling the oligarchic governance model is his defining commitment, progress should be assessed through concrete benchmarks: judicial independence, transparent public procurement, and credible investigations into high-level corruption.
The EU would also do well to reflect on its past missteps. Figures such as ex-premier Boyko Borissov were long treated as reliable partners in part because of their pro-European rhetoric. As former reformist prime minister Kiril Petkov explained, this rhetorical alignment masked governance methods and links to the Kremlin that deepened corruption and left Bulgaria highly dependent on Russian energy and influence. The lesson is clear: rhetoric is an unreliable guide; it is action that matters.
Brussels possesses meaningful tools to shape the incentives facing Radev’s government. Conditioning EU funding on rule-of-law benchmarks, strengthening oversight of fund allocation, and investing in independent media and civil society can all constrain the space for corruption. Because Russian influence in Bulgaria operates largely through compromised public officials and disinformation networks, targeting these channels should be a priority. Progress here would not only reduce external leverage but also provide a clear test of Radev’s reformist intent.
Russian disinformation deserves particular attention. In social media and digital platforms, Bulgarians are flooded with pro-Kremlin narratives, opposing military aid to Ukraine, saying that sanctions against Russia make Bulgarians poorer, and framing the EU as a source of corruption. The outgoing caretaker government of Prime Minister Andrey Gyurov sought EU assistance to counter Russian disinformation and interference, but this was too late to affect the electoral environment. The critical question now is whether the new government will take meaningful steps to counter the very disinformation system that may have aided its rise.
The paradox of Bulgaria’s election is that the concentration of power that alarms European observers may also reduce uncertainty. Radev now has both the authority to act and the responsibility to deliver. For the EU, the challenge is not simply to guard against democratic erosion, but to ensure that this consolidation of power translates into accountability rather than impunity.
Dessie Zagorcheva holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Columbia University. She specializes in international security with a focus on Russia and Eastern Europe. Her current research examines NATO’s response to Russian sharp power.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
