There is no debate among members of Congress about whether Ukraine needs the funding: they are well aware of the “shell starvation” that is setting in among Ukraine’s armed forces under a continued Russian onslaught.
And there is no genuine debate about who should foot the bill. Even as some legislators question whether America’s European allies are paying enough, they must be aware that European spending on Ukraine far outstrips American spending, and that 29 European states have sent to Ukraine a greater portion of their GDP than the US.
Rather, the arguments on Capitol Hill are about the role that America should play in the world and the purpose of its foreign policy.
On one side of the dividing line is a bipartisan coalition, including the White House and much of the Republican leadership, arguing that the US has an obligation to the world and indeed to itself to ensure that Russia is not able to rewrite history and erase an entire nation from the map of Europe.
Noting the contributions made by so many of America’s allies to Ukraine’s defense, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell summed up the argument this way: “Our partners don’t have the luxury of pretending that the world’s most dangerous aggressors are someone else’s problem. And neither do we.”
On the other side is a segment of the American right that is increasingly forthright about seeing the world in very different terms.
Shedding earlier arguments about the cost of supporting Ukraine, they now overtly question the wisdom. As the supplemental moved towards passage, Senator J.D. Vance called the effort to defend Ukraine a “new crusade” and “a new thing that American taxpayers must fund and must fund indefinitely.”
Senator Tommy Tuberville went further, calling Ukraine’s supporters “war mongers” and concluding that “Vladimir Putin wants out of this.” The bill passed 70-29 on February 13, with the support of 22 Republicans.
On one side of this divide is a vision of a structural, institutionalized American foreign policy, with a central role to play in maintaining global peace and security.
At the core of this vision is a belief that the metastasis of conflict around the world makes America and Americans less safe and less prosperous.
On the other is a vision of a transactional American foreign policy, in which foreign entanglements limit the country’s ability to pursue its immediate interests and in which, as Donald Trump recently suggested, America defends itself best when it defends others least.
This is a debate that the United States, as a democracy, should have. This debate is a core issue for this year’s US presidential election, and even the Republican primaries, where former UN Ambassador Nikki Haley has placed herself firmly in the institutionalist camp.
It is not a debate that the US can afford to postpone until the elections, however, because failing to act now in support of Ukraine risks making the shift to a transactionalist foreign policy a fait accompli.
As a major new study by the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) makes clear, Russian aggression is not a passing phenomenon. Over the past three decades, Russia’s post-Soviet leadership has consistently concluded that it needs to maintain military dominion in its former empire, as well as the ability to control political, economic, and even social developments in its erstwhile vassals.
To achieve this dominance, Russia’s leaders have likewise concluded that undermining the structures of US and European power in the world — ranging from NATO and transatlantic solidarity to the rules of the global trading and financial systems — is a critical Russian national-security interest.
Russia’s war on Ukraine, and on the West more broadly, is not a misguided adventure on which the Kremlin absentmindedly embarked, or from which they might easily be dissuaded. The militarized pursuit of regional domination and global disruption is, in Moscow’s view, the logical and indeed only route to defending Kremlin-defined national interests.
No negotiated accommodation in Ukraine will change that calculation. And, in one form or another, that same calculation is likely to outlast the reign of Vladimir Putin.
For the near- to mid-term future, then, American leaders from both parties face a stark choice: capitulate to Russia and bear the staggering costs of further war and disruption or contain Russia and restore deterrence and stability.
Given the situation on the front lines, it is no exaggeration to say that the decision point is right now.
Ukraine is paying a high and increasing price to defend both its own existence and America’s security. But Ukraine’s resilience, while remarkable, is not limitless.
While Washington dithers, Moscow’s war economy remains in high gear, flooding the front line with men and materiel, and bombarding Ukrainian civilians with increasing ferocity. By various estimates, Russia has plowed from 6%-8% of its GDP — and some 40 % of its budget — into the war effort.
American aid to Ukraine, by contrast, makes up only 0.3% of US GDP and less than 6% of total US defense spending.
Ukraine cannot hold the line without greater American support – and it should not have to. With each Ukrainian casualty, American power wanes. With each lost square mile of Ukrainian territory, the cost of restoring peace and security multiplies.
China, Iran, Venezuela, and other challengers are watching, believing that an America that doesn’t do what it takes in the heart of Europe is vulnerable around the globe. And as America’s adversaries seek to exploit those perceived vulnerabilities, the resulting conflicts will only send more refugees to the southern border.
For all of those reasons, containing the Russian threat — and preventing it from metastasizing into a global conflagration — must begin in Ukraine.
As the CEPA study explains, the costs of containing Russia after ceding ground in Ukraine will be prohibitively high. A resounding Ukrainian victory, by contrast, flips the script, by disrupting Russia’s strategy, challenging China’s and Iran’s ambitions, and restoring confidence in US and NATO deterrence.
All of those interests can be achieved, but only if America acts now.
Sam Greene is Director of the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis and Professor of Russian Politics at King’s College London.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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