The frequent presence of the Kremlin’s sanctions-dodging vessels off the coast of Gotland, where they perform dangerous ship-to-ship transfers of oil, is a clear provocation, not to mention a looming threat to marine life.
Now the Swedish Navy reports that shadow vessels in the waters of Sweden’s exclusive economic zone don’t just conduct their regular business: they’re also equipped with communications gear that is in no way needed by standard merchant vessels. The Russian shadow fleet appears to simultaneously be a spy fleet.
This collection of ships — estimated to number about 1,400 vessels worldwide — may operate in the shadows, but it’s indisputably there, and its activities are growing – especially in the Baltic Sea. The fleet transports pretty much anything asked of them, and in the past two years that has meant a lot of Russian oil, because Russia wants to keep exporting above the Western-imposed price cap.
Since vessels owned, flagged, or insured in the West (which is virtually the world’s entire merchant fleet, because Western insurers dominate shipping) can’t transport sanctioned cargo, Russia has turned to the shadow fleet.
These are aging vessels that feature mysterious owners and de facto lack full insurance. The vessels also frequently change their flag registration, though many appear to have settled on Gabon and Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), two countries that lack maritime expertise and seem willing to accept any entrant into their registries. The two registries do little if their vessels cause accidents or need help.
This all means trouble for the Baltic Sea states since a large percentage of Russia’s oil departs from its Baltic Sea ports. (This author discussed the shadow fleet in a report here.)
In recent weeks, shadow vessels have also taken to loitering in Sweden’s exclusive economic zone to the east of Gotland. And they don’t just loiter: they frequently conduct ship-to-ship transfers of oil, the perilous maneuver by which oil is transferred from one ship to another at sea.
They could choose to do so somewhere else but have selected the area just outside Sweden’s territorial waters (inside which Sweden would have a bit more power to intervene.) Their presence is certainly provocative. And such is the risk these vessels pose to marine life that earlier this month the environmental organization Greenpeace decided to intervene. “Oil fuels war. People want peace,” Greenpeace activists painted on the bunker vessel that supports the shadow fleet off the coast of Gotland.
The issue is also worrying the Swedish government. Foreign Minister Tobias Billström has been pushing the European Commission to include measures against the vessels in its next round of sanctions, he said on April 22.
The misery caused by the shadow fleet doesn’t end there. “We’re finding antennas and masts,” Rear Admiral Ewa Skoog Haslum, the Chief of the Swedish Navy, told Swedish National Television this month.
The Swedish Navy has observed that the vessels feature communications equipment that is in no way necessary or standard on merchant vessels. “We sense that in what’s moving around at sea, that they sometimes has additional objectives in their activities,” Rear Admiral Skoog Haslum said. The vessels, she suggested, could be part of Russian hybrid activities in the Baltic Sea.
It’s worrisome that these ships, which like all merchant vessels have the right to sail through every country’s waters, appear to be doubling as listening stations. It’s especially troubling that they’re clearly keen to scope out Gotland, a key strategic island in the middle of the Baltic, where the Swedish armed forces have recently reestablished a permanent military presence in response to the Russian threat, and where NATO may also decide to conduct activities. Indeed, so important is Gotland that NATO has to conduct activities there. Russia, of course, has the right to learn as much about these activities as it can – but not by using civilian vessels.
This is not the first time the Kremlin has illegally used civilian vessels for espionage. For years, Russian fishing boats in Norwegian waters have featured communications equipment of a sophistication no fishing boat requires.
Earlier this year, researchers at CSIS established that an astounding 80% of China’s research vessels engage in “suspect behavior or possess organizational links suggesting their involvement in advancing Beijing’s geopolitical agenda.” Late last year, one such vessel – the Zhu Hai Yun (珠海云) – circumnavigated Taiwan for no reason that could be explained by scientific research.
There is, alas, little Sweden, Norway, or Taiwan can do about vessels that exploit the rights afforded civilian vessels by conducting work for the military.
If these or other countries’ coast guards were to approach the allegedly civilian vessels and demand to investigate their gear, the Russian and Chinese governments could construe it as provocative and retaliate.
And because global maritime rules give all civilian vessels the right to so-called innocent passage, Sweden, Finland, Taiwan, or any other country definitely can’t block such vessels from their waters.
What they can do is call them out, which is exactly what Rear Admiral Skoog Haslum has done. The more we talk about the shadow fleet’s activities, the less this murky and subversive fleet will remain in the shadows.
Elisabeth Braw is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
