Russia’s much-trumpeted wonder weapons have been a bust in Ukraine. “Unstoppable” hypersonic Kinzhal missiles have been intercepted by American-made Patriot missiles. Nuclear-powered Poseidon tsunami torpedoes are useless unless Putin wants to start World War III. And next-generation T-14 Armata tanks have proven so elusive that the vehicle could reasonably be renamed the Unicorn.
And yet, finally, Russia may have found a wonder weapon that works. The irony is it’s not really new. It turns out that old-fashioned dumb bombs have become Moscow’s most effective weapon.
Or, more accurately, Russia is using dumb bombs made smart via a satellite guidance kit. Ukrainian soldiers complain that their positions are being devastated by big Soviet-era iron bombs converted into precision-guided glide bombs such as 1.5-ton FAB-1500 and the new 3.4-ton FAB-3000. Lobbed from high altitude by Russian aircraft beyond the range of most Ukrainian anti-aircraft missiles, the devices are near-impossible to intercept.
The weapons contributed in large part to the recent fall of the city of Avdiivka, with buildings and fortifications being demolished. Russia has already dropped 3,500 glide bombs this year, and that deluge of explosives is likely to continue and even expand. It’s a worrying development and it’s not immediately clear that Ukraine has an easy answer.
Glide bombs date back to Nazi Germany’s Fritz-X and Hs-293 weapons, and continued with the US AGM-62 Walleye in Vietnam and Desert Storm. These weapons were too expensive for widespread use, but in the late 1990s came a game-changer: the US Joint Direct Attack Munition, or JDAM.
JDAM is actually a kit that adds GPS guidance and a steerable tail to iron bombs. At around $20,000 a time — plus a few thousand more for an iron bomb — the result is a precision-guided munition that is far cheaper and easier to manufacture than a purpose-built guided weapon such as a $100,000 HIMARS or million-dollar ATACMS rocket.
JDAM is an American concept, but it’s a perfect fit for the Russian way of war. It takes advantage of Russia’s immense stockpile of Soviet-era iron bombs. Better yet, glide bombs allow Russia’s air force to do what it has failed to do for two years: provide meaningful support to the army.
Russian aircraft have stayed behind the front lines, kept at bay by Ukrainian air defenses and too far away to accomplish more than lobbing missiles at Ukrainian cities. To achieve some kind of victory, troops need to advance. Yet they have lacked the tactical competence to do more than inch forward, and only with the help of massive fire support.
This is where the glide bombs come in. With a range of around 40 miles, they operate at the outer limits of the Ukrainian air defense range. JDAM-type weapons are fire-and-forget: they are guided by GPS, which means the launch aircraft doesn’t need to loiter in air defense range while illuminating the target. They are also small, very hard to shoot down and pack more explosive power for their size than artillery shells.
The glide bomb war has been hotting up. Ukraine’s reported downing of seven Russian jets in just one week in February, and more aircraft destroyed on the ground by drones, have been judged an attempt to strike back against the weapon carriers. But the flurry of reports on combat aircraft destruction has ended, suggesting Russia has changed tactics to preserve planes. Meanwhile, the use of the weapons continues.
Are Russian glide bombs as accurate as Western JDAMs? For Moscow, the question doesn’t matter. Since World War II, Russia has relied on massive firepower to obliterate enemy defenses before the ground assault begins. A glide bomb that leaves a 70-foot-wide crater doesn’t need pinpoint accuracy.
Ukrainian leaders seem in despair. Their forces are already exhausted from two years of war, stocks of weapons and especially artillery ammunition are low, and now troops are being pounded by giant bombs. Airpower is most demoralizing when the target can’t respond. Ukraine’s air defenses and small air force have done a good job of covering the army, but this may be coming to an end.
What can Ukraine do? More long-range anti-aircraft missile launchers, such as Patriot and Franco-Italian SAMP/T, with a range of up to 75 miles, would help by downing or deterring Russian planes from dropping glide bombs. Russia would make an extra effort to destroy or neutralize these weapons: two Patriot batteries were reportedly destroyed by Russian missiles in March.
Another option is jamming GPS signals, as Russia has done with HIMARS and other Western GPS-guided munitions. But Russia’s electronic warfare capabilities far exceed those of Ukraine and its Western allies.
The best option would be fighters, namely the 60 or so F-16s slated to be transferred to Ukraine by several European nations. With pilots now undergoing training, the jets may be operational this year. The question is whether upgraded 1980s F-16s are capable of taking on advanced Russian fighters such as the Su-35, which are armed with long-range air-to-air missiles.
If there is any comfort to Ukrainians, it’s simply that Russia’s wonder weapons have yet to provide a decisive advantage. Bombs that leave big craters are useful, but ultimately the suicide battalions of paroled convicts and sullen conscripts will have to go in.
Ukrainians can make those attacks as costly as possible while waiting for some technological countermeasure that will at least partly mitigate the glide bomb threat.
Michael Peck is a defense commentator. He can be found on Twitter and LinkedIn.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
