Edward Lucas
Hello, everybody, and greetings from London wherever you are in the world. I’m Edward Lucas, I’m Senior Advisor at CEPA and it’s a great pleasure to welcome our distinguished panel and also all the participants in this press pool on the anniversary. So just to cut to the chase. This is an enormously important both for the countries that concerned and for NATO. Relations with Russia have deteriorated very sharply since then. But it was, I just want to make the point that this, when it was a decision which were taken back in 2000. This was not in the teeth of Russian opposition. It was with the enthusiastic support of Vladimir Putin, who was often extremely good deal with as part of the overall enlargement package. So once again, welcome to our excellent panelists. We have Ambassador Paul Jones, former Ambassador to to Warsaw for the United States, who’s now a Distinguished Fellow at CEPA. We have General Landrum, who is now a senior fellow in our Transatlantic Defense and Security Program, but used to be the Vice, the Deputy Chair of the Military Committee. We have Mathieu Boulègue, Senior Fellow from our Transatlantic Defence and Security Program. He’s originally from France. And most important we have a voice from the region. My very old friend Dahlia Bankauskaitė former Lithuanian diplomat, and now a Senior Fellow in our Democratic Resilience Program. Welcome to you all, we’re going to have a bit of a discussion for just a few minutes, everyone’s going to make a one or two minutes intervention. And then we’re going into the q&a with our guests from the media. So I want to come to you first of all, Ambassador Jones, if you can unmute yourself. If you would, give us a couple of diplomatic and expert perspective on the importance of Poland’s membership of NATO, which of course happened before 2002. But having the Baltic states in NATO certainly changed the security perspective for Poland. So, a couple of minutes from you, please Ambassador.

Paul Jones
Sure. Thank you so much and delighted to be on this call and welcome everyone who’s joining. I was the US Ambassador to Poland in 2015 to 18. And I can tell you in a word what NATO membership meant to Poland, and in a word was freedom. After its experience of being, you know, invaded by Hitler then Stalin at the outbreak of World War Two, which mirrored it’s being carved up and for 123 years of obliterated from the map of Europe in the 19th century, leading up to World War One. It obviously has very profound security concerns. But what it, how it affected how NATO membership, I think, affected Poland, and Poland’s defense, and this would, you know, different parts of this would also apply to some other countries in Central Eastern Europe. But it brought the United States sort of defense umbrella, to Poland. And it did that in a way that was, that was regional. So Poland, obviously has, or has a concept of its defense, very much indivisible, with its regional neighbors. Poland perceives if Russia were to, you know, if I take, invade or take, try to take a piece of territory of some of its neighbors, whether in the Baltics, in Ukraine elsewhere, that Poland is very much next. So it brought in the Polish view, US and European defense in a regional perspective, that eventually with the inclusion of other allies, went from the Baltics, down to the down to Romania and Bulgaria. And it also made the commitment of its allied defense, nonpartisan or bipartisan and consistent. Not depending on the politics, of, you know, whether the politics in Warsaw, the politics in European allies or the politics in Washington. And that was very important. We saw during the the recent government of Poland under Law and Justice, where there were some difficulties between, on issues of democratic institutions, between Washington, Brussels, Berlin, and Warsaw. But that really didn’t affect the security commitments. And finally, I’d say it helped Poland and it helped other allies that joined integrate with Europe and the region, which helped them economically a great deal. So I’ll pause there, but happy to go on how it may have changed since Russia’s invasion.

Edward Lucas
Super. we’ll look forward. There’s an enormous amount to discuss here, both in the past, present and, future. But I’m going to go straight over to Lance, from your perspective, what are your thoughts on the 20 years of the of the Big Bang expansion?

Lance Landrum
Yeah, thank you. I’m very happy to be here in this forum. I think with the addition of the Central states and the Eastern states in the NATO membership, their security clearly has been enhanced. Those who’ve been members, right, they now have the blanket of Article Five, and they have the blankets of NATO’s deterrence and defense. And I think what we have seen, particularly with this surging, malign influence, and aggressive Russia since 2008, arguably, if you will, with Georgia, and then following in 2014 infiltrations into Ukraine, that NATO has started to shift. And what we’ve seen in example, is the enhanced forced presence, right? These were the multinational battle groups that are in the Baltic states, and also into Poland. And it’s not just some forces. There’s a multilateral aspect of it. There’s a NATO flag over it. And there’s an increased opportunity for these nations to interoperate and to act together as well. And I think the other thing to remember associated with this is that these nations are now under the sort of this umbrella of NATO. And if we recall, November and December of 2021, into January and February of 2022. That NATO’s number one goal was to be part of an international political effort in order to bolster diplomacy to prevent conflict in Ukraine. It’s number one goal preventing conflict. But NATO’s goal right after that was to prevent the expansion of any conflict in Ukraine into the territory of NATO that would draw on NATO into conflict. And in that sense, it has been successful. Now, we could argue whether or not Russia ever intended to cross into NATO territory, but regardless, it hasn’t happened and it unforeseeable future it doesn’t seem to be happening. But NATO tried to be a player in different things like [inaudible]. So these member states clearly have benefited from it, they continue to benefit from it. Now it has evolved since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, I’m happy to go into that and later we’d like to transition.

Edward Lucas
Super, thanks so much for that. And I’m just for everyone’s reference, I’ve put it in the chat, a PDF of the, from the Rome Summit, which includes the signatures of everyone at the end, including Putin’s signature. So if you’re interested in historical curiosities, and going back to a completely different era, that’s well worth a look. Let’s go to Mathieu here, because it was not so long ago that your president Emmanuel Macron, for whom of course, you don’t bear personal responsibility, refer to NATO as brain dead. And now France is absolutely leading the charge on reviving the European pillar of NATO. It’s always been a degree of ambiguity on the French side about exactly what they, what you want from NATO. So what are your thoughts on the 20th Anniversary?

Mathieu Boulègue
Thanks a lot, Edward. If anyone has some specific questions about what Macron’s thinking, please feel free to reach out by chat or directly by email, I can give you my concerned point of view from that. But listen, I think what is interesting to note is that 20 years onwards and 70 years onwards with the Alliance, the perception that we have that the alliance is enlarging, for instance, or expanding, quote-on-quote, I think couldn’t be more right. But also couldn’t be more wrong. Could it be more wrong, because the alliance is not enlarging or expanding. It is countries that are actually willingly and legally joining the Alliance. Right. So we should not say, and I think it’s important to remind as well for the general public in terms of the writing, that we shouldn’t even say NATO’s enlarging or there was an expansion of NATO. It is, in recent months, Sweden and Finland joining, willingly, the Alliance, which means that NATO borders are not really expanding. It’s basically countries feeling insecure, that are fulfilling that mission of collective security, fulfilling that mission of better deterrence, better dialogue and better cooperation. So I think it’s really important in terms of the optics, because the opposite of these optics, that NATO is expanding, is basically Russian propaganda, right? The fait accompli that the Kremlin has been feeding us in terms of information warfare and information propaganda, that the alliance is getting closer to us, quote on quote, that the alliance is out there to get us, quote on quote, that is going to place defensive or offensive missile systems that could hold Russia at risk of interdiction or destruction. So I think the opposite is equally dangerous when it comes to feeding that sort of propaganda machine around the expansion of NATO. So that would be the other first thing. And then from being brain dead to being back on track. I think this is also one of the key finding. of that report that we had recently on the future of European security and NATO, is that even if it’s brain dead, it’s still pretty muscular, right? That regardless, I think the brain dead comment was probably one of the most misinterpreted code ever. And I don’t think it was leading to anything else, but just scaremongering. But in any case, the alliance is back. And it’s still fulfilling its mission of collective defense and ensuring the security of its members and I think it took two invasions of Ukraine to realize that and we have the track record of policy and change and reform, to show that since 2014-15, and the initial response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, things now are up to speed. That we have two new allies, we have a collective security that is probably more insured than ever, regardless of potential statements by some US politicians seeking re election or something in the United States. The Alliance is still there, and still standing. And I think it is now understanding again, what its core purpose and its mission is.

Edward Lucas
Thanks so much for that. And now finally, Dahlia. I still remember the absolutely transformative feeling in Lithuania when the festival with the Prague Summit. Making the decision and then when NATO actually happened. And it’s a kind of paradox that Lithuania has never in its history been more secure, even though the security environment probably hasn’t seemed more daunting since 1939. So do you remember what you were doing on this day 20 years ago?

Dalia Bankauskaitė
Thank you. Hi, Edward. And thank you for having me here. Yes, it was 20 years ago and recently, we’ve been exchanging with my colleagues actually remembering their day, March 29. Very close and Baltic States joining NATO 20 years ago and being accepted to NATO 20 years ago, confirms that NATO’s strategic judgment was absolutely correct. Taking the perspective it was of a critical importance, if we take into account the current situation. And it offered to the Baltic States, it offered stability and security to our societies. Actually it offered us freedom to create the life we want, to create our state. And Edward you know that the strive for freedom is part of Baltic identity, and strive for just things. However, when we look back, the road to the membership to joining NATO was not an easy one. And for Lithuania, it was quite, quite challenging in the sense that Lithuania first of all, applied, wrote a letter, asking to be accepted to NATO, and not waiting for the invitation. And it was the context that first of all, the NATO allies had to tame, to get used to the idea of accepting other new members, one thing. Another thing, it was the time of concerns about establishing relationship with Russia, not provoking them, appeasement relationship. What else, then the issue of Baltics being defendability of Baltics, capability of Baltic self defense, as well as defendability that’s already the responsibility of NATO. Russia, offering its security guarantees and also initiating negotiations with the Baltic states. So all that package as well as the idea of keeping neutrality on the eastern flank. From today’s perspective, it just sounds quite unrealistic or worse. On the other hand, even then, to be very fair, Baltics understood that they are not going oh, we are not going to be security consumers, but we have to think of how to, to contribute too. So I think we were one of the first, even prior to joining NATO as full fledged members, we started participating in peacekeeping missions, Afghanistan, Mali, and so many other 120 or 50, I counted. And today, Baltics, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia are the key contributing to defense, you know well above 2%, actually, we talk about almost three or 3% of our GDP for defense. So perhaps I will stop here.

Edward Lucas
Super. Well, thanks so much for setting the scene to our four panelists. And it’s now over to our very distinguished guests from a large number of media outlets, I see dozens and dozens here. So if you want to raise your hand, you can do that with, by electronic means, or you can pose a question in the chat. And I will happily read it out for you. And we’re going to carry on for roughly the next 40 minutes. And so we’ll try and get through as many questions as we can. I suppose the thing that leaps out for me, from this, is that the Baltic States and between central and also Romania and Bulgaria, but chiefly the Baltic States were really brought in as kind of NATO light. At the beginning, there was no enhance for presence, there was the absolute minimum of air policing. And there were no contingency plans. The contingency plans came in only after I think, after the Strasburg/Kehl Summit. So there were several years where your deterrence consisted of having a laminated copy of Article Five nailed to the front of your post with Russia. And everyone relied on that. And of course, it’s been a huge change since then, we’ve actually started building defense. And we are increasingly worried that we haven’t done enough and we have a lot more to do. So please do jump in. I’m looking at. I’m scanning between my screens at the moment and I see we’ve got everyone from we’ve got Radio Canada, which I used to stream for we’ve got the New York Times. We have media from all over the world so. And I know journalists don’t like being shy. So please, yes, Christina, I think I saw your did your hand go up briefly, Christina. Now it’s gone down again. Jen Kirby, Jen can turn your screen on so we can see you and ask a question.

Jen Kirby
Sure. Thank you so much for doing this. I really appreciate it. I guess I was. I hope this isn’t sort of going far afield. But I’m kind of curious what the panelists think of these Eastern Baltic States and their role in potentially ushering Ukraine into NATO or creating some sort of security arrangement. Obviously, we know Washington and Berlin are very reluctant. But these Baltics, the Eastern European states have been kind of a champion for Ukraine. And I’m kind of curious if you could offer some perspective on how they’re thinking about it. Thanks.

Edward Lucas
Dalia I think that’s one for you. How do Lithuanians regard the prospect of Ukrainian membership? Then I might come to Lance. Next, just to see how it might look from the military committes’s point of view. They used to work. Dalia.

Dalia Bankauskaitė
Thank you. Very short answer, very short one. So Baltics, Lithuania are full of support of membership, Ukrainian membership in NATO. And it was to some extent disappointing, that Vilnius summit was productive in defense in delivering defense capabilities or defense plans, regional plans, but it was not, run short of really defining the the future for Ukraine’s possibility of joining NATO. So definitely, definitely the aim is for for Washington, that being united, being being united in NATO, to offer Ukraine membership perspective. We absolutely know that invitation does not mean the membership immediately tomorrow, but a clear map. Very concrete and, and less vague phrases like as long as it takes but really giving a proper timeline. That’s, the bold extent. And, and, okay, I can’t say entirely on the Central and Eastern Europe. But that’s, that’s we are in that group.

Edward Lucas
And Lance? How does it look from your, from your point of view? Any thoughts on? And then we’ll come to Lara Jake’s next in New York Times. But Lance a couple of minutes of your thoughts.

Lance Landrum
Yeah thank you. I think, well, let me just start. I you know, my sense is that the Baltic states have been very supportive of Ukraine membership, right. I think they see a lot of themselves in this quest for membership from Ukraine and the process that they’ve been going through and the trials and tribulations. A little bit on the military aspect. Let me just share with you that Ukraine was under the process of being a partner, enhanced opportunity partner, etc. So we’ve seen all of that. And one aspect of that was the transformation of their military forces, particularly interoperability of the military forces, NATO’s standards adaptation by the military forces. And I can tell you, that I saw it firsthand before the invasion, that Ukraine took this very seriously, very seriously, and made great advancements in very tangible and demonstrable ways before the Russian invasion. Most impressively is I saw the Ukraine military forces and their leadership continue this transformation and this work towards NATO standards and interoperability to satisfy the NATO requirements even after the invasion. And so that was really striking the way we had personal interactions with their leadership, with very tangible transformation efforts and doctrine changes and training changes and interoperability changes that really matched with what NATO was doing. And then the final thought on this is let’s remember, before the invasion, I think most people would think that NATO was helping Ukraine it was sort of a one way street, right? It was NATO help, NATO expertise, NATO training, Western nations framing, etc. Now, I have to tell you, it’s a two way street. We have a lot to learn from the Western nations. We have a lot to learn from the NATO organization from what Ukraine has done during this conflict. And things like command and control of disaggregated forces, logistics and sustainment of disaggregated forces, the innovation and creativity that they put forth on the battlefield, particularly related to technology. So I think that there’s a lot of benefit that their horses have gained from this and that we could gain from them and we’ll see how the politics play out.

Edward Lucas
Great, let’s um, we’ve got a good question coming in from Maurizio. But first of all, I’m going to go to Lara Jakes in the New York Times. So Lara faraway.

Lara Jakes
Hi, thank you. I just wanted to follow up on Jen’s very good question and the observations that both of you just made. As you know, there’s a movement in Washington and some quarters of the Biden administration to let Ukraine begin ascension talks to NATO in the same way that it’s beginning ascension talks to the EU. And as I’m sure you’re aware, this is getting pushed back the higher level of the policymakers. So I’m wondering what can be done from outside of Washington between now and the NATO summit in July to perhaps change this dynamic? As I’m sure the panelists here would want to do? And what does it say about NATO if they do not even begin the beginning of ascension talks, given that the EU is already doing that?

Edward Lucas
Thanks very much, Laura. So accession talks and the dance run. And I think let’s go to Ambassador Jones, and then Mathieu on that. So Paul, you go first.

Paul Jones
Yeah, thanks. I think, essential to getting in what I think many of us agree would be the right direction, is to make clear what I think I would certainly say polls believe, and many of us believe is that Ukraine would be a great added advantage for the Alliance in terms of defense and security. You know, between Ukraine, you know, as Lance was indicating, has developed, tremendous capability and tremendous interoperability. I would stretch that back to when Russia, you know, originally invaded Ukraine back in 2014. So it’s been 10 years now. And we and NATO allies, such as the United States, Poland, and the UK, in particular, worked with Ukraine during that period. And then obviously, it’s ramped up tremendously since then. I think, you know, the debate, the discussion should be, you know, how Ukraine adds to the alliance in terms of defense capability, as well as in terms of values and completion, sort of another step toward the completion of Europe as a whole and free continent. Poland, obviously, is very strongly in favor, I would just take us back to 2013. The entire eastern flank was nervous of Russia at that time, later invaded Ukraine in 2014. We saw in 2022, when I got to Poland in 2015. I was looking over previous communications. And, you know, the polls had quite emphatically alerted, warned that the US administration in 2010 of Russians intentions in Ukraine, particularly but along the eastern flank. So I think bringing Ukrainian as a strength, as making the Alliance stronger is our best argument.

Edward Lucas
Great and Mathieu. thoughts from you? And if you want to give us an insight into the evolving French thinking about NATO, we’re very grateful.

Mathieu Boulègue
Yeah, sure. Yeah. I’ll give it a try. But yeah sure. To sort of piggyback on what Ambassador Jones said, and I fully agree with his remarks, so you have two ways of seeing it. Right. The first way when it comes to NATO trying to incorporate more members is the deterrence part, right? It’s the Russia policy. The fact that yes, if we do announce that Ukraine will at some point, join the Alliance very overtly and start making the first steps it will lead to escalatory patterns. However, that’s the opposite side is self deterrence. NATO policy cannot be solely defined and ruled by what the Kremlin does and think. We have much wider policy around it and we should not be self deterred entirely just because there are proclamations and saber rattling, specifically nuclear saber rattling. This will be a very defining moment for the Alliance, if we get there, in terms of fine tuning communication, fine tuning the message and make sure that when we say a we mean a and it’s understood as a and not distorted as B by the Kremlin, which will be a very strong and tough endeavor. But we have to try right? Look at the debate around weapons procurement for Ukraine. About two years ago, we were still debating whether F 16 or HIMARS would be a bit too much in terms of how we would antagonize the Kremlin if we were coming to aid Ukraine. And now we have F 16 HIMARS in Ukraine, trained by NATO, NATO advisors and troops from NATO countries. So we have increasingly, we have increased the temperature, basically the lobster in the tank analogy. We have made sure that the lobster is being boiled to perfection. And we haven’t thrown the lobster directly into hot water. Same for the troops, right. And going into French thinking, for instance, we could have been a bit smarter in our approach to signaling the intention to send NATO troops, right. Boots on the ground can mean anything from cooks, to medics, to engineers, not necessarily war fighters, immediately. We could have been a bit more coherent in our approach, I would say when it comes to communicating what troops really mean. Same for Ukraine joining the Alliance. We need to be a bit more decisive and be smart in our communication approach to make sure that we do integrate Ukraine and the future of European security, because Ukraine’s fate depends on it. And our own fate in terms of European security also depends on Ukraine. So it’s a very complicated balance, we have to try. If we don’t try, we’ll fail automatically, right. 100% of those who participated have won. So I’ll stop there

Edward Lucas
Super. We’ve now got a question from Maurizio, who is Maurizio Geri, the GMU, postdoc EU fellow. And his question is about this dime diplomacy information/cyber military and economy toolbox. And his question is about what NATO should do in order to win the hybrid war that’s going on against Putin. He says, what should we do quickly, to win the hybrid war with Putin before he invades other regions in neighboring nation states, continuing the pattern since 2008? So that’s a really interesting question, because NATO is not really geared up for hybrid. It does defensive hybrid, but it’s, most of the tools in the hybrid arsenal are in the hands of governments rather than NATO planners. So I’m going to throw this nice, easy question to you, Lance. Can NATO do offensive hybrid? If so, how should it do it? And how should it do it quickly?

Lance Landrum
Yeah, thank you for passing that over to me Edward. And listen, I’ll agree with you as far as NATO being a bit disaggregated on on this. And despite being sort of the military member, with military background on on the panel, I have to answer this question, starting with the political aspect of it, right? Because I, here’s, here’s my sense of this, right. There needs to be the highest levels of political agreement and census and buy-in associated with this aspect that leads to clear policy. And a strategy associated with being able to resist the malign influence, the hybrid influence, this gray zone activities with respect to Russia in this case. And I think, you know, when you look at that holistically, you know, you kind of, you’re going to see the opportunities for offensive type capability, you’re going to see the opportunity for defensive capability, which should include things like civil resilience, government resilience, infrastructure resilience, society resilience, and information are part of this. And I think that there has to be some reckoning associated with the level of risk that the governments, the member state governments are willing to accept as they give consensus for a NATO policy associated with this. And right now, I just don’t see that coming together in a way that is unified and in solidarity from the NATO alliance, like we said, it’s aggregated. I think, all of that is not a very good answer to the quickly part of the question. But I think it is one that is very, very necessary in order to put together a deterrent effect, which has a very clear political will and political credibility combined with a level [inaudible] and capability such that the adversary sees that the costs are much greater than the benefit on that. So I know that’s a high level kind of vague answer, but this is an incredibly difficult one to put together in a very coherent way for the Alliance.

Edward Lucas
Super. I’m going to come to Dalia next. Cause Dalia, you’ve literally written the book on hybrid from a Lithuanian point of view. I can’t think of anyone better to answer that. Then I’m going to get Mathieu. Then we’ve got a good question about Poland from Vanessa from the AP and I’ll give that one to Paul. But um, darling, give us your thoughts on hybrid. First of all.

Dalia Bankauskaitė
I’m really following up on other thoughts already said. And immediately listening to the question I thought comprehensive defense or total defense concept that actually first starts from the national level and this is whole of society approach that should really built up. So in addition to traditional defense, these these competencies, this comprehensive defense approach should be implemented as much as possible. And here, here if whole of government approach because that’s traditional, that’s military approach is quite understandable among Member States, NATO member states. So whole of society approach bottom up, cooperating with the civil government is much less cultivated. Differently what we do in the Baltic Sea Region, it’s three Baltic States, together with the Nordic countries, really work on that comprehensive defense concept that is not only in the theory, but it’s, the interoperability is implemented in reality. So I can really enlarge more but I can also say that recently, we finished, we’re about to finish the resilience curriculum for military academies for learners to introduce, to set a certain framework for encouraging comprehensive defense for member states and putting them on the same page. And I want us to step in a mentioning when we talk about better, about arguments for Ukraine, being a reliable NATO partner and joining at some point in NATO, that nobody doubts about military, traditional defense capacities and capabilities of the country. But it’s also they’re extremely strong in a whole of society approach. So this is also a learning factor as well as contributor to the overall the transatlantic defense capabilities.

Edward Lucas
But thanks, because it’s interesting, when we talk about hybrid our focus naturally shifts to defense and resilience, and there’s a huge amount we can learn from the Nordic and Baltic countries on that. But Maurizio’s question was actually about what we can do offensive hybrid. Mathieu, do you have any thoughts on that?

Mathieu Boulègue
I do actually and I want to take more counterintuitive and bit more assertive approach. Bottom line is hybrid doesn’t exist. Okay. At least in Kremlin’s terms. Hybrid is great for horticulture. It’s great for genetics, because it breeds a mix of ambiguous methods, whether it’s short of war, sub threshold, you name it below Article Five. The Kremlin is not ambiguous in its approach. They are at war with us, okay. It’s an extremely aggressive statement. It’s a statement that nobody in western capitals wants to hear. And I recognize that, but it’s something that is slowly shifting the way we do approach the current Kremlin leadership. And we do approach deterrence against that leadership. Not least because they define themselves in a full scale conflict against NATO and Western interests. It’s not a war with tanks, it’s not a war with weapons the way we usually define them as Article Five, but it’s still very much a low intensity conflict. It’s a form of war, short of bang, if you will. So they’re not ambiguous at all, when they use cyber attacks, electrical and magnetic disruption or information warfare capabilities, it isn’t very much war, it’s just that we haven’t defined a threshold as it being necessarily considered or understood as open conflict, to confrontation with said Russian leadership. So I think the wind in at least in the sort of Russia watching community is going towards that understanding that it is very much a low intensity conflict. And that hybrid is in a way, something of the past. It doesn’t change the tools and Lance mentioned it about gray zone operations, for instance, what we call sub threshold provocations and so on, that are equally defined as a means of warfare against us. And whatever comes next in the Kremlin, whether it’s bionic Putin or post Putin will still remain as such. So that changes our approach to deterrence, that changes our approach to how we do anticipate the more offensive or aggressive or bolder actions against the Kremlin. And I think the past two years with Ukraine have shown us that we can be bolder, right? And that’s a whole different discussion. I’m sure we could have an hour and a half discussions about red lines about what deterrence in the gray zone looks like. But sub threshold deterrence and when bolder selective actions in the gray zone look like for us to increase the temperature of say, said lobster tank once again. So just you know, I don’t want to go into that debate because it’s it’s way too long. But please make sure that the framing of that understanding is, you know, going where the wind is going and the wind is no longer about it’s just being hybrid, we’re not too sure, it’s war. Okay? And this is something that is highly unpalatable for policymakers. But that we have to unfortunately accept because the competitor that we’re facing has already accepted it and is no longer ambiguous about all these things.

Edward Lucas
Well, thanks. I think we could all make a good resolution never to talk about hybrid ever again. I never liked it. I always thought the old Soviet term active measures was perfectly, perfectly adequate for that. Now, we’ve got a great question now from, a very topical one, from Vanessa Grera, who is the AP correspondent in Warsaw, Poland. And she says, What about the repeated Russian incursions into the airspace of of Poland, NATO country, the latest is under 39 seconds when a missile went over Polish airspace, but this is by far not the first. So let me come to you, Paul. If you were still sitting in your ambassador’s office, and what telegram would you be drafting to Washington, with what recommendations should you be, would you be giving in response to what is a actually quite a serious breach of NATO’s territorial integrity?

Paul Jones
Hey, thanks. Thanks, everyone. And Thanks, Vanessa. Good, good to speak with you again. So first, I’d say you know, I honestly don’t know, I have no insight from the United States, nor the Polish side. On specifically how they’re assessing this and other incursions. I’d say a couple of things. One is, for context, one is during my time, and I’m sure it persists, the Poles are constantly tested by Russian air force in the north by, you know, active measures from various kinds. And they take all of those tests extremely seriously. They usually don’t publicize them, when they’re not made public for other reasons. In the lead up in my time there. And they, you know, consider every incursion in any way, as a way to test, to probe, to assess defenses, and to assess response times and a number of other things. I would say, one of the I think great successes of NATO’s and Polands response to the more recent invasion of Ukraine in 2022, is to provide the level of security that has made what could have been a weak link of the supply routes through Poland into Ukraine, not at all the way we claimed. I mean, I think we’ve seen the Russians be very cautious and avoid in, you know, most respects, any incursions or actions against that supply line, because they know how Poland and the alliance, the United States would react to that. I would say on these specific incursions, in the sense of is it intentional or not? In the end, it doesn’t necessarily matter, because it will be, it is I’m sure, being taken with the utmost seriousness, and I’m sure responses are being taken in order to further detour or respond to such actions in the future.

Edward Lucas
Vanessa, do you want to come back on that with a follow up either to Paul or one of the other panelists?

Vanessa Gera
I think that was a really great response. It does raise the level of anxieties in Polish society. So I guess, yeah, I guess I would, I would be curious. And also, I’ve been thinking about this issue of the anxieties that people are, are experiencing now in this region, and how much of them are reasonable and how much are actually part of Russia’s sort of, you know, we don’t want to call it hybrid warfare. But you know, we’re against the West, to make people feel afraid. There are stories in the press here about people trying to buy second homes in Spain or even moving to Spain just to get away, people are buying gold, and it’s actually pushed, you know, gold up to an all time high. And it’s like, it’s not without cost, because people are making like really expensive, like financial decisions based on their fears.

Edward Lucas
Yeah, well, I think this is a really important point. This is whether, it was a mistake or not, it’s slowly salami slicing are deterent. we’ve seen in your neighboring country, the Czech Republic, the Vrbětice arms dumps being blown up. We’ve seen assassinations while in Germany a couple of years ago, to one in Britain years before that, but again, again, we’re seeing different sorts of pinprick attacks. And we never seem to have anything to do in response except issue cross press releases and say we’re gravely concerned. Lance, what should we do?

Lance Landrum
Yeah, thanks. I think this is a really interesting and very well put questions and the comments associated with it because I think this is a very specific example of how this cross cuts against a lot of the sort of themes and concepts that we’re talking about, like policy associated with resisting Russian malign influence, the hybrid aspect that Mathieu said that is just really just they are mixed with tradition whats not something that’s parsed out separate. Dalia, total defense, civil resilience, etc. I would repeat what the Ambassador said the nations and the NATO alliance take this very seriously. And they do a very detailed scrub of the intelligence associated with it, both the technical aspects of the intelligence and also the human mental aspect of the intelligence, which is really hard to determine the intent, right? So these things could be just accidents, we’ve seen evidence of that. These things maybe are some evidence of probing and a way to test, and a way to desensitize a little bit. Sort of this mix of this hybrid along with traditional conventional warfare that Mathieu talked about. But I think the other thing that we need to really think about if we’re going to react to this is let’s look back what Turkey did in Syria some years ago, against the Russian aircraft that kept flying over the sliver of the Turkish airspace for just a few seconds right. Now, admittedly, that was a manned aircraft, it wasn’t a ballistic missile. So maybe there’s a different threshold there. But I think we also need to think about the consequences before we overreact with something like that. And so the consequences being things like, okay, so we shoot down a ballistic missile and a bunch of debris lands on a Polish village, and people are killed. Are we ready to do that? When and otherwise, that missile was just gonna fly over Polish airspace and land outside of Poland. Did we make things actually worse? There’s also a technical aspect of this that we would have to own up to with a political policy, right in capacity, and capability and again on consequences, of either shooting it down, or it’s not perfect. It’s not like if we put our capabilities in a certain area, we can shoot missiles down with 100% accuracy. Do we have to be ready of well, we shot at it and we missed. So there’s a lot of aspects to go with this. And then the final thought is, this all goes through, I think, an overall policy about how we are reacting to Russia’s malign influence that has to include a very robust information campaign for our citizens related to the civil resilience associated with these activities.

Edward Lucas
Yeah, and I think this is absolutely vital. This war on nerves is, as materials just pointed out in the chat. It’s the psychological preparation of the battlefield. And if you project the conviction that Russia is invincible, that NATO doesn’t work that you could be hit in your country’s deterrence is shot to pieces, then you’ve as Russia, or for that matter, as the People’s Republic of China, you’re already halfway to winning because the defeatist mentality is kind of ingrained. We’ve got time for just one more question and that’s from Josh Luckenbaugh from the National Defense Magazine. I think I got that right Josh, and he’s pointing out that all the money that’s going into defense is going into our stuff and he says are the Baltic, Poland is investing heavily in defense are the Baltic states and the other so called new member but um, Central Eastern European members paying to do the same? And if so what defense technologies are they investing in? Which is really interesting. Dahlia is Lithuania developing anything? I know the Estonians are getting into drones and battlefield robots. Nut is there any homegrown defense technology in your area we should be keeping an eye on?

Dalia Bankauskaitė
I think exactly that I see we’re not like Estonia, Lithuania or Latvia but it’s really Baltic, although at national level. So it’s a defense plans and these are the so called smart player a smart balance where we’re planning what is needed to have this sufficient or sufficient defense or self defense at least the first days in case of really attack happened. So drones or air defense, not only drones are there. As well as a lot of geotechnic applications. And of course, being very close with Ukraine cooperating. So a lot of things are, f I may say so, tested technologically and improved by working in the, in the field. Preparing, preferring the infrastructure to host the German Brigade 2027, platforms for acquisition of tanks and other ammunition, which are simply not really so good and in explaining, quoting, but I’m happy to provide more information. So these are the things that are in the plans and really looking into the compatibility to build a persuasive defense capabilities within the Baltic, within the Baltic region. Including Poland, because the focus is of ability of self defense, while after we’re, in the meantime, the NATO allies come in assistance.

Edward Lucas
But I think we’ve just got time for one quick question. And I see a hand up from Syed Rizwan Ali. Sir, would you like to introduce yourself and ask a quick question, we have a quick answer. And I’m going to hand back to my CEPA colleagues will wrap up.

Syed Rizwan Ali
Yeah, thank you very much Edward. I’m grateful you that you have given me an opportunity to join this. Well, in my view, NATO’s presence is like a guarantee for world and regions security and stability. But my question is that nexus of Moscow and Beijing has already endangered the peace of world. So what my question is, what NATO’s intentions are to make peace and trade links to Western world? And my last and very important question, this world is heading towards World War Three. So how to make sure that this war, don’t spread war and world faces peace? Thank you.

Edward Lucas
So you’re I think your question is about what NATO can do to prevent World War Three, which is obviously a huge subject. I, I think this is possibly above the pay grade, even of our elevated panel, but I think I’ll give you Ambassador Jones, because there is a perception, particularly in the outside the Euro-Atlantic sphere, that NATO is basically a projection of US Imperial interests, and that the European allies are basically singing along to the American tune for their own reasons. But that the rest of the world should see NATO with a degree of suspicion as an instrument of projection of American power. And NATO probably could do a better job in rebutting those preconceptions. If you’re speaking to an audience in the, in this what we sometimes loosely call the Global South. What would you say to counter those criticisms of NATO?

Paul Jones
Yeah, thanks so much. And thanks for the question. I would, I would say, and I completely agree, and I think, I don’t know. I mean, perhaps imperialism, but I think there’s also a sense in much of the rest of the world, that, you know, this is a European issue, this isn’t really an issue of global importance, what’s happening because NATO and Russia have been, you know, tense for quite some time. I would say, first and foremost, you know, look at the at the facts as as Mathieu said earlier, countries want to join NATO, they want to join NATO, because they’re feeling their security is under some threat. And, you know, they had already some, in some cases, Finland, Sweden had already been part of the EU. So it wasn’t an economic issue. It was that their security felt under threat. NATO has never, you know, encroached into it, you know, outside of its territory. It’s a defensive alliance, it has helped partners who have sought its help. So I think, you know, regional arrangements wherever they are, that can pool the resources for defensive security are, are unfortunately needed in the world today. And that is why, you know, there’s been this voluntary number of countries that have come together and a couple more want to come to join because they want to feel secure. I think it adds to the security of the of the world because it removes an entire major theater of traditional warfare from a World War Three battlefield, right. If there’s going to be conflict in the world, it’s not going to happen within NATO. And it’s not going to happen, it is less likely to happen on NATO’s periphery, when NATO is strong and is able to deter adversaries. So therefore, we see the more likelihood of, of sort of global conflict emanating in other parts of the world.

Edward Lucas
It’s, I think, really well worth remembering that the, when Europe likes to say Europe’s at peace, critics would say Europe’s just between genocides. And Europe’s ability to turn its own quarrels into wars that are not only enormously costly in human life and destruction in Europe, but then spill out into the rest of the world is something that we all need to bear to in mind. I wonder if any of the other panelists wants to jump in for 30 seconds. At the end, before I wrap up, just jump and stick your hand up or unmute yourself if you do. Dahlia, give us give us give us 30 seconds to Lithuania. We’ve just had terrible news of glide bombs landing in Kharkiv, which is a big reminder of how precious our peace and safety is.

Dalia Bankauskaitė
I think if we do not sort out, we have the war, we have the war in Europe, it’s not the war only in Ukraine. So I think we risk now without solving, without solving but more like prolonging this confrontation with NATO and, and NATO and the West. So Europe might fall into a permanent cycle of wars and frozen conflicts. And it is not good neither for Europe, nor for the world nor for the United States. And worst of all, it is not good for people because every life is met, and right to be free and to decide your own life. It’s a key thing. So that’s where I think NATO is really spirit, is strong. It’s about freedom. It’s about values.

Edward Lucas
Think that’s probably it, I’m just going to wrap up with a couple of thoughts. One is that I feel that NATO was a tremendously good answer to the questions of the past, it did brilliantly well during the Cold War. And it then caught its breath and was instrumental, I think, in sorting out the security architecture of the continent in the postwar years and avoided a lot of things that could it could have gone wrong. My worry now is whether NATO is fit for the future. And I think if we’re having this discussion in 10 years time, we will be asking very difficult questions about whether NATO was really able to deal with rising threats from outside its area of operation, particularly this huge question about how we deal with China’s desire to be the world’s most powerful country by 2049. There’s also I think, quite a big question about Africa, where the we see Russia, going into places in Sub Saharan Africa, which has traditionally been heavily influenced by France and the inability to push back there, and with all the enormously negative consequences, both for people living there, and also if they migrate for the migration picture in Europe. And then I think the third big question of whether it’s really sustainable for the United States to do so much of the heavy lifting the European, the non American partners, combined are bigger and richer the United States, and they are still, despite the fantastic efforts made by countries like Lithuania spending 3% of GDP, they are still freeloaders. And is the United States really willing to carry on, bearing that burden, in exchange for benefits that are sometimes tangible, sometimes more intangible. So I think we have a lot more to discuss in the years ahead. But in the meantime, I want to thank my four distinguished panelists, very much look forward to seeing them an atom to atom rather than electron electron soon. And thank you very much for the galaxy of journalistic talent who’ve tuned in, we hope this was welcome. And if you have any follow up questions, you’re welcome to contact CEPA directly or track me down on Twitter or LinkedIn. And I’d be very happy to respond to any questions that you’ve got. It’s press at cepa.org or reach our hotshot team. So that’s it for me. Thank you very much.