Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s triumphant Middle East tour made two things clear. Firstly, while countries under threat might want to ignore Ukraine’s hard-won battlefield experience, they can’t.
The second, which also causes deep irritation in the Kremlin, is that he is more willing to risk his personal safety than almost any other head of state. The contrast with Vladimir Putin’s cotton-wool security obsession remains stark.
This sudden feat of blitz diplomacy, much of it drone-related, deserves attention and analysis.
Zelenskyy, of course, is no stranger to danger and is perhaps more psychologically immune to it. Other heads of state and government stayed away from the region during the war, at least until the shaky April 8 ceasefire; Ukraine’s president saw a rich opportunity and jumped at it.
That won points with Saudi Arabia, its Gulf neighbors, and Jordan. Not only did Zelenskyy take a risk, but he also arrived with the message that Ukraine was willing to help. At his best, the Ukrainian leader is a man of goodwill and personal warmth; in an increasingly cold and transactional global environment, the Arab states will have noted this. Friendships matter.
What is Ukraine able to offer? Quite a lot.
No other democracy, and few autocracies, have the experience in the key new forms of warfare, including drones, but also battle management systems, electronic warfare, and AI. President Trump may have stated that the US doesn’t need Ukraine’s help, but clearly, the Arab countries took a different view.
Three countries in the region — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar — signed 10-year deals aiming to bolster their anti-drone and anti-missile defenses (which have been shown as too leaky and too expensive), electronic warfare systems, and the tactics required to make use of them. Notably, the deals also cover seaborne drone technology, which may be critical in future efforts to keep open narrow sea routes like the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb.
More than 200 military personnel have been sent to the region, Zelenskyy said in March. That has allowed the military to obtain even more experience in dealing with aerial attacks, this time in a different environment. While Russia rains explosive devices on Ukraine day and night, no military experience goes to waste.
New kinds of threats have been encountered. Iran and Russia collaborate on a range of military and security activities, including drone warfare. They may also learn about types of air defense that were less available to Ukraine’s armed forces before, but may arrive at some later date.
There is also a significant financial benefit. Ukraine’s budget is in a difficult state, and it is projected that problems will become acute in the coming months. The EU’s €90bn ($105bn) support package has been delayed so far by the bloc’s Kremlin-friendly members. And although the money will arrive, no one is sure when. It is unclear what the cash-rich Arab states may pay for their new deals with Kyiv, but it is likely to be significant. This is no small thing for a country waging an existential fight for its survival.
Ukraine is becoming very experienced and adept at defense diplomacy. It has established a plethora of joint defense enterprises, including manufacturing plants in European allies like the UK and Denmark. Every country is now thinking about drone defense and attack, so it won’t just be the Middle East needing Ukrainian assistance. This is potentially a huge source of revenue and political influence.
Might Kyiv also hope that the Middle East will offer stronger diplomatic support for its war against Russia? That would be very helpful. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have close relationships with the Kremlin, and the latter in particular has provided very significant financial and banking assistance to Putin’s people. But whether they will become committed allies is open to question. The future is likely to favor relationships of convenience rather than commitment.
Even so, it is possible that the countries in the region may take part in Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction process.
Perhaps the biggest lesson of Zelenskyy’s recent travels is that Ukraine can project power in unexpected places. As recently as January, it was of only marginal interest to many Middle Eastern countries.
Not anymore. Kyiv has found yet another opportunity to surprise with its ingenuity and adaptability.
It moves fast to use opportunities to demonstrate that it can be not only a security assistance consumer, but also a security producer. Thus, the usual script of Zelenskyy’s tours abroad in the last four years has been turned on its head here: instead of asking for humanitarian assistance or weapons or signing security aid packages, he was now in a position to offer help.
In other words, this was another chance to show that Ukraine indeed does have cards and is willing to share them. And once again the silent contrast is revealed — deal with Ukraine, and you get some give; deal with Russia, and it’s take, take, take.
Dr. Volodymyr Dubovyk is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at CEPA. He has been working at the Odesa I. Mechnikov National University since 1992, as an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations since 1996, and has acted as a Director of the Center for International Studies since 1999.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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