Constrained by shortages, delayed aid, and restrictions on using some Western weapons, Kyiv’s response has been built piecemeal, driven by necessity and the will to survive. It has filled gaps where traditional weapons were unavailable or insufficient. Drones have become critical.
Kyiv’s innovation has helped blunt Russian assaults, while its domestic defense industry is moving toward production on a scale that would have seemed impossible at the start of the invasion.
The so-called drone wall is less a fixed system than an evolving one: primarily defensive today, but steadily expanding across the air, sea, and now ground domains, said Deborah Fairlamb of Green Flag Ventures, which invests in Ukraine’s defense industry.
What began as an improvisation is increasingly hardening into a technological and durable defense system, as the country seeks to become an indigestible “steel porcupine” for its predatory neighbor. Since the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s defense-industrial base has grown at an unprecedented pace, with annual production capacity increasing 50-fold to $50bn.
Mavic drones, for example, became emblematic of the war not because they were built for combat, but because Ukrainians adapted them to drop grenades when no better option existed, said Babay, the callsign of deputy commander of the unmanned systems battalion of Ukraine’s 63 Separate Mechanized Brigade.
Armin Papperger, CEO of the German defense manufacturer Rheinmetall, was dismissive of such Ukrainian improvisation. “This is not innovation,” he told The Atlantic on March 28. “This is how to play with Lego.”
But that judgment overlooks Ukraine’s repeated demonstration that systems assembled quickly, adapted continuously, and fielded at scale can have major battlefield impact. For the defenders, it’s been a race to build effective systems that are cheap and can be quickly mass-produced.
“We’re constantly trying to make drones cheaper, faster to build, easier to teach, and more modular,” said Heorhii Volkov, commander of the Yasni Ochi drone unit of 13 Khartiia Brigade.
This is underlined by the US-Israeli war in Iran, which is offering reminders that expensive and procurement-heavy systems do not guarantee a quick victory — see, for example, the reported destruction of 16 Reaper drones over Iran, each costing up to $30m. Meanwhile, an opponent equipped with cheap drones can still impose disproportionate costs and disrupt forces in ways that traditional procurement models struggle to match.
“NATO has been slow to learn from Ukraine’s drone warfare innovations,” said Xen, the callsign of a former US special-forces operator who has worked with the Ukrainians.
Russia was also slow to absorb some of the lessons. But bogged down in trench warfare in the Donbas, it was eventually forced to adapt, increasing its own drone capability with the help of partners such as China and Iran.
“Ukrainian drones are not a revolution at the level of physics or materials,” wrote Bohdan Krotevych, the Azov Brigade’s former chief of staff. “They are a revolution at the level of application, scaling, and adaptability. They systematically change the balance on the battlefield.”
Now Ukraine’s drone wall is expanding. Mid-range strike drones have wreaked havoc on Russian air defense, aided by the increasing use of Starlink connectivity over occupied territories.
In March, Sergei Shoigu, secretary of Russia’s Security Council and a former defense minister, warned that Ukraine’s drone production is at a pace that means no region is beyond reach. Ukrainian drones are regularly flying more than 1,000km into Russia to strike at oil production, export facilities, and factories supporting the arms industry. Reuters reported on April 2 that Russia is poised to cut oil output by a fifth following Ukrainian drone strikes on port facilities; tankers are meanwhile backed up in the Baltic Sea as they cannot fill up at damaged docks.
“The most strategically significant development of this war is Ukraine’s ability to strike Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure across vast distances,” said Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, former commanding general of US Army Europe.
“Ukraine can now reach from the Arctic submarine bases to southern energy infrastructure,” he added. “Russia cannot defend everything.”
Ukraine is also pouring millions of dollars into missile development to match the success of its drones. Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s defense minister, said the government is acting like a venture investor by giving large grants to local companies.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in March that every long-range capability Ukraine now possesses — from 500km, or 310 miles, to more than 1,000km — was developed domestically.
At sea, Ukrainian naval drones have effectively forced much of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to retreat from occupied Crimea to Novorossiysk, and are being used to attack shadow fleet oil tankers, possibly including this March 22 strike near Istanbul. Ukrainian drone vessels are now being adapted as carriers for interceptor drones, extending Ukraine’s defensive reach over the water.
Units that integrate ground robotic systems could cut frontline infantry requirements by up to 30% by the end of this year, and reach 80% in the future, according to some in Ukraine’s military.
In December, one machine-gun-equipped ground robot reportedly held a position for 45 days. “Ukrainians are right when they say, ‘send robots, not humans,” Green Flag’s Fairlamb said. Now Ukrainian technologists are working on ways to integrate land drones into the fortification network.
While Russia has continued to pound Ukrainian cities with drones and missiles, Kyiv has developed low-cost interceptor systems that are attracting worldwide interest, including in the Middle East.
With its young, technology-focused defense minister, many of the key elements are beginning to align. Across the battlefield, drones and other emerging systems are helping fill critical gaps, and Kyiv will continue using that asymmetric advantage to deny Moscow the chance to achieve its goals.
David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He can be found on X/Twitter @DVKirichenko
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
War Without End: Deterring Russia’s Shadow War
Either Europe will continue allowing Russia’s shadow war to set the terms of escalation, or it will act now to prevent a larger war.
