Georgia heads into parliamentary elections on October 26. Much like previous votes, the latest is deemed critical for the country’s domestic, but most importantly, foreign policy trajectory.
The big change this time is that the country may have to grapple with a novel approach to government — a coalition.
A series of polls from over the past couple of months produced a variety of results with a few key things standing out — they suggest that the ruling Georgian Dream party will take more votes than any of its rivals and yet will lack the numbers to enjoy an extension of its absolute parliamentary majority. One poll shows a drop to around 32%, a loss of one-third of its previous voters.
The ruling party claims it will garner up to 1 million votes, more than in 2020, but the track record from past elections shows that it would be extremely difficult to achieve, especially given the new, proportional electoral system.
True, the opposition remains chronically divided albeit with somewhat fewer parties competing than last time. A few electoral alliances have been formed and that may provide a wider representation in the new parliament.
This could lead to something novel — Georgia’s usually fractious parties forced to share governing responsibilities.
Yet it is unclear how the parties will behave if this is the electoral outcome. When potentially making a choice between the biggest opposition party — the United National Movement (UNM) or Georgian Dream — the For Georgia party of former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, which argues its politics fit between its two rivals, is likely to side with the ruling party. There are also uncertainties about how Mamuka Khazaradze’s party, Lelo, might act toward the UNM.
The Girchi party would likely side with Georgian Dream too, especially given the party’s recent statements that have hinted at a deal with Georgian. Overall, the ruling party, irrespective of whether it manages to snatch a constitutional majority (of 113 out of the 150 parliamentary seats) or a simple majority, will have a big say in the potential coalition government. Georgian Dream has resources that it will use to lure smaller groups and smaller parties to join a coalition.
Of course, there is also a possibility that the anti-governing party opposition will have sufficient seats to build a governing majority without the Georgian Dream. But the problem with this line of thinking is that Georgia has never had a genuine coalition government before.
True, the Georgian Dream founder, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, came to power in 2012 along with the backing of other parties, but this was a pre-election coalition and not one forged through tough negotiations after election results. And indeed Ivanishvili provided the central, dominant figure who welded the government together and then kept the coalition alive using both his personal finances and prestige. Similar circumstances prevailed at the time when Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in 2003-4. There is no such figure among those opposed to Georgian Dream this time.
It’s therefore quite possible that any coalition-building process will be difficult and create a deep sense of political instability. Even if the opposition wins more seats, it is quite possible that Georgian Dream will break their unity through the lure of significant financial benefits by offering patronage to dole out well-paid government positions. After all, whatever the outcome the ruling party will still have a very significant parliamentary presence.
There are also reasonable doubts about whether the diverse backgrounds of opposition parties can be corralled into an administration in the absence of a charismatic political figure. The distrust between them is quite widespread, which makes the parties especially vulnerable to manipulation by a well-entrenched and experienced governing party.
One example suffices: when the leaders of For Georgia and Lelo were asked by the Georgian president, Salome Zurabishvili, to join a unified front, the negotiations ended in failure and acrimonious finger-pointing.
The political situation might press the parties toward the novel development of coalition government, but this is fraught with both challenges (and opportunities.)
Street protests might follow, international organizations might withhold recognition of the election results if there is evidence of voter or ballot manipulation, and the ruling party might well react badly to such developments.
Difficult days lie ahead.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
