An energy crisis is emerging in Ukraine, presenting a critical issue that Western allies will soon have to address. They face a daunting decision: should they defend the airspace over the country’s western regions, or risk the possibility of Ukraine’s defeat?
In the past several weeks, Ukraine’s energy facilities have faced unprecedented destruction with a substantial portion of both production and transmission capabilities now in ruins. Its ramifications reach far beyond the mere loss of energy production. Numbers are state secrets, but some estimates suggest more than half the country’s energy-generating capacity has been destroyed.
The dwindling energy supply is eroding Ukraine’s defensive capabilities and directly threatening its security. Without reliable energy supplies, no state can conduct intensive 21st-century war. Power outages are causing havoc, disrupting military logistics and communications. Essential infrastructure is crippled, which reduces civilian and economic resilience. Plans to rebuild Ukraine’s energy capacity is therefore threatened, not to mention efforts meant to strengthen its efforts to create greener energy sources. The instability from these attacks disrupts the economy and civic society and weakens morale.
The impending expiration of the Ukraine-Russia gas transit agreement adds another layer of complexity to an already dire picture. The possibility of Russia’s widespread targeting of Ukraine’s gas network infrastructure now looms large. Hitherto used not only for moving Russian gas to the EU but also to distribute to Ukrainian households, the network is already being hit.
Ukraine’s large gas storage sites have also been struck. Ukraine helped out the EU considerably last year with the gas it stored and holds some of the largest storage facilities in Europe. Their endangerment poses risks to the whole of Europe.
Yet in a stark reversal of fortunes for Kyiv, having been a net exporter even last April, Ukraine now imports record amounts of electricity from its neighbors. While it synchronized with Europe’s power grid in March, these imports have been insufficient to offset the losses. The Ukrainian government has resorted to programmed blackouts to balance the grid which, while necessary, exacerbates the plight of citizens and military commanders alike.
Not all is doom and gloom though. Ukraine’s transmission infrastructure boasts multiple pathways and localized generation capabilities, enhancing resilience to targeted attacks compared to more centralized systems (something Western policymakers should pay attention to.) The irony is that this decentralization is partly due to the grid’s Soviet-era design, meant to war-proof the energy system in the event of a conflict with the West. The Ukraine Energy Support Fund which coordinates international aid in the energy domain, has also been able to collect equipment that makes up at least in part for the lost generation capacities. Similarly and crucially, the new agreement governing the requests for emergency support to the national grid company, Ukrenergo, was recently signed with the European Network of Transmission System Operators.
Still, the potential for Ukraine to go fully dark remains a chilling prospect. This would strategically undermine its capacity to sustain a long-term war. In response to this possibility, three discernable camps of advocates have emerged.
The first represents a conventional approach and calls for repairs to damaged infrastructure and the rebuilding of conventional power sources. It is a strategy that requires time — a resource in short supply — and in-depth analyses of where, when, and how to focus the efforts.
Conversely, the proponents of diversified generations champion innovative solutions. They call for the creation of many local systems with smaller capacities, which would require increased innovation or importing technology from abroad.
The third camp, which largely overlaps with the other two, advocates the prioritizing of air protection for critical energy infrastructure, a strategy that necessitates significant investment and long-term outside help.
Notwithstanding the debate, the eventual size and shape of the effort to shore up Ukraine’s energy security will inevitably draw from all three of these approaches. Most crucially, however, a rethinking of strategy is in order.
The focus should not just be on restoring lost capacity, but also on war-proofing the energy infrastructure for the future. Various measures should be pursued, including the dispersion of both energy production and transmission, further integration into the European system, and, above all, bolstering air defenses. (This won’t be easy given NATO’s lack of systems.)
Dispersed energy production is far more resilient to warfare than large power units. Local electricity generation from renewables is therefore key but must be accompanied by effective energy storage – a need acknowledged both internally in Ukraine and internationally. Alternative solutions like waste-to-energy biomass should likewise be considered, although scaling up that specific solution would require adopting waste segregation standards which Ukraine is currently missing.
NATO’s role here is crucial not only for securing Ukraine’s skies. The alliance should help with advanced technologies and designs to enhance Ukraine’s energy infrastructure resilience. Implicit in this endeavor is the imperative to protect nuclear blocks from damage, notably given that there will be more of them and that these will be built with Western technology.
Russian bombs falling on Ukrainian power plants and pipelines is Europe’s problem too, and in various regards. The reconstruction plans discussed at the donor conferences need a reality check, as priorities must be set straight: without stable energy, Ukraine will not sustain itself.
And as for Kyiv, it must work with its partners to rebuild its energy capacities not only for the sake of resisting Russia — but also to keep it at bay.
Maciej Filip Bukowski is a 2022 CEPA James S. Denton fellow, a 2023 International Republican Institute Transatlantic Security Initiative fellow, and currently an international analysis expert at BGK, a Polish development bank. A graduate of Sorbonne and Cornell law schools, he is completing a Ph.D. thesis at the Jagiellonian University on the geopolitics of climate change.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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