We’re stuck with an outdated image of Ukraine as a helpless victim draining US resources. That narrative is obsolete. After more than three years of war, Ukraine has transformed into a strategic asset that can ultimately reduce the need for large-scale US troop deployments in Europe and significantly improve our warfighting capability. My meetings in Kyiv at the Kyiv Security Forum in May drove home the point.
Ukraine now fields the largest and most combat-hardened land force in Europe, with around a million personnel under arms. It has developed and deployed homegrown technologies — particularly drones and long-range strike systems — that are responsible for around 75% of Russian battlefield casualties, according to Russian military doctors.
War has supercharged Ukraine’s defense industrial base, once formidable during the Soviet era, forcing it to scale and innovate at a pace unmatched by many NATO allies. Ukraine’s ability to field new battlefield concepts within weeks of development offers a rare and invaluable operational learning lab — one that both the US and China are closely studying.
In business terms, Ukraine has shifted from a cost center to a strategic investment with compounding returns. The United States is now helping Ukraine close a few key capability gaps — in air defense, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR), and long-range precision strike.
But Ukraine is increasingly self-sufficient. It is ramping up domestic production of 155mm artillery shells, and its drone manufacturing is approaching millions of units annually. Much of Ukraine’s defense production capacity remains underutilized, needing only financing and partners to expand. With the right support, Ukraine could soon help meet Europe’s own defense production shortfalls through exports and joint ventures.
For Europe, especially as the Trump administration presses allies to assume greater responsibility for their own defense, Ukraine is becoming indispensable. Russia’s defense industry is operating in wartime overdrive. Even a ceasefire in Ukraine would not halt Russia’s military buildup, as President Putin has mobilized his economy and population for a prolonged confrontation with the West. Indeed, recent evidence shows the Kremlin is building new bases and stockpiling modern equipment to face its NATO neighbors. Russia’s military, according to US commanders, is now bigger than at the start of the all-out war in 2022.
European rearmament is underway, but it will take years to generate deployable capabilities. Ukraine can begin filling that gap now — as the only country in Europe currently degrading Russia’s military at scale.
The country has provided a real-life testbed for advanced US weapons systems, hugely increasing the effectiveness of the Patriot air defense system, for example. It has also become exceptionally good at drone production and rapid battlefield improvements (Ukraine’s drone output is 20 times that of the US), which is now attracting US companies to sign joint ventures.
The alternative is stark: if Ukraine were to fall under Russian control, NATO would face the urgent and expensive need to reinforce its entire Eastern flank (and of course, Ukrainian technology and factories would fall into the Kremlin’s hands). That would delay or block any near-term US force reductions in Europe — limiting flexibility to reallocate assets to the Indo-Pacific or other global priorities.
For the United States, reducing its military footprint in Europe is becoming a strategic necessity. Ukraine offers the only credible pathway to doing so without undermining NATO deterrence.
Limited US investments in Ukraine’s remaining defense gaps — paired with Kyiv’s commitment to repay support through long-term critical minerals supply under the US-Ukraine Critical Minerals Agreement — represent a high-return, low-cost national security strategy.
Ambassador Paul Jones (ret.) is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and an International Affairs Advisor at Squire Patton Boggs global law firm. He was US Ambassador to Poland (2015-18), US Ambassador to Malaysia (2010-13), and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (2013-15). He was also Vice President for International Government Relations at Raytheon Technologies (2020-23).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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