Every US administration starts off berating the useless European allies and hoping to focus on problems at home. Reality bites, and sooner or later, the Americans learn that this doesn’t work. Donald Trump’s administration is no different. So don’t panic. That is the kindest interpretation of the past three turbulent months in transatlantic relations.
Vice President J.D. Vance, in remarks in Washington, DC on May 7, insisted that the US and Europe are “on the same civilizational team,” saying that it was “completely ridiculous” to imagine anyone driving a “firm wedge” between the transatlantic allies. A wedge (or battering ram) was just how many Europeans had interpreted the blistering civilizational challenge he issued in Munich in February.
Among other straws in the wind: President Trump had a seemingly cordial meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and publicly criticized Russian air attacks on Ukraine, saying “Vladimir STOP!”) The US signed a critical minerals deal with Ukraine and resumed previously promised deliveries of F-16 jets and Patriot missile systems.
Meanwhile, European leaders—the newly elected German chancellor Friedrich Merz, France’s Emmanuel Macron, Britain’s Keir Starmer, and Poland’s Donald Tusk—headed to Kyiv to issue an ultimatum to Putin: ceasefire now, with “no ifs, no buts”.
It could work. Elements would include a face-saving armistice, a legal fudge about occupied territories, US economic engagement, plus full-blown security arrangements that safeguard Ukraine against future aggression. Russia, having learned its lesson, turns inwards to solve its own problems, meaning outsiders can all breathe a sigh of relief and get back to business as usual.
This seems about as likely as finding a bargain price for the Kerch bridge. One reason: Europe is not yet serious about security. Ukraine’s friends are too militarily weak to provide any credible defense or deterrence for post-ceasefire Ukraine. They know it, Russia knows it. Britain’s Strategic Defence Review, likely to be published this week, will underline that. But without European military heft, any peace deal is just a prelude to what one might call “Operation Second Helpings.” Like a caricature greedy Russian at a hotel buffet, Putin will jostle his way to the counter to fill his plate again and again. Who will stop him? Not the Europeans.
Nor—on current form—are the Americans ready to do it. A country that blows a billion dollars’ worth of high-tech weapons in a few weeks on failing to stop the Houthi rebels’ missile and drone attacks on Israel and international shipping, and then declares victory and walks away, does not look likely to make a decade-long commitment to protect Ukraine against nuclear-armed Russia. The minerals deal with Ukraine made a nice headline, but is unlikely to be consequential in commercial, let alone geopolitical terms.
Nor does the US yet have a serious Europe policy, beyond a confusing rhetorical mix of bouquets and brickbats. What is the timeframe for its (apparently impending) drawdown of military forces? What capabilities does it want the Europeans to provide, and when? What role is Europe to play in countering China? Amid the media fireworks of the tariff war, long-term strategic considerations are absent.
By contrast, Putin does have a plan. Befriend Trump. Split the European Union. Wreak havoc. Wear down Ukraine. So far, it’s working. The sight of the US president’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, using a suspected Russian intelligence officer as his interpreter, apparently under the impression that she was provided by the US embassy in Moscow, epitomizes the imbalance in negotiating smarts and clout.
The lesson for Europeans is to stop whining and wishful thinking alike. Seize Russian assets. Rush help to Ukraine. And rearm—fast.
Edward Lucas is a Non-resident Senior Fellow and Senior Advisor at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
