Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Beijing on May 19-20 during a highly publicized two-day summit. The pair announced some 40 new agreements, including a symbolic “declaration on the formation of a multipolar world.” But pomp, ceremonials, and signatures aside, the summit did not see an agreement on the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, which Russia views as critical to its energy exports.
The meeting perfectly embodied the nature of an opportunistic, practical, and pragmatic bilateral relationship that remains fraught with limitations, distrust, and irritants. It seems that Moscow and Beijing are never as close or as distant as they appear, especially in military and security relations.
A chapter in a new CEPA report, entitled Military (In)coherence of the Sino-Russian Relationship, explores the nature of the bilateral military, defense, and security relationship. It assesses how both countries understand cooperation in the military and security sphere, as well as how they manage existing frictions.
During the summit, Putin and Xi vowed to deepen military relations, without clearly stating where and how. The announcement must be understood as part of information and psychological warfare, serving as a deterrent to the United States and its allies. Russia and China share similar threat perceptions regarding the US and its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, especially long-range strike capabilities and anti-ballistic missile defense systems.
This strong anti-American undertone was clear when both leaders denounced the US plans for the Golden Dome missile defense system as a “clear threat to strategic stability.” It was also notable that Putin’s visit came after, rather than before, President Trump’s in mid-May.
Competition with the United States, whether geopolitical or technological, will continue to shape relations between Russia and China, with the risk of creating regional hotspots, notably in the Asia-Pacific region and the Arctic.
Since the 1990s, Beijing and Moscow have been formalizing their military, defense, and security relations through structured consultation mechanisms. Both countries have demonstrated increased cooperation in these spheres by conducting regular bilateral military exercises, joint air and naval patrols, arms deals, defense industry exports, and military-technical cooperation. They have also engaged in military education and training, more recently, covert drone combat training in Ukraine.
Despite seemingly deepening military cooperation, bilateral relations can be equally defined by irritants and friction. The most blatant factor is the lack of a shared strategic culture, which limits greater integration and is further compounded by deep-rooted mistrust and a historical reluctance on both sides to enter into a full-fledged alliance that would limit their sovereignty.
Joint drills produce nice media images but fail to focus on interoperability – the connective tissue that defines genuine joint combat operations. Similarly, arms sales from Russia to China have steadily declined since the mid-2000s, as Beijing has become increasingly technologically self-sufficient. China also used the Russian military industry for reverse-engineering, industrial espionage, and intellectual property theft that fueled resentment in Moscow. Beijing can now see a time, in the not-so-distant future, when it will no longer need Russia to close technological gaps.
Conversely, Russia’s war against Ukraine since 2014 and international sanctions have forced the Kremlin to turn toward Beijing to acquire critical dual-use components and military technology – for instance, microelectronic components, machine-building tools, and spare parts. This situation is profoundly altering the bilateral dynamic, leaving Russia now trapped in a form of dependency and overreliance on Chinese imports.
Moscow and Beijing do not need to see or address existing obstacles to continue displaying closer military and security ties. It is important to both that they convey the idea of a military alliance without actually establishing one. Indeed, neither regime is interested in such an alliance, nor are they seeking to fight the United States together.
The two countries are too cautious to risk being drawn into each other’s conflicts and prefer to act independently, rather than jointly, so they can pursue their own security agendas. They might have defined a unique form of bilateral relationship in modern interstate relations.
In the future, Russia and China might be tempted to demonstrate military proximity through mutual access to military bases and facilities, the co-location of military forces, or a limited engagement in a shared theater of operation in Central Asia, the Middle East, or the Asia-Pacific.
Yet even the smallest amount of coordination against the US and its allies constitutes a level of cooperation to be reckoned with, particularly in the event of regional escalation. These are the risks that US and NATO military planners must increasingly factor into their assessments for planning and deterrence purposes.
Mathieu Boulègue is a Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He is a freelance researcher and consultant in international conflict and security affairs, with a focus on the Former Soviet Union. In his research, he focuses on Russian foreign policy and military affairs, Ukraine, Russia-NATO relations and Transatlantic security, and Russia-China defense and security relations, as well as military-security issues in the Arctic. He is a Consulting Fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House – The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
