Nuclear power is making a geopolitical comeback, fueled not least by the ever-growing demand from booming AI. Once sidelined by cost, safety, and proliferation concerns, nuclear is now being revived not just for decarbonization — but also as a strategic lever in a new era of great power rivalry.
One telling indicator is Washington’s push to overturn the World Bank’s 1959 ban on nuclear lending — a move meant to allow US firms to compete with China as well as Russia. Europe, long hostile to nuclear, is similarly coming around to support the technology.
The West needs to make up ground. China accounts for about a third of all nuclear reactors under construction worldwide and plans to more than triple its capacity to 200 GW by 2035. Its approach—state financing, turnkey construction, long-term fuel supply—locks clients across the Global South. China aims to sell 30 reactors by 2030. Pakistan, Argentina, Egypt, and others are being drawn into dependency that could last decades — not just for electricity, but for Chinese-style regulatory, digital, and security protocols.
Russia remains an important player. Rosatom, despite sanctions, continues to lead nuclear exports with projects worth over $200 billion in 40 countries. In Turkey, it’s financing and building the entire Akkuyu nuclear power plant, which will provide 10% of the country’s electricity. Russian and Chinese deals mirror how Washington once used oil pipelines and Bretton Woods institutions to build postwar influence.
Now the US wants back into nuclear diplomacy. It’s urging the World Bank to offer concessional finance for American technologies such as Westinghouse’s AP1000. This is about leveling the playing field: China and Russia offer generous terms; the US needs the World Bank to de-risk Western projects and crowd in private capital. Congress has just voted in favor of facilitating financing of nuclear projects worldwide. The US also is reviving its uranium enrichment capacity with a $2.7 billion federal push to break dependence on Russian supplies.
Europe, meanwhile, is divided. Although the European Union’s Net-Zero Industry Act now includes nuclear technology, the European Investment Bank continues to block funding for reactors, though not for nuclear fuel production. France, Finland, and much of Central Europe support nuclear’s return.
Berlin, led by its Green legacy, resists. That may soon change. Friedrich Merz, se to become Germany’s next chancellor, has signaled support for reopening the country’s shuttered plants. Westinghouse claims it could deliver “products and services” to restart German reactors which would fundamentally shift the balance in EU energy strategy, strengthening France’s push to place nuclear at the core of European reindustrialization and strategic autonomy.
In Poland, the nuclear debate underlines how the Trump Administration is pushing the country away and toward Europe. While Warsaw selected Westinghouse for its first nuclear plant in 2022, the frontrunner for the second one is now France’s Electricite de France. Why? A broad Franco-Polish security treaty is in the works, including negotiations over European defense integration and extending France’s nuclear umbrella to the East. And Paris puts money on the table. The EDF deal may be part of that package—a geopolitical quid pro quo wrapped in an energy contract.
Ukraine, too, is doubling down on nuclear. Despite the war, Kyiv has continued building new blocs, viewing nuclear power as a resilient, sovereign energy source. Interestingly, Russian attacks have spared most Ukraine’s reactors—except for a drone strike in February that damaged the Western-funded sarcophagus over the Chernobyl nuclear plant. That signal was clear: don’t buy Western reactors. Ukraine is now about to purchase Soviet-era Russian reactors from Bulgaria.
A wildcard is new technology, Small Nuclear Reactors. They are pitched as game-changers—scalable, cheaper, ideal for replacing coal plants. Despite years of research and decades of applications in military and maritime use, they remain largely theoretical. China seems ahead with its first small reactor scheduled for grid connection in 2026. In the US, the NuScale’s landmark program is lagging behind, dashing hopes to export American small reactor technology to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania. Czechs appear to have grown impatient and recently transferred their small reactor program to Britain’s Rolls Royce.
For now, the main battleground center around traditional gigawatt-scale reactors. Global nuclear politics no longer are just about clean electrons. China and Russia use nuclear partnerships to extend their influence. Contracts aren’t just about watts — they are about whose standards, contracts, fuel cycles, and alliances define the 21st century. The decisions taken today won’t just shape emissions. They’ll define alliances for decades.
Maciej Filip Bukowski is the Head of the Energy and Resilience Program at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation in Warsaw, a non-resident fellow with the Tech Policy Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), and a Research Fellow at the Earth System Governance Project. His upcoming PhD thesis examines the geoeconomics of clean tech policies in great power rivalry between the EU, the US and China.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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