In May, under a veil of secrecy, the 3rd Ukrainian Army Corps counter-attacked in northern Donetsk Oblast, the focal point of the most intensive fighting in the blood-soaked Donbas region.
Exploiting weak points along the flanks of a pair of Russian field armies, which were advancing around the town of Lyman toward Sloviansk, the Ukrainian force under Brig. Gen. Andriy Biletsky marched through the village of Nove. Then it pushed south, cutting behind the Russian 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies (each tens of thousands strong, at least on paper), so compelling them to retreat rather than risk encirclement.
By the time the 3rd Army Corps officially announced Operation Vivaldi in late September, its troops had liberated at least 176 sq. km. (68 sq. miles) of occupied land. And it was especially important territory.
By pushing the CAAs back across the Zherebets River, the 3rd Army Corps eliminated 18 months of Russian progress toward Sloviansk, one of the key fortress cities in the Donbas. In the worst case, the city’s defenders now have more time to prepare for the coming siege.
It didn’t happen quickly or easily. That it happened at all comes down to the 3rd Army Corps’ nearly airtight operational security, its aggressive adoption of aerial and ground robots for practically all conceivable roles, and an age-old truism of ground warfare: every rapid advance risks turning into defeat if the attacker overextends and exposes their flanks to counter-attack.
1. Secrecy still matters. While messaging is important in a war where national morale is a strategic resource, Biletsky and the 3rd Army Corps understood that if it was to succeed, it needed to develop quietly.
The reason is rooted in the tendency for face-saving Russian commanders to lie to their superiors about the real disposition of their forces on the battlefield. As a rule, a Russian colonel won’t admit his battalion is losing ground unless there’s undeniable public evidence his battalion is losing ground.
If the 3rd Army Corps could avoid providing that evidence, by not posting the customary lavish video montages of tactical wins, its leaders knew it would help the Russian commanders plausibly claim all was well, and that there was no need for Moscow to send more air support or reinforcements.
And the strategy worked. While a few videos leaked of Ukrainian advances across the Lyman salient, enough for the most attentive open-source intelligence analysts to conclude something big was happening east of Sloviansk, the mainstream media never caught on. And the Russians never made a serious effort to reinforce the combined arms armies.
By the time the 3rd Army Corps announced its counteroffensive, four months after it began, it was too late for the senior Russian command to do anything about it.
2. Robots can lead. The manpower-starved Ukrainian armed forces are adopting robots at a breakneck pace. And the 3rd Army Corps is doing it even faster. “Drones, robots and motivated infantry, that’s what the first season of Vivaldi sounds like,” Biletsky said.
To preserve its infantry and combat engineers for the close combat role for which they’re indispensable, the corps deployed robots first. And under the blanket of explosive aerial drones, it rolled out some novel unmanned capabilities.
Mine-clearing ground robots raked up dense Russian minefields, and old BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, fitted with remote control and packed with dozens of anti-tank mines, sped across the disputed gray zone and blasted apart Russian fortifications.
Under cover of darkness, Vampire heavy bomber drones airlifted small-wheeled ground robots, each rigged to explode on command, alongside Russian positions. Like inexpensive precision bombs, the robots were driven into enemy bunkers and detonated.
In terms of human soldiers, the Russian CAAs almost certainly outnumbered the 3rd Army Corps, probably by a lot. But the Ukrainian force more than made up for this shortfall with robots, lots and lots of robots.
3. Breakthroughs give, and they take. The reason the Russians were vulnerable to counter-attack is that they’d achieved a breakthrough in the direction of Sloviansk. But in more than a year of attacks, they had advanced too far, too fast, extending a 100 sq. km salient toward the city.
This bulge in the otherwise straight front line threatened to deposit Russian troops on Sloviansk’s doorstep, which in the worst period was just a few miles west of the salient. The bulge was a danger to Ukraine, but also an opportunity. By elongating their flanks, the Russians practically invited the Ukrainians to probe for weakness in their defenses.
The Ukrainians found these weaknesses around Nove and attacked, first with drones and then with infantry and armored vehicles. All under a veil of secrecy. Four months later, the Russians were in retreat, and the Ukrainians could claim a rare decisive victory in the war. And one last thing: Vivaldi hasn’t finished yet.
David Axe is a journalist, author, and filmmaker in South Carolina. For 20 years, he has covered war for Forbes, Rolling Stone, The Daily Beast, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Vice, The Village Voice, Voice of America, and others. He has reported from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and elsewhere. His current focus is on covering Russia’s wider war on Ukraine.
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