As the ice recedes in the Arctic, a new and contested area is fast emerging: the circumpolar region is now becoming key in the modern geopolitical contest. The September agreement between the US, Denmark, and Greenland is an important first step in shaping a new Arctic military architecture.
The Arctic is present too in the shadows cast by the Iran war on the Strait of Hormuz and other critical trade chokepoints, amid proposed alternative maritime shipping routes through the region. It is also at the forefront of climate insecurity, with permafrost thawing and waterways opening.
The Trump administration is correct in assessing that Russian ships are present “all over” the Arctic. Yet if Russian surface deployments are not apparent close to Greenland, they are indeed noticeable from the Barents Sea to the Pacific Arctic. In fact, Russia remains the primary security threat to US and NATO interests in the region, and everyone would do well to remember it.
A CEPA report, Frontline Arctic: The Evolution of Russia’s Military Posture in a Changing Arctic, examines the threat that Russia’s military posture and activities continue to pose to the United States, NATO, and their regional allies.
Russia has been preparing for a conflict in the region. It will seek to impose costs on foreign militaries close to or within the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) and through the Northern Sea Route (NSR); ensure defense in depth by expanding interdiction capabilities; and protect the NSR from perceived foreign encroachment against its disputable status as a “body of internal waters”.
Yet in the context of over a decade of war against Ukraine, international isolation, sanctions, and the accelerating impacts of climate change, the Kremlin has been forced to adapt its military, defense, and security approach toward the region to keep pace with recent developments.
The CEPA report establishes that Moscow now treats the Arctic region as a fortress, a frontline, and a contested space. A fortress, as Moscow is increasingly emphasizing territorial defense and near-sea control close to the AZRF and Russian-dominated waters. A contested space, driven by the Kremlin’s obsession with controlling the NSR and fears of foreign encroachments by the US and NATO. And a new frontline with NATO, amplified by persistent low-intensity warfare and sub-threshold operations in peacetime.
Russian authorities feel increasingly vulnerable in the Arctic, a region where Moscow once held strategic dominance. It remains central to Russian status and identity, but Moscow increasingly senses that its control and sovereignty are slipping away as other powers take a growing interest. This situation demands a military response through deploying offensive capabilities, strengthening Arctic infrastructure, and reorganizing command structures.
In the European High North, Russian retrenchment is creating a new frontline with NATO between the Barents and Norwegian Seas, and the approaches to the Kola Peninsula. Such a situation creates an unstable and potentially contested operating environment for the US and NATO.
In the Pacific Arctic, security issues in the Bering Sea and around the Aleutian Islands and Alaska are becoming a new point of contention with the US, especially as Russia and China are now demonstrating a military presence through joint naval patrols and aerial drills near US territorial waters and airspace. Russia aims to use Beijing as a disruptive force multiplier in the Pacific Arctic.
Russia’s Arctic posture offers a dangerous mix of retrenchment, resentment, and adaptation. In the context of the demise of the Arctic Council as the primary forum for circumpolar discussions on science and governance, the result is greater volatility. Indeed, a vulnerable Russia makes the Kremlin more likely to rely on a mix of nuclear signaling, disruptive grey zone activities, and localized coercion.
Western policy should equally adapt to this new reality. Although the Kremlin shows no willingness to start a conflict in the Arctic per se, Russia plans for all contingencies, including what is increasingly seen as an inevitable conflict with NATO. This “new normal” only heightens the risk of miscalculation from accidents, incidents, and tactical errors, which Arctic allies have yet to address. The situation is compounded by the risk of horizontal escalation, namely, unintended escalation originating from other theaters of operation but that could spill over into the Arctic.
Finally, the US and NATO allies should continue to collectively determine the future of military security and deterrence in the Arctic. The recent activation of Arctic Sentry will significantly strengthen NATO’s presence in the European High North. It will help NATO coordinate efforts and synchronize Arctic-specific endeavors under one umbrella. The deployment of Task Force X-Arctic in June to test unmanned systems will enhance domain awareness in the European High North. Similarly, the US Coast Guard recently ordered 11 Arctic Security Cutters in cooperation with Finland as part of the expansion of its icebreaker fleet.
Both developments strengthen the logic of integrated deterrence by sustained presence, whether through improved domain awareness, greater forward deployment, or stronger Arctic-hardened technology (notably polar-specific uncrewed platforms and autonomous systems). Much remains to be done to revert to a safe, stable, and predictable Arctic.
Mathieu Boulègue is a Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He is a freelance researcher and consultant in international conflict and security affairs, with a focus on the Former Soviet Union. In his research, he focuses on Russian foreign policy and military affairs, Ukraine, Russia-NATO relations and Transatlantic security, and Russia-China defense and security relations, as well as military-security issues in the Arctic. He is a Consulting Fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
This article is drawn from CEPA’s September report: ‘Frontline Arctic: The Evolution of Russia’s Military Posture in a Changing Arctic’
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
