The implementation of the Russian president’s project to return his country’s governance to the 19th century has continued throughout his rule, accelerating significantly at the end of his last term and the beginning of the current one.
It is manifested in the soft transit of power the Kremlin has chosen, under which senior government officials gradually pass their authority to their children and relatives, guaranteeing the continuity of the system while simultaneously rejuvenating it (by introducing youth, if not necessarily wisdom.) It also allows them to retire without fear of their successors seizing their financial assets or leveling corruption charges.
The reshuffles in government since Putin’s May inauguration suggest it has become a “government of heirs.” Dmitry Patrushev, son of Presidential advisor Nikolai, became a vice prime minister; the son of Yuri Kovalchuk, “Putin’s banker,” became head of the Chamber of Accounts; and former intelligence chief and prime minister (2004-2007) Mikhail Fradkov’s son became deputy minister of defense.
Putin has also given more power to his own relatives. His daughters hold non-governmental positions: Kateryna Tykhonova is the general director of the National Intellectual Development Fund, while Maria Vorontsova is presented as an endocrinologist and member of the Russian Association for the Promotion of Science, both organizations that are generously funded by the state.
Their formal affiliations are less important than their increased public activity. For example, both Putin’s daughters appeared during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum 2024 which took place in June. Starting out as holders of non-governmental positions is common in the new systems and tends to lead to bigger and better things. That’s the path trodden by another of Putin’s relatives — Anna Tsivileva. His great-niece first headed the pro-Kremlin fund Homeland Defenders, which focused on the social rights of the Russian military. After this preparatory stage and proper media recognition, she became deputy minister of defense and will now oversee the enormous finances required for the war.
In this endeavor, the Kremlin is repeating the practices of the Russian Empire between the 15th and 19th centuries, all of it in keeping with the drive to de-modernize demanded by Putin and his inner circle.
At the same time, as political actors and clans maneuver to win more advantageous positions for their children and relatives, there is competition for prominence and intrigues and alliances are born. They must ensure, however, that no group concentrates enough power to challenge Putin’s rule.
This principle became even more crucial after convicted criminal and mercenary leader Evgeny Prighozhin launched his mutiny in June 2023. In the period between the end of the mutiny and the inauguration of Putin, an alliance was formed between Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, FSB Chief Alexander Bortnikov, and Igor Krasnov, head of the Prosecutor General’s Office. By April however, the situation had changed.
Bortnikov and Krasnov left the group and a new alliance was formed by others with the aim of reducing the influence of Patrushev and the Shoigu clan.
In the end, Putin re-shaped all the alliances by transferring Sergei Shoigu to Patrushev’s position and, in an act of deliberate humiliation, demoting Patrushev to the position of presidential advisor for shipbuilding. With these moves, he demolished the mythology surrounding Patrushev and Shoigu as the number two and number three politicians in Russia.
In pursuit of his grand de-modernization strategy, Putin has made himself a despot. Kremlin propaganda explicitly talks about two further terms of his presidency (until 2036) as something that should be taken for granted. Now he is portrayed not just a president but as the leader of the nation.
This image is intimately connected to the importance of the Orthodox church in his claims to legitimacy and the concept of nationality, returning to the Russian Empire’s trinity of autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationality.
Putin does not need elections and has turned them into a relic. They have become an acclamation, where there is just one real candidate on the ballot. He proposes the same for his inner circle: your children will inherit your titles and powers without any elections or competition. Family is, after all, a major traditional value.
The basis of this autocracy is its claim to protect traditional values and present itself as a guarantor of spiritual bonds. It defines Russia as a nation-civilization.
Therefore Putin is seen not just as a president in Moscow, but as an autocrat of an entire civilization. And that civilization has the right to absorb other cultural spaces. Especially those in close territorial proximity.
Russia, according to this project, is the guardian of traditional values based on the ethos of Orthodoxy. These values are opposed to the liberal values of the modern world, the world of the 21st century. Putin argues that such liberal values have lost their human origins, while traditional values have retained them.
Under this construction, alliances with the Russian Federation should not only be on the basis of geopolitical motives, but also values — especially for those who are dissatisfied with the current mainstream. Personal freedoms must be subordinated to state interests.
If the state demands more soldiers and more workers, for example, then women should give birth to more babies. Plans are in place for any other point of view, such as arguments for not having children at all, to be outlawed, in the same way that the LGBT movement has been declared “extremist.”
Alongside domestic restrictions, Putin seeks a return to the 19th century in international politics, a shift exemplified by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
He began the active phase of de-modernizing international politics in 2014 when he annexed Crimea and occupied part of Donbas. In the absence of a serious response, he became more decisive and discarded hybrid warfare — a tool of the 21st century — instead relying on the bloody wars of conquest seen in the 19th century.
Ukraine has felt the Kremlin’s de-modernization of international affairs more than any other country. Kyiv understands exactly what the Russian Federation is trying to achieve, the language of which century it speaks, and the language it encourages others to speak.
In contrast, the US and the European Union persistently try to speak to Russia in the language of the current century and are repeatedly surprised by the lack of understanding in Moscow.
It is time to recall the old language. And if Washington and Brussels don’t start speaking it, then they should at least understand what Russia really wants. Only then will the West be able to grasp the full extent of the Kremlin’s demands, and whether democratic nations are ready to suffer the global consequences that would result.
Dr. Oleksandr Shulga is the head of the Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia (IKAR), the only institution in Ukraine conducting monthly sociological monitoring in Russia. He has 16 years of advanced experience in the field of quantitative and qualitative sociological research.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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