April 3 was a grimly familiar day for many Ukrainians. Russia was launching hundreds of aerial munitions against key targets with its usual, cold disdain for civilian casualties. By the day’s end, 579 missiles and drones had been fired. It wasn’t the worst attack ever — the Kremlin can now muster up to 1,000 daily — and yet it was serious enough.
Destruction and death were scattered across the country, but there was some reassurance to be had. Ukraine’s air defense system had brought down 541 elements of the swarm.
Of course, there is only limited satisfaction in the recognition that things could have been worse. It still meant 38 missiles and drones had made it through the net, and these often do very serious damage.
Yet the air raids have changed in scope and nature, and something cheering is emerging. Ukraine is getting much better.
Russia has enormously increased the volume of attacks and has now moved away from a largely night-only pattern to a 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week cycle. But as the Institute for Science and International Security detailed in an April 7 report: “Despite record launch volumes, [Russian] hit rates declined, indicating improved interception capabilities, including the growing role of interceptor drones, mobile fire groups, and layered defense systems.”
April 3 was somewhat better than most days: 6% made it through to their targets compared with an 8% average during March. This is a steep fall from last fall, when some months saw almost 19% of drones reach their targets.
Air defense used to mean firing expensive missiles at expensive threats. That remains true, especially as demand for Patriot interceptors is greater than ever. But the character of aerial warfare is changing, as the US and its allies have been reminded in recent weeks. In Ukraine, and increasingly across the Middle East, the fight now also includes mass-produced drones hunting mass-produced drones.
In February, Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said the aim was to detect all aerial threats in real time and intercept at least 95% of incoming missiles and drones, while building a multi-layered air defense system and raising interceptor production to better protect cities and critical infrastructure. So far, the numbers seem to suggest Kyiv is on track.
“In March, Ukrainian interceptor drones destroyed over 33,000 enemy drones, twice as many as the previous month,” Fedorov said on April 8 in reference to UAV attacks both behind and on the frontline.
Ukraine says its air defenses destroyed or suppressed 89.9% of Russian aerial targets in March, up from 85.6% in February and 80.2% in December. This increased interception rate is also paired with an increase in Russian launch rates, as there was about a 28% increase from February, which was the second straight monthly increase.
“There are just more launches happening, often in periodic waves one after another,” said Norman, a soldier from the 109 Separate Territorial Defense Brigade.
The Kremlin’s emphasis on quantity has been visible for months. In September 2025, Russia was able to launch more than 800 drones in a single night. But as Russia scaled its offensive capacity, Kyiv was scaling production and improving the use of its interceptor drones.
In effect, both sides are now locked in an industrial drone race. For Ukraine, the challenge is to build interceptor drones cheaply, in large numbers, and with steadily improving kill rates. For Russia, it is to manufacture more attack drones while constantly adapting with countermeasures designed to evade interception.
The technology is advancing in many different ways, as a drone pilot from the Bulava unit reportedly downed two Shahed drones with a Sting interceptor from 500 km (311 miles) away.
Deborah Fairlamb, founding partner of Ukraine-focused venture capital firm Green Flag Ventures, added that one in three Russian aerial targets over Ukraine is now destroyed by interceptor drones.
But Ukraine’s success also drives Russia’s search for countermeasures. “Most interceptors are manually flown. They use thermal cameras to see drones at night. This may be a reason why Russia is doing some daytime attacks now, as the sun can damage a thermal sensor,” said Heiner Philipp, an engineer with Technology United for Ukraine. Each side is adapting to the other’s methods in near-real time.
“If you want the 50-100 kg (110-220 lb.) warhead on the Shahed to explode in the air, a 1 kg or greater payload is likely needed. Adding mobile fire teams with machine guns and thermal imagers can reduce costs even further,” Philipp said.
“The core challenge in modern air defense is not just capability, it’s cost and volume,” said Dmytro Kavun, co-founder and president of Dignitas Ukraine, a US-based nonprofit focusing on defense technology innovation. “Even tens of thousands of low-cost interceptors can dramatically reduce the pressure on high-end systems like Patriot by taking on the bulk of drone threats.”
But the search for cheaper interception is not limited to drones. Fire Point, the Ukrainian defense company behind the Flamingo missile, is in talks with European partners to develop a lower-cost alternative to the Patriot system, with the goal of reducing the cost of intercepting a ballistic missile to under $1m.
A cheaper domestically anchored option would ease pressure on Western-supplied interceptor missiles, worth millions, while making Ukraine’s broader air defense shield more sustainable.
Yet higher interception rates do not eliminate the danger. As Russia modifies its drones with larger and more specialized warheads, the consequences of even a small number of penetrations become more severe.
“Russia has adapted its warhead loadout for various targets, from standard and enhanced high-explosive fragmentation warheads to thermobaric and heavier 90-kg warheads, which increases the destructive effect but often reduces the range,” said Serhii Kuzan, chair of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center.
Ukraine’s improving defense model is the result of sustained effort. Vitaliy Goncharuk, the former chairman of the country’s Artificial Intelligence Committee, said that over the past 18 months, a layered air defense network against Shahed drones has been built in parallel to greater propeller-driven interceptor drone output. That combination, he says, has made the current model far more effective.
“Aircraft-type interceptors are better suited for longer loiter times and more complex targets,” said Kavun. “The key is not one ‘best’ system, but matching the right tool to the right threat and doing it at scale.” The Ukrainian Air Force says its newly acquired Mirage jets are achieving a 98% hit rate against drones and cruise missiles.
Goncharuk also warns that a more serious challenge is emerging. Russia is increasingly moving toward Shahed and Geran variants equipped with jet engines, effectively turning them into low-cost cruise-missile-like weapons that are harder for propeller-based interceptors to stop. Countering that will require a different set of solutions, above all, cheap short-range missile systems and, over time, potentially laser-based defenses.
Still, Ukraine’s response shows how quickly necessity can reshape battlefield conditions. Under sustained Russian pressure, Kyiv has learned not only to field cheaper interceptor drones at scale, but to apply the same logic of rapid wartime adaptation to more advanced systems such as missile systems. The result is an air defense model that began with Ukrainian drones, but is rapidly expanding across a variety of technologies.
David Kirichenko is a Ukraine-based freelance journalist and a regular contributor to Europe’s Edge at CEPA. He is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society and can be found on X/Twitter @DVKirichenko
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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