On April 15, the Foreign Ministries of Azerbaijan and Russia issued a joint statement on the shooting down of Azerbaijani Airlines flight 8243 by Russian air defense systems in December 2024, killing 38 people.
The tragedy, compounded by Moscow’s denial of responsibility, had triggered a sharp deterioration in Azerbaijani-Russian relations. Baku escalated its rhetoric against Moscow, suspended bilateral cooperation across multiple sectors, and worked toward rapprochement with the European Union and the US.
It demanded that Russia should admit its responsibility, punish the perpetrators, and pay compensation to the victims’ families. Although Moscow seemed reluctant, Baku’s firm stance prompted partial acknowledgment and a promise of action during President Ilham Aliyev’s meeting with Vladimir Putin in Dushanbe in October 2025.
Nevertheless, relations remained frosty, and Azerbaijan secured strategic agreements with the EU and Washington, including the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and a charter on strategic partnership signed during a visit by Vice-President JD Vance to Baku. These deals were criticized in Russia’s state-controlled media and by its conservative political establishment.
They were signs of how much Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus has declined since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, creating space for regional actors to pursue new initiatives.
Azerbaijan and Armenia, which have been involved in a bloody conflict over disputed territory for decades, took the opportunity to discuss peace, convening multiple meetings between state officials and with Turkey to explore further development of TRIPP and reopening the Turkish border.
Baku and Yerevan’s enthusiasm for the TRIPP project, and working with Western partners to develop exports and imports without Russian involvement, triggered heated debates in Moscow.
There was anger that TRIPP, the missing link in the “Middle Corridor” trade route connecting Central Asia and China to European and global markets, would cut out both Russia and Iran.
But the situation changed dramatically when the US and Israel attacked Iran, upending the Gulf region’s security architecture, disrupting energy supplies, and threatening maritime security.
Russia saw the turmoil as an opportunity to make a comeback in the South Caucasus by stepping up diplomatic activity and seeking involvement in regional projects, including TRIPP.
In February 2026, Armenia’s Minister of Economy Gevorg Papoyan rebuffed Moscow and restated his government’s position that Russia would not participate in TRIPP, underscoring Yerevan’s deepening partnership with the EU and the US.
Armenia’s determination to advance the new transit initiative as a cornerstone of its strategic alignment with the West has long fueled unease in Moscow, though Russia has so far refrained from open confrontation.
But the Kremlin has seized on the upheaval and uncertainty caused by the Iran war to recalibrate its stance.
Russian Vice Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk, who is responsible for economic diplomacy in the post-Soviet region, warned that the viability of the TRIPP route and the investment appeal of its associated infrastructure remain uncertain.
He also pointed to violations of property rights involving a Russian businessman, as well as mounting pressure on a Russian state-owned company to relinquish its railway concession in Armenia. Russian businesses are “wary” of working in the country, Overchuk added.
He said Armenia’s EU-oriented policies and actions against Russian businesses could prompt Moscow to reconsider its economic ties, which still accounted for 35% of Armenian foreign trade in 2025, according to figures released in January.
Armenia’s trade with Russia fell by half on the previous year, the data showed, as Russians stopped using the country as a conduit for sanctions-busting imports and illicit transfers of gold and diamonds to the UAE.
Overchuk’s barely concealed threats were no coincidence. They came shortly before Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s visit to Moscow on April 13 and weeks before critical parliamentary elections scheduled for June.
At the same time as talking tough to Armenia, Moscow has softened its rhetoric towards Azerbaijan as it seeks to reassert its influence in the South Caucasus.
Finally agreeing to act over the AZAL tragedy was part of its attempts to keep Azerbaijan as a leading regional trade partner by mending ties, while simultaneously issuing threats over Armenia’s pro-EU orientation.
These shifts, especially the change of heart over the AZAL flight and Overchuk’s appearance at an intergovernmental meeting a few days later, suggest optimism in Moscow that the Iran war has buried the TRIPP project.
Although TRIPP poses no direct threat to regional states, its success would reduce Moscow and Tehran’s influence and boost regional investment. The Iran war and the global uncertainty it has triggered may allow Russia to reclaim ground in the South Caucasus lost since 2022.
Armenia seems alert to the risk. Azerbaijan should beware of Moscow’s motives.
Fuad Shahbazov is a policy analyst covering regional security issues in the Eurasian region. He regularly provides his short geopolitical insights at @fuadshahbazov.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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