Two things are clear from the Kremlin’s response to the US-Israeli military campaign against its Iranian ally. The first is that Russia is worried, and the second is that it still enjoys a significant surplus of chutzpah.
So it was that the invader of Ukraine condemned the use of military force against Iran and the resulting violations of international law and the UN Charter on February 28, calling the operation an “unprovoked act of armed aggression.” On the same day, Russia launched 106 missiles and drones against Ukraine.
The Iran situation poses several risks and challenges for Russia. Moscow fears the attacks could trigger uncontrolled regional escalation, further complicating the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape for the Kremlin, particularly relations with Israel and Gulf countries. Closer to home, it is concerned that the attack on Iran could destabilize the South Caucasus and Central Asia, where Tehran maintains significant influence.
Furthermore, Russia will likely need to rethink its policy toward Iran, especially if US operations lead to regime change in Tehran and a new government proves less accommodating to Russian interests. As a side note, the prospect of regime change also reminds the Kremlin that no leader is safe from US policy. Finally, Moscow has a lot to lose economically in Iran, given decades of investment in the energy, railway, and nuclear sectors.
Nevertheless, the US operations also present the Kremlin with rewards and opportunities. First and foremost, Moscow hopes that the fighting will divert Washington’s attention from Ukraine, delay any form of negotiated settlement, and potentially slow US military assistance to Kyiv. While the US is preoccupied elsewhere, Moscow has free rein in Ukraine, especially if the war with Iran drags on.
Moving forward, Russia might hope to play a critical role in finding a “peaceful solution” to the Iran war, while positioning itself as a potential regional security broker. This is an important policy area for Moscow, as it has previously proposed championing a collective security architecture in the Gulf region. Finally, it will hope what it terms violations of international law are the death knell of the liberal, Western-led, rules-based international order. The Kremlin believes it thrives on chaos.
Mathieu Boulègue is CEPA Senior Fellow and is a freelance researcher and consultant in international conflict and security affairs, with a focus on the former Soviet Union. In his research, he focuses on Russian foreign policy and military affairs, Ukraine, Russia-NATO relations and Transatlantic security, and Russia-China defense and security relations, as well as military-security issues in the Arctic.
It’s easy, I think, to exaggerate the significance of this for Russia, Ukraine and Europe.
To be certain, Putin would rather that Khamenei be still alive and that Iranian supply lines — both for weapons going out and grain going in — were still open. But Putin is pragmatic and understands the limits of Russian power here. And the likelihood of a wide-ranging military attack on Iran is exactly why Shahed drones are now mass-produced in Russia.
More broadly, the loss of Khamenei — like the fall of Assad in late 2024 or Maduro in January — does little to puncture Putin’s power or pull, outside of the heads of some Western commentators.
For Europe and Ukraine, things are more challenging — but it’s also an opportunity for clarity. The war in Iran is one of choice. Its consequences, to be sure, matter to Europe, but it is not as central to European interests as the war in Ukraine.
And the fact that Washington has once again failed to consult its allies and run roughshod over their concerns is now the umpteenth signal that European security rests in European hands. As a result, we are seeing European leaders keep their distance. The bigger question is whether they can use Trump’s distraction to steal a march on support for Ukraine by agreeing terms and material assistance for post-ceasefire deterrence and defense while the Americans aren’t looking.
Sam Greene is a Senior Nonresident Fellow for the Democratic Resilience program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and Professor of Russian Politics at King’s College London (KCL).
For Europe, the issue is whether Trump is changing the aims of Western engagement with Iran.
Until now, US goals have been the same on missile and nuclear programs and proxies. However, the administration has unilaterally added new goals — that the security forces must disarm and that the Iranian Navy must be “annihilated”. He has said the Iranian people should rise up and take over their government.
There are risks here. One is that the administration’s cavalier approach to international law and to the concerns of allies and partners will make them reluctant to support further operations against the theocratic regime and future reconstruction operations in Iran.
This directly involves European states. They must decide if they will condemn Trump, passively cooperate by providing access to infrastructure, or outright cooperate with operations against Iran. Trump will remember their decisions (see the March 3 brickbats aimed at Spain and the UK), which could draw various threats or actions against them.
The Europeans pride themselves as rule-of-law countries, and several have stated that the US is either violating international law, including President Macron of France and Prime Minister Sanchez of Spain, who say that the operations were conducted “outside of international law”. Others say the US has entered a war without a clear strategy to end it.
The strain of making policy on the fly is clear with the US-UK relationship. Prime Minister Starmer initially blocked US planes from using British bases, following legal advice, but then agreed to let the United States use bases to strike Iran’s ballistic missiles and their storage sites being used to attack the UK’s Gulf allies, the 300,000 UK citizens residents there, and the UK military bases on Cyprus. Others have avoided confronting Trump. Chancellor Merz of Germany says that his government is in no position to lecture the US, while Poland’s President Nawrocki takes a different tack, pointing out that US operations are weakening Iran, an ally of the Russian Federation.
Much of the European reaction in the long run will depend on the success of US and Israeli operations. There is, after all, a best-case scenario where the Iranian people reclaim their state, there is no Iraq-style descent into mayhem, and a democratic government emerges with respect for human rights, we can expect European criticism to be muted.
If, however, the worst-case scenario occurs and Iran devolves into civil war and the entire region is destabilized via Iranian proxies, we can expect criticism to rise. Whichever way it goes, the Europeans will be concerned to focus on what matters most to them — assisting Ukraine to fight off Russia’s all-out invasion, now in its fifth year, and attempting to stand back from any involvement in US efforts in Iran.
Although Donald Trump’s policies up until now have been in line with the demands of the international community, his additional demands and manner of execution are fraught with risk. The certainty is that Europeans cannot avoid events.
G. Alexander (Alex) Crowther is a Senior Fellow at CEPA. He is a Professor of Practice for Cyber Issues at Florida International University and does research for the Swedish Defense University.
The Kremlin has so far remained composed, and has avoided open confrontation with the United States. At the same time, Moscow perceives the situation as critical to its interests. This latest assault on a key ally follows the humiliation of Putin’s allies in the club of authoritarians — that is, the spectacular collapse of the Assad regime, its key client-ally in 2024, and Maduro’s arrest by US forces in Venezuela in January.
This time it is Iran, one of Russia’s major partners and an independent actor, in the crosshairs, as opposed to a smaller client state. Iran is the ally that helped Russia adapt and even transform modern warfare by supplying Shahed drones.
It is the ally that Russia proudly welcomed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the SCO, in 2023 and BRICS+ in 2024. Moscow is now Tehran’s main arms supplier (parts of Russian-made drones have been discovered after attacks in the Gulf), it undertook the high-risk venture of helping Iran build a nuclear power plant in Bushehr, and beyond the military sphere, Iran is also a significant trade partner, purchasing Russian grain and industrial goods.
All these attempts to build a quasi-alliance and, more broadly, a multipolar world order in which Russia would have a meaningful voice are now at risk. The rewards the Kremlin might extract from this situation pale in comparison to the risks. A short-term spike in oil revenues and Washington’s distraction from Russia’s war on Ukraine are no substitute for a place at the global high table.
Moscow seems to understand that the problem lies not so much in the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as in the risks the US operation poses to the Iranian regime itself. Should the regime remain in place, Moscow will seek to maintain, if not deepen, the current level of relations.
The Kremlin has already embarked on an active signaling campaign in the region and beyond. Putin denounced the killing of Khamenei as illegal and immoral and held phone calls with Gulf leaders to reiterate this message.
Even prior to the US attack, Moscow invested in the regime’s stability by supplying equipment reportedly used by the IRGC to suppress street protests. It is highly likely that this support will continue in covert and hybrid forms while the active phase persists, and later through more open arms and technological supplies should a peace deal with the regime be reached.
Evgeny Roshchin is a Visiting Scholar at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and was formerly an academic in Russia.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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