Russia was always one of the most accomplished myth producers and, still- more important, has been one of the world’s largest exporters of myths about itself. Some of these have changed over time, but all served a single purpose — to create a sacred canopy that could conceal the real Russia from the outer world.
Winston Churchill’s 1939 maxim that “Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” highlighted this very idea.
Russian rulers like to depict the country as a powerful and unbreakable state, synonymous with national grandeur. A central theme of the myth is that Russia cannot lose a war, including the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, and that Russians loyally support the regime, come what may.
The agencies of the state, including the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), conduct surveys that confirm this. They report unwavering support for the war against Ukraine and rising trust in Vladimir Putin (78%). Unlike the Soviet era, there is an acknowledgment that some reject the war of aggression, but the pollsters say this unhappy minority is stable at around 20%.
Russians will die for this myth of national greatness and foreigners, spellbound by the sacred canopy will see only some mystical and even transcendental entity that rational Western scholars have no hope of understanding.
It’s nonsense of course, but there are truths buried within this that can be useful to the regime. The most important of these is that Russia will fight on forever, regardless. For the Kremlin, which has gambled on draining Western interest and determination, it’s perhaps the most useful myth of them all.
In reality, the regime does have real problems.
One of the most telling examples was the attitude of Russians to the mass mobilization edict in the fall of 2022. According to the very first wave of sociological monitoring, “The Mirror of Russia” conducted by the author’s Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia (IKAR), a Kyiv-based organization that continues to survey Russian opinion, there was a strong rejection of further mass conscription.
Even those who demonstrated loyalty to the regime opposed any further call-up and (crucially) showed no personal willingness to be mobilized next. This attitude remained very clear throughout this year and has even strengthened — the number of those who won’t support such mobilization policies rose from 60% in December 2022 to 69% in September 2023.
What has the Kremlin learned from this? We have to draw conclusions through inference, but it’s fairly clear. Firstly, Putin’s pollsters have without doubt conducted their own private sociological surveys, and secondly, there has been no new wave of mass mobilization. The regime knows how people feel, and it fears their possible response.
Russian military analysts urged the government to make this decision in the spring, or at the latest in the summer, to no avail. So we can reasonably conclude, with high probability, that Putin won’t announce a further mobilization until he is re-elected in March 2024, and that the Russian military will have to continue using covert mobilization with 20,000 conscripted monthly.
The alleged war criminal, FSB agent, and military blogger Igor Girkin, even lost his freedom, being sent to jail for criticism of the Kremlin and then of Putin himself. Girkin’s main complaint concerned the absence of a second wave of mass mobilization. Putting him behind bars was risky for the Kremlin, but mobilizing hundreds of thousands of Russians was even riskier, given popular attitudes.
Recent Russian surveys from various companies have tended to make headlines in the West when certain questions are asked, like whether Russians support an end to the war or a “special military operation”. When a majority of Russian citizens express support, it triggers a sense of optimism. Perhaps the support of ordinary Russians is lower than imagined.
Sadly, however, the results are less clear-cut. Systematic sociological analysis shows societal readiness to end the war was almost as strong a year ago. Moreover, in December 2022 the number of those happy to see it end immediately was 69%, rising to 76% at the beginning of the fall.
Delving a bit deeper, surveys ask on what terms would Russian society accept peace.
The answers are complicated. Look at Russian attitudes towards the loss of Kherson, the only oblast capital they managed to occupy after the full-scale invasion. A few months after Kherson’s liberation, they were asked how they assessed its loss. Three-quarters of respondents supported withdrawal because it helped to save Russian soldiers.
What does this tell us? It suggests that Russians reconcile themselves to decisions made by the authorities. In the same way, some 60% supported the first wave of mass mobilization but opposed another. Once a decision is made and implemented, most Russian citizens don’t see any reason to oppose it because it has already happened.
Such a mindset offers the authorities considerable room for maneuvering on decisions in occupied Ukrainian territories. The outlook can be summarized as “what’s done is done”. This is not wholly bad news — after all, it also suggests the Kremlin could withdraw and not face too great a backlash.
To be clear, there are signs of war weariness. Last December, 48% of Russians backed an indefinite war until total victory; that number is 15% at most. And vice versa, the number of those willing to wait a few months for the war’s end increased to 44% from 31%.
This is known in the Kremlin and makes it fearful of a possible future. If Russians shift from passive acceptance to overt resistance, perhaps propelled by demands that they become fresh cannon fodder on the Ukrainian front, the situation could change quite fast.
Myths are a significant part of this multi-dimensional confrontation. Only a calm and scientific approach will provide unbiased data to detail the population’s mood swings and to predict the evolution of the Russia-Ukraine war.
Dr. Oleksandr Shulga is the head of the Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia (IKAR), the only institution in Ukraine conducting monthly sociological monitoring in Russia. He possesses 16 years of advanced experience in the field of quantitative and qualitative sociological research. During these years, Dr. Shulga was engaged as a supervisor, consultant, or expert to carry out various studies, including areas of the potential risk of escalating tensions and instability.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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