Russia has had the initiative in southern Donbas since October 2023. With waves of glide bombs, artillery, and infantry assaults, the fighting is primitive and costly in terms of lives, but ensures slow progress.
Yet the Ukraine debate has moved so far into discussions about ceasefires and peacekeeping forces that the war on the ground is in danger of being forgotten. Ukraine’s armed forces have been mauled over the last three years. They lack manpower and sufficient weaponry to stop advances by Russian forces which are more badly mangled by war, but have deeper reserves of people.
Russia will not stop if it’s winning, so the allies must urgently consider how to enable Ukraine to pressure Putin on the battlefield or costs will be much higher in the future.
While the fighting in the towns of Torezk and Chasiv Yar has been underway for months, Russia has been able to occupy positions in the east, south, and southwest of Pokrovsk, and to retake the town of Velyka Novosilka (see map.)
Russia now controls four of the six major roads leading to Pokrovsk, and most recently also managed to take the strategically important connection between that town and Kostyantynivka.
The city is vital for Ukrainian logistics in the region and its importance will probably mean several months of fighting and further attempts by Russia to surround the city.
By threatening Pokrovsk and retaking Velyka Novosilka, Russia could set itself the goal in 2025 of advancing either north from Pokrovsk to the cities of Kostyantynivka, Sloviansk, and Kramatorsk, or southwest deeper into Zaporizhzhia Oblast, with the prospect of developing a threat to the major city of Zaporizhzhia itself.
Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to hold territory in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. The Kremlin has thrown men at the problem, resulting in exceedingly high losses, but Ukraine forces have chosen their defensive positions wisely and are proving obstinate.
This explains the decision to withdraw North Koreans from the front in Kursk after suffering exceedingly high losses, possibly as many as 4,000 of the 10,000 or more expeditionary force has been killed and wounded. These units are presumably regrouping and possibly undergoing improved training.
Russia is no longer capable of large-scale and rapid military operations, but it can continue a grinding, gradual conquest as it fights street by street, village by village, and city by city. As many as 700,000 men may be dead and wounded, but with sign-up bonuses as high as $40,000 for contract volunteers, Russia continues to find the men its operations require.
In addition, Russia repeatedly fires ballistic missiles and drones into Ukrainian cities to terrorize the civilian population, most recently in Odesa, Poltava, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson.
For Ukraine, the only way to turn the tide is to break free from away from Russia's attritional warfare by employing greater mobility and speed.
To do this, Ukraine needs more and better standoff weapons that can attack and threaten Russian troop concentrations, command and control, communications, logistics, and airfields at an early stage.
Ukraine is currently demonstrating the potential of using standoff weapons with the success of drone attacks and combined attacks using Ukrainian drones and Western weapons such as ATACMS and Storm Shadow. Unfortunately, Ukraine's partners, including Germany, are far too hesitant in this regard.
The air force needs more combat aircraft, as the existing and limited fleet of F-16s are primarily used to support air defense. With significantly more aircraft with air-to-air missiles, Ukraine could finally keep the Russian aircraft with their highly effective glide bombs at a distance.
There is a shopping list of what else is needed, including components, parts, and supply chains for drones from countries other than China.
Ukraine needs maintenance, repair, and logistical support with industrial and contractual partners closer to the front. It must finally be allowed to manufacture spare parts for equipment supplied by partners itself.
A renewed effort by Europeans to weaken the Russian defense industry would also be a significant help. The Europeans must better enforce sanctions, cut off trade routes to Russia through third countries, stop financial flows, and block technology exports.
A rapid increase in Ukraine's arms and ammunition production is possible if allies spend at least 25% of their military aid for Ukrainian domestic production. European financial institutions should also invest directly in Ukraine's defense sector.
While Europeans and Americans are currently primarily concerned with themselves, Putin is slowly and systematically continuing his war. Tensions between Europeans and Americans, as well as US plans to withdraw troops from Europe, are likely to encourage Putin in his long-term plans.
Despite much speculation, there is currently no evidence of any serious movement towards a ceasefire or negotiations. There is currently no agreement among Europeans or Americans on how Putin can be stopped militarily, nor on long-term security systems to control Russia in future. These are key questions, and must be answered.
Nico Lange is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.). He is also a Senior Fellow at the Munich Security Conference in Berlin and Munich, and is Chair of Military History at the University of Potsdam and at the Hertie School of Governance.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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