There’s more than one way that a US withdrawal or diminishment of military support for Europe might happen, but the ultimate risk is the same. In one likely scenario, Donald Trump re-takes the presidency in November and before he is even inaugurated, announces that NATO’s Article 5 will not necessarily trigger US military intervention. The enemies of the alliance, especially in the Kremlin, would conclude the US security guarantee is now conditional and unreliable.
Or a new US President says that she or he simply cannot promise to put Europe first. There will be some help in a crisis, but US forces’ war-readiness will be prioritized in Asia.
Or both.
We cannot know exactly how it will play out, but we can reasonably assess that things are changing in the military relationship between the US and Europe.
Political and military prudence now demand that European states view the US commitment as no more than a possibility, and prepare for US withdrawal of support for Europe as the baseline scenario. Not because we know this will happen, but because we know it may.
This is alarming, given that Russia has reemerged as an existential threat to European security. Although Putin’s Russia — for the moment — remains focused on its war of aggression against Ukraine, there is a distinct possibility that Russia will challenge the territorial integrity of NATO sooner rather than later. As US withdrawal from Europe emerges as a plausible scenario and European governments continue to show and indecisiveness in the face of Russian threats, the likelihood of such a conflict will only increase.
Successfully deterring Russia, even after a US drawdown, will require European states to demonstrate capability and resolve.
For obvious reasons analysts are most concerned about the capability. European arsenals, by and large, seem wholly unprepared for largescale inter-state war. A senior British general admitted this year that the army could fight Russia for two months at best, while many other European countries, like Italy, Belgium, and Spain, are still far from meeting NATO’s requirement that 2% of GDP be spent on defense.
Losing access to American capabilities would hurt, especially in the missile domain, given that European states rely heavily on the United States to provide long-range fire support as well as missile defense assets in case of a warfighting contingency with Russia. Currently, other aspects like logistics, are also heavily reliant on the US.
However, US abandonment would also heavily affect the resolve dimension. While resolve is often conceptualized as a more political factor, it is directly linked to military capabilities. You are more likely to show resolve if you are confident you can wage an effective war when things go wrong. Losing access to US military capabilities will therefore not only undermine our capacity to defend ourselves, it will further push the perceived balance of resolve in Russia’s favor.
Lack of resolve is further highlighted by European states’ continuing disunity over the extent of assistance to Ukraine, and the need for Russia to comprehensively lose the war, which highlights risk aversity.
Urgent action is required. With the potential impact of a second Trump administration on Europe, European decision-makers must act. They should hope for the best but prepare for the worst-case of complete US withdrawal within months of Trump’s team taking office. Any other approach would be reckless and inconsistent with state leaders’ primary responsibility to ensure the security, prosperity, and survival of their nations.
This leaves only one option: drastically shortening the timeframe for Europe to become independently war capable. European states don’t need competent and well-equipped armies by 2030 — they needed them yesterday. This calls for very significant increases in defense spending and a major buildup of Europe’s defense industrial base. This is a key element of restoring the Kremlin’s understanding of European resolve.
Instead of repeatedly emphasizing their risk aversion in endless discussions about escalation risks in the Ukraine war, they must clearly demonstrate their steadfastness and commitment, even if it increases risks to their own security. Bear in mind that Europe is already the target of a worsening Russian sabotage and subversion campaign.
With November’s US election fast approaching, Europe is at a crossroads and a sense of panic over Europe’s future could set in. Not the kind of panic that paralyzes decision-makers, but the kind that triggers a fight-or-flight instinct. Europeans must choose to fight if they are truly determined to defend their way of life in liberal democratic societies.
The continent cannot wait until November to get serious. From today, European states have at best two to three years to reestablish effective deterrence vis-à-vis Moscow, otherwise they run great risks. European decision-makers must act accordingly.
Fabian Hoffmann is a Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project (ONP). His research focuses on missile technology, nuclear strategy, and defense policy. His PhD project focuses on the implications of conventional long-range strike weapons on nuclear strategy. His research has been published in Journal of Strategic Studies, European Security, War on the Rocks, and The Washington Post, among others.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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