Polish President Nawrocki’s meeting with President Trump on September 3 holds a great opportunity for both countries, and for Ukraine and Europe. Nawrocki’s first international visit, a month after his inauguration, it will mark the beginning of his more active international engagement. 

Although the two leaders have only met briefly — an Oval Office photo during Nawrocki’s campaign widely seen as a political endorsement — they like each other already. Both are polarizing figures riding waves of national conservatism and nativist politics. Trump’s affection for Poland is real, spurred by his first visit as president in July 2017 (while I served as US Ambassador) when he spoke movingly about the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 and, for the first time in his presidency, clearly affirmed NATO’s Article 5.  

Like Trump, Nawrocki shows signs of testing the boundaries of presidential power, though in a very different democratic framework. Poland’s parliamentary system leaves governance in the hands of Prime Minister Tusk and his coalition who, for example, decide on purchases of US military equipment and energy.  

Yet Nawrocki wields veto power (which he’s used several times already), commands the armed forces, and shares overlapping responsibilities in foreign policy. This cohabitation is as intensely partisan as US politics between Trump and the Democrats. The recent row over a leaked letter from the government to Nawrocki ahead of his Washington visit only served to underscore the vehemence.  

But Poland is united on the threat from Russia. Nawrocki’s politics and background position him to influence Trump on Ukraine and Europe from a perspective that Keir Starmer, Friedrich Merz, or Emmanuel Macron cannot. A nationalist historian, Nawrocki’s views on Russian imperialism and Ukraine’s independence are strident and well-founded.  

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While the media have focused on his support for reducing benefits to Ukrainian refugees in Poland and pressing Ukraine on historical grievances, his support for Ukraine’s defense against Russia is steadfast. In preparation for his Washington visit, he convened Baltic presidents and Denmark’s prime minister in Warsaw, with President Zelenskyy joining virtually — a good move. 

In Washington, Nawrocki should emphasize that Trump’s ambition to reduce U.S. forces in Europe will only be viable if Ukraine’s formidable military capability and defense industry are secured firmly within NATO’s orbit (not necessarily as a member, which Nawrocki does not currently support). Russian domination of Ukraine would leave Europe — and Poland most of all — more exposed and more dependent on US troops.   

Nawrocki’s visit is also well-timed to impact the US administration’s National Defense Strategy and Force Posture Review, expected in the coming weeks. While US priorities will center on the homeland and Asia, the treatment of Russia, Ukraine, and Europe will shape US policy for the next three years.  

Polish leaders and their constituents are laser-focused on maintaining U.S. troop levels in their country. That may be achievable in the near term, given Poland’s popularity in the US and its leadership on defense spending in NATO. But Poland should also prepare for a longer-term shift by complementing opposition to troop cuts with requests for deeper defense cooperation and advanced US systems, together with US military personnel to help operate them.  

A senior multi-party Polish parliamentary delegation laid very effective groundwork in July. The chairs of Poland’s foreign affairs and defense committees, along with Nawrocki’s now-international policy advisor and other leading members of the Sejm, emphasized Polish unity on US defense ties and the Russian threat. Their message resonated across Congress and the administration, setting the stage for the president’s visit.  

Political theater will doubtless play a role on September 3. Neither Trump nor Nawrocki pulls any punches on domestic politics. Other issues may impinge, such as the Polish government’s recent announcement to join several European partners in pursuing a digital services tax, which Trump opposes. Yet Poland’s commitment to US energy projects – especially liquefied natural gas and nuclear — should appeal strongly to Trump’s business instincts.  

The central opportunity, however, is security. For Poland, Ukraine, and Europe, Nawrocki’s first presidential encounter with Trump offers the chance to shape US strategy at a critical juncture. 

Ambassador Paul Jones (ret.) is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and an International Affairs Advisor at Squire Patton Boggs global law firm. He was US Ambassador to Poland (2015-18), US Ambassador to Malaysia (2010-13), and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (2013-15). He was also Vice President for International Government Relations at Raytheon Technologies (2020-23). 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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