There may be a lingering sense in Europe that the US administration is still threatening to pull out or disconnect from NATO, but CEPA Senior Fellow Skip Davis says there’s no sign of this. Indeed, the Ankara summit is likely to agree steps that will cement the US military presence in place even as Washington demands that Europe do more.

He went on to discuss the summit goals, increased spending commitments, the US force review, and the capabilities Europe needs to develop.

Here’s an edited summary of what he said.

Question: Is the US really decoupling from European defense, and what could that mean for European NATO?

Davis: I would not call it decoupling. Decoupling would mean something much more significant: a real withdrawal of troops and a withdrawal of support or commitment. President Trump, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State have all said in meetings with counterparts at NATO ministerials that the United States remains committed to the alliance.

At the same time, they expect Europeans to do more: to spend more, commit more forces, maintain higher force readiness, and take on greater responsibility for defending their countries through NATO defense plans. In this regard, “right-sizing” means reducing the U.S. contribution in certain force packages in order to require European countries to step up.

The NATO Force Model is part of that. Countries commit forces to defense plans and keep them at higher levels of readiness. They enter NATO’s force pool, which distinguishes forces at the highest readiness, high readiness, and lower but still available readiness levels. These forces are available for crisis or conflict at shorter notice than in the past.

In terms of forces stationed in Europe, the US does not have huge numbers of people in Europe compared with Cold War levels. It has already pulled out one rotational brigade, largely from the southeast, beginning last year. The rotational brigade in Poland continues.

There was also confusion in the press around an announcement about a drawdown of 5,000 troops from Germany. In the end, there was not really a significant withdrawal of 5,000 troops that would substantially affect theatre infrastructure or command and control. The administration also looked at pulling the brigade out of Poland, but that would have sent the wrong signal to an ally that is spending significantly more and wants to host US troops. That was stopped and reversed, and the rotation continues.

One important element that is not being sent, however, is the Strategic Fires Battalion, which had been built specifically for the European theatre. It was designed to counter the Russian threat from Iskander systems that violated the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. That deployment was canceled in May. Germany is now pursuing new missile production plans with the US.

As for the US six-month review announced on June 18: this is not the first such review. It is probably the second or third I have heard of. It appears designed to give military advisers space to come up with new recommendations that can then be decided on by the President and the Secretary of Defense.

The possible candidates [for withdrawal from Europe] are some Air Force and maritime units, but maritime units are extremely limited. These include forward-deployed naval forces, such as Aegis cruisers based out of Rota, Spain. That is a friction point with President Trump, especially given Spain’s position during the recent war against Iran.

But it would be difficult to move those ships quickly. There is a significant amount of maintenance and support infrastructure there, and the location is extremely useful for US objectives. It is also important for NATO missile defense because those Aegis cruisers are among Europe’s only long-range anti-ballistic missile capabilities, apart from the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland.

I do not think many of these ships would be sent back. One or two could be possible, but they are multi-purpose forces with both offensive and defensive capabilities beyond Europe, and it took a long time to build up the current force presence. There may also be options among Air Force squadrons, but I doubt they would remove F-35s that have just arrived. There is too much synergy between the US F-35 squadron and F-35 forces across the alliance.

Question: NATO members pledged to increase defense-related spending to 5% of GDP. What exactly does that involve?

Davis: There are several components here, so let me unpack them. The 5% commitment agreed last year as part of the defense investment plan includes two main elements. First, there is the 3.5% target for core defense spending by 2035. Second, there is the additional 1.5% of GDP to be spent on a wider set of defense-related areas.

That 1.5% includes everything related to resilience, which means something specific in NATO terms: the ability of a country to mobilize and support a defense effort in a time of crisis or conflict. That includes the health sector, communications, transport, energy, cybersecurity, government services, and other fields.  

The same category also supports spending for Ukraine and spending to expand a country’s defense-industrial base. So, broadly speaking, there are three general categories: resilience and critical infrastructure, support for Ukraine, and defense-industrial expansion.

Alliance Secretary General Mark Rutte says this summit is all about implementation. Last year was about major commitments; now the main focus is on follow-through. He wants to demonstrate real defense-spending increases showing that countries are moving toward the 3.5% and 1.5% goals, through defense-related contracts, and the fielding of new defense capabilities as a result.

He has highlighted model countries such as the Baltic states and Poland, and a few others that are moving faster than expected from the old 2% level toward the new targets. These are also the countries closest to the fight [in Ukraine]. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, they have been among the strongest supporters of Ukraine and have reacted most strongly in terms of building capabilities against potential Russian aggression.

In addition, at the Summit the Secretary General will showcase new contracts agreed and signed by ministries of defense, interior and others responsible for critical infrastructure. Those contracts will direct spending increases toward specific capabilities, munitions, and stockpiles. Munitions stockpiles remain a major issue for NATO countries (as the UK noted when it promised to spend an additional £11bn, or $15bn, on stockpiles in a June 30 announcement).

Part of the money will also be spent on increasing forces. NATO countries had reduced their force posture for many years, even after some changes following 2014. The significant shift only came after 2022. That means more manpower, more equipment, more weapons systems, greater expenditures on training and readiness, and in some cases entirely new forces.

Ukraine has also demonstrated the importance of autonomous systems. Many countries are now beginning to transform their militaries for greater use of unmanned systems, which also requires new organizational structures.

The ultimate alliance plan will likely include defense-spending plan percentages: what countries have agreed to spend toward the 3.5% target, toward the 1.5% target, and toward the commitment that 20% of defense spending should go to new systems (that last goal goes back to the 2014 Defense Investment Pledge).

There will also be a major defense-industry day. NATO already has a NATO Industry Forum once a year, but now it is also holding industry days connected to summits. The aim is to announce new contracts and new multinational capability-development agreements. These are high-visibility projects where NATO countries work together on common capability targets or requirements.

So there will definitely be several events and media coverage designed to demonstrate achievement. The Secretary General has already cited numbers during his recent visit to the United States, including a figure of roughly $250bn in additional investment by European allies and Canada over last year and this year.

Question: Is the US review about pressing Europe to offer more support to US operations beyond Europe?

Davis: Unless there is another major crisis over the next couple of months, I do not see many opportunities for Europe to demonstrate support for US operations beyond the transatlantic theatre.

One possible exception would be if there were a major minesweeping or mine-clearing operation in the Strait of Hormuz, or a security force to escort commercial traffic. But Europeans would likely be in a defensive role, not an offensive one.

More likely, I expect the review to involve hard analysis of where the US military can take risk in defending Europe, based on both NATO ally commitments and US interests. US bases in Europe are used for more than European defense. They are extremely convenient for operations in the Middle East, the broader Gulf region, and North Africa. They provide critical power-projection capability as we saw in the recent war on Iran.

In the end, I think the recommendations will focus on what is most important for US defense and where risk can be accepted. Some measures may be superficial but still claim to punish certain allies. But I do not think the review will be so politically punitive that it accepts major military risk.

Question: If the US does reduce commitments, what should European governments do to backfill those commitments? Should they focus on logistics, manpower, industry, or something else?

Davis: They definitely need to focus on industry in order to build capabilities and rebuild munitions stockpiles. They also need to build new capabilities, especially autonomous systems, which have been identified as crucial for modern warfare.

The NATO Force Model is also important. Some US forces currently identified in NATO defense plans or in the force model have probably been reduced. Those are likely to be conventional forces. European allies will have to contribute more to backfill them.

The priority areas include air defense, maneuver capabilities, engineers, aviation, and deep fires such as artillery battalions and ideally longer-range systems. Allies should also develop land-based deep-strike options, not just air and maritime options. Europe currently has limited air- and sea-launched long-range strike capabilities, such as SCALP/Storm Shadow and Taurus, but not many others comparable to US systems. Some work is already underway on this through a UK-German program and French equivalents.

I would not expect Europe to replace the United States quickly in areas such as strategic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) or strategic airlift. Those are areas where the United States will probably remain the primary supplier. Europeans already have enough to do in meeting the capability targets they agreed to last year.

Question: What will Russia make of all this?

Davis: There are two sides to this. We often focus on the idea that reduced US commitments would mean less of a threat or lower deterrence for Russia. But as long as the nuclear deterrent remains strong, and the US commitment to it remains strong, that is a major factor. NATO also has its nuclear-sharing arrangements: dual-capable aircraft, US nuclear munitions, and the five allies capable of deploying them. That remains in Europe and is not changing.

A reduced conventional force commitment could be interpreted by Russia as a sign that the United States is less likely to come to Europe’s aid. But what remains is still significant: command structures, V Corps forward presence, a division headquarters, a heavy brigade forward, US presence in the Baltics, and forces across Europe, especially in Italy, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. That broad footprint shows the United States is not decoupling and would be present in the event of a fight.

The United States may not send as many forces far forward, but if US blood is shed, it is easy to imagine the US public and political leadership becoming fully committed.

The positive side is that increased European capability gives Europe a stronger position in any negotiations with Russia. It forces Russia to take note that Europe is standing up to defend itself. Real increases in European capabilities will be noticed by Russian military and political leadership.

Russia may use these developments rhetorically to claim that NATO poses a greater threat. But NATO is a defensive alliance. It has never been an offensive alliance. Even in cases such as Kosovo and Libya, NATO intervened to protect civilian populations, not to overthrow governments, and certainly not to attack Russia. NATO has been careful to say this publicly and to posture its forces accordingly.

Davis:

Let me mention a few other things.

One interesting development over the past year is the creation of new enhanced vigilance activities. Baltic Sentry was established in response to the Russian shadow fleet. Eastern Sentry was created after drone incursions into Poland and other countries, including Romania, to coordinate better air surveillance and air defense. Arctic Sentry was established this year after the Greenland-related discussion between the United States, Denmark, and other allies, in order to increase defense and security efforts in the Arctic region among NATO allies with appropriate capabilities, plus the United Kingdom.

These activities involve new force contributions to increase awareness and deterrence against Russian threats. In the Arctic, the focus is also on Chinese threats. NATO is trying to improve strategic awareness and response, and to test connectivity between autonomous systems and different forces, the implementation of AI tools, and other new capabilities. These activities also include experimentation.

Another important development is the arrival of NATO forces in Finland, including a Combined Air Operations Centre and a Multi-Corps Land Component Command. There is now also a multinational force there.

NATO now has nine forward land forces. The old term was enhanced Forward Presence battalions; now they are called Forward Land Forces. There were eight battlegroups in the Baltics, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, and now there is a ninth in Finland. These are tripwire forces across key areas of the alliance.

Support for Ukraine is another major objective of the summit: demonstrating continued European commitment to Ukraine and emphasizing Ukraine’s importance as part of the future European security infrastructure.

Allied Command Transformation is also working on several developments that may be announced during or around the summit. These include counter-UAS initiatives designed to introduce low-cost interceptors and capabilities into the alliance, next-generation targeting, improving the ability to leverage autonomous systems in the maritime domain, and other initiatives that will pay dividends in the coming years rather than immediately.

Maj Gen (Ret) Skip Davis is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He was NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment after retiring from the US Army after more than 37 years of service. Commissioned in the infantry he served the first half of his career in rapid deployment airborne and infantry units and spent over 20 years abroad including command in Iraq and Afghanistan, and multiple operations in Africa and the Balkans.

Sofia Slonovska is a CEPA Editorial Intern and a graduate of Bard College Berlin, where she studied politics, economics, and social thought. Ukrainian-born, her research interests include European security, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and transatlantic relations.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.