When NATO leaders gather in Ankara for their annual summit, they will grapple with how to respond to the mounting threat of drone warfare.
Drone components are now critical infrastructure. The security risk of a drone is rarely found in its carbon fiber frame. It resides in the data transmission devices, flight controllers, ground control stations, navigation systems, and sensors that manage sensitive information. NATO members have committed to spending 5% of GDP on defense by 2035 and the debate is now moving from pledges to implementation. The alliance needs to adapt to a battlefield shaped by rapid technological development in drones.
Increased allied defense spending offers opportunities to reduce our present dependence on Chinese drone technology. The US has taken the lead by prohibiting all Chinese parts. But so far, it has failed to substitute coherent alternative suppliers. Joint ventures with Ukraine and NATO allies represent a potential path forward.
The US Federal Communications Commission issued a landmark 2025 Public Notice that banned all foreign-produced drones and their critical components. It’s a comprehensive list, covering communication systems, cameras, batteries, and even motors.
The logic is simple but daunting: a sensor manufactured by a state-controlled entity in a “covered foreign country” — specifically China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea — represents a risk for data exfiltration or remote disruption. With a component-level ban, the US government is attempting to close loopholes where a domestic drone might still have a foreign-made brain.
But drone security is not a domestic US issue; it is a transatlantic challenge. Ukraine is now a source of military innovation, particularly in drones, counter-drone systems, and battlefield data on how to fight Russia.
The Defense Industry Day at the NATO Summit represents an appropriate forum to address the drone challenge. Together, allies must address how to balance compromised supply chains against the need to scale up production.
The US is setting the agenda. After the 2025 FCC Public Notice, the 2026 Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) put the prohibitions into action, blocking federal agencies from procuring Chinese drones and critical components. The prohibition applies not just to federal agencies but to all federal contractors.
But its impractical to ban all Chinese parts overnight. The military’s demand for high-performance, low-cost drones often outstrips the capacity of the domestic industrial base. In March 2026, the FCC introduced a glide path, a “Conditional Approvals” list offering limited approval for specific drones and components through the end of 2027.
The US has also published a “Blue List” identifying drones safe for government use and managed by the Defense Management Contract Agency. To earn a spot, a drone must not be manufactured in — nor use parts from — China. It cannot use software developed in these countries or utilize network connectivity administered by adversarial entities.
Blue List drones cost more than non-Blue List drones, at a time when the overall cost of drones is falling. In December 2025, the launch of a new Blue List drone website allowed the Department of Defense to purchase trusted, low-cost drones. The most recent list featured over 39 certified systems and 165 components.
The challenge ahead lies in harmonizing these strict US standards with NATO allies. Since few alternatives to Chinese parts now exist, exceptions to the policy must be used. The goal of future policy must be to make exceptions obsolete by aggressively funding and scaling the domestic and allied production of critical components — from sensors to flight controllers.
Solving the drone dilemma requires more than a ban; it requires a vision. The US must pursue a sustainable approach that connects the strategic intent of Executive Orders with the statutory requirements of the NDAA and the regulatory oversight of the FCC. By operationalizing these policies through programs like the Blue List, the US begins to build a resilient, trusted ecosystem for autonomous flight.
The path forward for the US and NATO is clear: we must treat drone components as critical infrastructure. Security and supply chain access are not competing interests; they are two sides of the same coin of national sovereignty. Only by securing the silicon can we truly secure the skies.
Lt. Gen. Lance Landrum (Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He served in the US Air Force for over 31 years and is currently President of Team Landrum Advising and Consulting, LLC, which provides strategic advice on executive-level leadership, developing enterprise strategy, and forming implementation plans to achieve tangible results. He was Deputy Chair of NATO’s Military Committee (2021-2023) and was also the United States European Command Director of Operations, J3 (2020-2021).
Erin Bailey is an intern with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. She is pursuing a Bachelor of Science in International Relations and Affairs at the George Washington University.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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