It was 4:10 am on January 7, 2022. Suddenly, an undersea communication cable off the coast of Norway went dead at a point recently crossed by Russian fishing trawlers. Norwegian police, while reaching no firm conclusion, believe that they were the most probable suspects.
On October 7, last year, the gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia started to lose pressure. A communications cable was also severed, and the investigation revealed that the damage must been caused by a dragging anchor of a Chinese vessel. It took nearly a year before Beijing admitted the blame, calling it an accident.
These attacks form a growing pattern of undersea cables and pipelines being attacked, apparently as part of Russian-Chinese hybrid warfare, and represent a visceral sign of the vulnerabilities facing NATO. The alliance pledged to increase the resilience of critical infrastructure in its 2023 Annual Report, which emphasized not only traditional military threats but also non-military challenges such as cyberattacks and infrastructure sabotage.
The shift is overdue. Modern warfare is hybrid. Adversaries increasingly target civilian infrastructure to destabilize societies without entering into direct military confrontation.
Although NATO is taking important steps to meet this challenge — a Maritime Centre for Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure was inaugurated last May — its plans remain vague. There are some obvious solutions such as the replacement of vulnerable undersea communication cables with satellite-based systems, but they are expensive. Meanwhile, many Western countries lack even a plan to defend energy grids, water supplies, and transportation networks.
Another major unprotected risk is the proliferating offshore wind turbine farms. The North Sea and Baltic region are home to an array of offshore wind farms, which are becoming an important part of Europe’s energy mix. Poland alone is set to build offshore installations worth several gigawatts of power. Such installations are vulnerable to both physical sabotage and cyberattacks.
Some NATO member states have launched national initiatives to address these vulnerabilities. The United Kingdom and Germany, for instance, have measures to protect undersea cables and energy installations. Berlin even has established a dedicated research center, while London has led a Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) of 10 North European NATO allies to patrol the Baltic and is commissioning two new naval vessels to address the issue.
Nordic countries are also acting. Denmark and Norway have invested significantly in surveillance and defense systems designed to safeguard their offshore energy assets. Both will deploy long-range drones in the Arctic.
While important, these national efforts are fragmented and lack the overarching coordination that only NATO can provide. The alliance is investing in joint surveillance of undersea cables, shared intelligence on potential threats, and a rapid response framework.
These measures, while welcome, need to be bolstered through redundancy and diversification. Satellite communications should cover disrupted undersea cables. Backup energy supplies need to be installed to protect electricity cables and gas pipes.
To counter hybrid warfare targeting subsea infrastructures, NATO must establish clear and legally sound protocols for responding to attacks. This should involve a framework to lay out the precise action NATO units can take if they catch perpetrators in the act. Such protocols should ensure that responses are both effective and compliant with international law, enabling NATO forces to intercept, investigate, or even neutralize threats while respecting diplomatic legal boundaries.
In the longer term, NATO must address the role of emerging technologies in protecting infrastructure. Artificial intelligence and machine learning must be integrated into surveillance and monitoring systems, providing early warning of potential sabotage. New materials to reinforce cables should be developed.
NATO’s new focus on protected critical infrastructure is necessary and timely. Its effectiveness, though, will depend on whether plans will be translated into action. In the coming years, threats from Russia and its allies will only increase, and NATO must act decisively.
The Svalbard attack was a warning. It endangered data flows between a Norwegian Island and the mainland, not between the US and Europe. A second cable managed to ensure connectivity. Unless it takes decisive action, the alliance may not be so lucky next time.
Maciej Filip Bukowski is a non-resident fellow with the Digital Innovation Initiative Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Maciej is also a 2022 CEPA James S. Denton fellow and an Earth System Governance Project Research Fellow. A graduate of the Sorbonne and Cornell law schools, he is completing a Ph.D. thesis on the geopolitics of climate change at Jagiellonian University.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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