After the first wave of compulsory mobilization in 2022 brought broad opposition and an exodus of young men, the Russian authorities did their homework. As a result, they are significantly better prepared for the next round, which many observers expect may follow the September 18-20 Duma elections.
But surveys carried out by the Kyiv-based Institute for Conflict Studies and Analysis of Russia show opposition is not just high, it is also increasing.
Many Russians are deeply unhappy at the idea, and Putin’s inner circle, despite its tight control of information and communications, will have to take their opposition into account. Finding ways out of the country for their fighting age children has become an urgent talking point among middle class Russians in Moscow and St Petersburg.
Negative attitudes to compulsory mobilization became entrenched after the first wave, in the fall of 2022, and the share of Russians opposed to a repeat has remained at around three-quarters of the population since early 2024.
Yet support for compulsory mobilization has continued to fall, to 11% in 2026 from 24% in early 2023, and differences between age groups have narrowed, according to the 10th update to IKAR’s sociological monitoring of Russian opinion.
While an absolute majority of young Russians has always been opposed, the older generation were more willing to back mass mobilization. Today, however, the differences between young, middle-aged, and older Russians have shrunk, with an absolute majority in every age group opposing a second wave: 68% among elder generation, 72% among the mid-age group, and 80% among young people.
The Kremlin has only itself to blame. It has failed to provide either an ideological foundation for the war that is accepted by the majority of Russians or a clear vision of victory.
The first factor is not so important while the army relies on contract recruitment, but will become critical if there’s compulsory mobilization.
The absence of a vision of victory, however, has a negative effect both on society’s perception of mobilization and the willingness of large numbers of citizens to sign military contracts. It pushes the prospect of demobilization indefinitely into the future and increases the perceived likelihood of death or serious injury. (The UK chief of staff said on September 11 that Russian military casualties had now reached 1.5 million).
In short, compulsory mobilization, with no end in sight, is a highly undesirable prospect for most Russians.
The Kremlin’s bureaucracy continues to prepare regardless. The Ministry of Defense has improved its capacity to track citizens liable for mobilization, compiling up-to-date information on home addresses, workplaces and social circles, while imposing a range of restrictive measures, including bans on leaving the country, even through Belarus, an ally in the Ukraine war.
Employers, both state and private, will play a much greater role than in 2022, both by notifying employees and ensuring those wanted for military service report to enlistment offices.
There’s better capacity for geolocating those who have been called-up, making it more difficult for them to evade mobilization by moving away from their registered address or to another part of the country.
Universities will also play a part, and many have already become platforms for persuading students to sign military contracts. They will be assembly points for young men required at the front.
Recruiting agencies are also increasingly being used to find men willing to sign military contracts, with spending on the latter increasing to an average of 802m rubles ($9m) per month in the first four months of 2026, compared to 358m rubles per month in 2025. If there is forced mobilization, the agencies will be used to bring wanted men to military recruitment offices.
The recruitment system already targets men across society who might be willing or pressured to sign contracts. They include prisoners, conscripts, reservists, foreign nationals, migrants, recent recipients of Russian citizenship, debtors, and people facing criminal or administrative legal proceedings.
But the contract recruitment system has reached its ceiling, both in terms of the monthly number of contracts signed and the quality of manpower signing up. There are also enormous differences in regional payments, with recruits in Penza region being paid 400,000 rubles, compared to 3.7m rubles in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous District.
The exhaustion of the previous model for replacing frontline losses, alongside the high degree of readiness for mass mobilization, make compulsory conscription a logical next step for the Kremlin once the elections are out of the way.
Which is why the Kremlin has sought to construct a comprehensive system of military socialization, encompassing preschool, school, and higher education. Its ultimate goal is to raise generations for whom war and mass mobilization are regarded as normal, even expected, aspects of life.
Russian society is capable of enduring continuing economic deterioration, declining purchasing power, internet restrictions, fuel shortages, drone attacks, and, most likely, disruptions to electricity and heating supplies.
But it does appear to have one red line, which is that participation in the war should not be compulsory. And, for all the Kremlin’s preparations, it does not know how its people will respond to themselves or their loved ones being forced to the frontline.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
