The threat from non-state actors in the crucial waterway, and the German government’s response, have raised important questions about the future of naval warfare.
In May, the German Navy sent its F125 frigate Baden-Wurttemburg, and the replenishment ship Frankfurt-am-Main, on a deployment around the world, which included sailing through the contested Taiwan Strait.
It was a firm statement by the government in Berlin on the importance of the Indo-Pacific region and the freedom to transit international waters. But the German navy followed it up by announcing that both ships would divert around the Cape of Good Hope on their way home, to avoid the threat of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
The change of route, announced at the end of October, came after several European navies, including the French, Italian, Greek, and British, had been deployed to the region to escort merchant shipping. They neutralized Houthi attacks with anti-ship ballistic missiles and unmanned drones.
The German decision sparked immediate anger in the international maritime community. James Rogers, director of research at the Council on Geostrategy, described the situation as “shameful,” while retired U.S. Navy Admiral James Stavridis labeled it “simply ridiculous.” In a post on X, Stavridis called for “a global coalition to destroy the Houthis’ capability to shut down shipping. Now.”
The attacks by the Houthis are the first time in decades that most European navies have been exposed to real combat, and in a way that, until a few years ago, many would not have thought possible. It is also the first time anti-ship ballistic missiles have been employed — and it is a non-state actor using them, against non-military targets.
The response, in the form of the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian (launched December 2023) and the EU’s Operation Aspides (launched February 2024), appears proportionate when the aim is to avoid an escalation of tensions in a region already inflamed by the conflict in Gaza and Iran’s attacks on Israel.
But when compared with past operations, such as 1991’s Operation Desert Storm, in which the US Navy was able to achieve overwhelming sea control around the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Red Sea crisis illustrates a marked deterioration of Western sea power.
The trend became evident during 2011’s Operation Unified Protector when the US was the only force capable of carrying out a Suppression and Destruction of Air Defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign against Libya. Some European navies withdrew the units they had deployed to the region.
More than three decades after the end of the Cold War, the commitment of allied nations to preserving stability through robust naval power and sea control appears to have partially vanished. The negative effects of falling investment, and a land-centric mentality, have eroded Western sea power, as shown in the disaster of the U.S. Navy floating pier in Gaza.
The adversary in the Red Sea does not have conventional armed forces, let alone something that resembles a navy, yet the threat posed by attacks like those of the Houthis is massive.
Maritime trade and the critical infrastructure of undersea cables and pipelines are the central economic pillars of a highly globalized society, and navies provide the best protection.
As Alessio Patalano, a professor of military history at King’s College London, has highlighted, “In a contested maritime century, we should start thinking about navies as the ultimate national security insurance policy.”
Yet navies require sustained investment to build and maintain their capabilities, investment that must be informed by a coherent maritime strategy that emphasizes the importance of the sea for economic prosperity.
There is no question that sea power is back as a driver of international security.
While it is a different kind of sea power, one in which the importance of coastlines and resilience against an array of conventional and non-conventional threats will dictate the success of navies, it is still sea power. And the ways and means to build and sustain it have not changed.
Gonzalo Vázquez is currently studying for an MA in War Studies at King’s College London. He is a junior analyst with the Center for Naval Thought at the Spanish Naval War College.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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