Attacks on shipping by Iranian-backed Houthis in the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, one of the most commercially important chokepoints in the world, have triggered the deployment of numerous warships to the region.
After weeks of deliberation, the European Union (EU) launched Operation Aspides under a Greek commanding officer on February 19. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called the decision a “step towards a stronger European presence at sea to protect our European interests.”
A flotilla of EU warships will seek to safeguard commercial vessels from missiles and drones, but will not attack the launch sites.
The two-month delay underscores a maritime security strategy primarily driven by the demands of crisis response. The handling of the crisis has showcased the EU’s struggles with sea power, which translate into an inability to deliver on its aspiration to be a guardian of the world’s oceans.
Several EU countries individually chose to send warships in December, and France’s frigate Languedoc has intercepted several attacks. Italy became a strong advocate for an EU mission to the Red Sea after sending a frigate to the region.
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Greece have also deployed vessels to the region. Spain, however, has been reluctant to deploy any of its Alvaro de Bazán-class of air defense frigates.
While US warships and aircraft have taken the lead in both defending merchant vessels and attacking Houthi missile batteries and supporting onshore units, aided by the UK, the EU has been dithering. The slowness of response suggests the bloc lacks the necessary political determination to articulate its sea power ambitions. This has been aggravated by a complex organizational system and weak command and control structures, which are not as centralized as they need to be.
The EU certainly has a lot at stake. It is badly affected by the Houthi attempts to sever the shipping lane. Many EU-based companies have suspended transit to avoid potential damage which has an effect on goods price inflation.
Operation Aspides will “complement the international efforts already ongoing to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea,” according to EU trade commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis.
Warships deployed to the region have to be equipped with arsenals of air-defense missiles to ensure their survivability against UAVs and anti-ship missiles, but this capability is not widespread among European navies and will take years to build up.
Additionally, warships that deplete their magazines will be forced to abandon the theater of operations as they are unable to reload at sea, meaning replacement vessels will need to be on standby for rapid deployment.
There is an imbalance between the expensive defenses used to intercept cheap drones and missiles launched from Yemen. Aster 15 missiles, carried by the French FREMM frigates, cost around $1.1m each, while the SM-2 and SM-6 missiles on US destroyers are about $2.1m and $4.3m respectively.
The costs are of course outweighed by the benefits of missile interceptions save merchant ships from damage, but even so, European navies — still rigged for peacetime — will struggle to maintain operations if the conflict becomes more intensive. That’s partly about missile inventories and partly about maintenance requirements and manpower shortages.
In spite of the strategic objectives described in its recently updated Maritime Security Strategy, the EU’s approach remains primarily reactive, and is undermined by an enduring set of organizational deficiencies and capability gaps resulting from decades of fiscal austerity and cutbacks.
So long as these core deficiencies remain unaddressed, Brussels will continue to drift and will be unable to deliver on its pledge to protect the freedom of the seas.
Gonzalo Vázquez is currently working as an Intern at the NATO Crisis Management & Disaster Response Center of Excellence in Bulgaria. He is a junior analyst with the Center for Naval Thought at the Spanish Naval War College and a regular contributor with the Center for Maritime Strategy in Arlington, VA.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
